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Preface
The 2003-2004 academic year will mark 
the 150th anniversary of engineering 
education at the University of 
Michigan. More precisely, the first 
classes in engineering met on January 
20, 1854, and the first degree in 
engineering was given to a Michigan 
student in 1856. Throughout the 
ensuing years, the UM College of 
Engineering has provided leadership 
for engineering education, research, 
and practice for the nation and the 
world while contributing greatly to the 
progress of the University of Michigan.
 When the College celebrated its first 
centennial in 1954, under the leadership 
of Dean George Granger Brown, a brief 
history of the College was developed 
along with a film and convocation 
to celebrate its achievements. Hence 
it seems appropriate to look to the 
150 year milestone as an opportunity 
to update this history by adding an 
analysis of the events of the past half-
century. Yet here we have an unusual 
challenge, since many of the records of 
the College were apparently lost during 
its move from the Central Campus to 
its current North Campus site. 
 Of course this should not be too 
surprising, since the neglect of 
history has been an all too frequent 
shortcoming of public universities. 
A visit to the campuses of one of our 
distinguished private universities, 
places such as Harvard, Yale, or 
Princeton, conveys an impression of 
history and tradition. The ancient ivy-
covered buildings; the statues, plaques, 
and monuments attesting to important 
people and events of the past—all 
suggest that these institutions have 
evolved slowly, over the centuries, 
in careful and methodical ways, to 
achieve their present forms.
 In contrast, a visit to the campus 
of one of our great state universities 
conveys more of a sense of dynamism 
and impermanence. Most of the 
buildings look new, even hastily 
constructed, in order to accommodate 
rapid growth. The icons of the public 
university tend to be their football 
stadiums or the smokestacks of their 
central power plants rather than their 
ivy-covered buildings or monuments. 
In talking with campus leaders at 
public universities, one gets little sense 
that the history of these institutions 
is valued or recognized. Perhaps this 
is due to their egalitarian nature, 
or conversely, to the political (and 
politicized) process that structures 
their governance and all too frequently 
informs their choice of leadership. 
The consequence is that the public 
university evolves through geological 
layers, each generation paving over 
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staff to build substantial collections 
of materials on this subject. Finally, 
from my earliest days as a scientist at 
the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 
I have been trained to keep careful 
records of all of my experiences, 
events, meetings, observations, and 
plans in bound notebooks. Hence even 
though much of the formal historical 
documentation of the recent history of 
the College may have been lost, I have 
accumulated several bookcases filled 
with carefully documented notebooks 
on the evolution of the College of 
Engineering from my own perspective 
as I progressed through my various 
roles, from new faculty member to my 
current position as University Professor 
of Science and Engineering.
 Our particular contribution to 
the history of the College will take 
two forms. First, Anne has created a 
pictorial narrative of the evolution 
of the College of Engineering on the 
Central and then the North Campus of 
the University, animated by a series of 
vignettes illustrating the remarkable 
people and events that shaped the life 
of the College. 
 Second, I have written a more 
personal narrative of the history of the 
College of Engineering as I have seen 
it, experienced it, and digested it from 
the multiple perspectives of a faculty 
member (from the trenches) to dean (at 
ground zero) to provost and president 
(as an angel on high) to my current 
appointment as a university-wide 
professor (as a ghost from the past). 
Here it is important to add the caveat 
that this narrative is not intended as 
or obliterating the artifacts and 
achievements of earlier students and 
faculty with a new layer of structures, 
programs, and practices.
 Yet the history of public higher 
education in America is just as rich and 
significant as that of our elite private 
colleges and universities. One might 
even suggest that the complex and 
frequently ignored history of the public 
university, tightly coupled as it is to 
the changing needs of our society, may 
be more relevant to understanding the 
future of higher education in America 
than the gradual, evolutionary changes 
experienced by private institutions. 
Such is certainly the case with the UM 
College of Engineering, long regarded 
as one of the world’s leading colleges 
of engineering education and research, 
and yet all too often unaware of its own 
remarkable history.
 In considering what contribution we 
might make to the sesquicentennial 
celebration of the College, my wife 
Anne and I decided that an effort to 
fill in this historical record might be 
both appropriate and valued. After 
all, we have not only served (together) 
in my roles as Dean of Engineering 
(1981-1986), Provost and Vice President 
for Academic Affairs (1986-1988), and 
President of the University (1988-
1996), but our tenure as a member of 
the faculty and leader of the broader 
campus community spans the majority 
of the past 50 years (1968 to present). 
Furthermore, we have long shared 
an interest in the evolution of the 
University campus and have worked 
with both library and administrative 
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a rigorous history of the College in 
modern times, but rather a fusion of 
personal memoirs, observation, and 
conjecture. Furthermore, I should 
confess that I have succumbed to the 
temptation of all former academic 
leaders by not only analyzing the 
past but also attempting to address 
the future, speculating a bit about the 
future of engineering education, and 
being so bold as to offer some advice to 
both the College of Engineering and the 
University of Michigan concerning how 
to sustain Michigan’s 150 year tradition 
of leadership in engineering education.
 There is yet another purpose to 
this effort: that of providing through 
personal example an introduction 
to the archaic academic profession 
of deaning. Among the menagerie of 
academic leadership positions, the 
role of dean is both one of the most 
important and most challenging, 
particularly in large, complex, and 
highly decentralized universities 
such as the University of Michigan. 
Although university presidents and 
provosts can influence the quality of 
the institution-wide environment for 
teaching and research, it is usually the 
dean who most directly impacts the 
quality and reputation of an academic 
school or college. Deans are responsible 
not only for recruiting, developing, and 
evaluating the faculties of their schools, 
but beyond that, they must attract the 
resources and build the environments 
necessary for quality teaching and 
research.  
 In sharp contrast to the challenge of 
leading the diverse array of disciplines 
characterizing the contemporary 
multiversity, the disciplinary span of 
most schools is sufficiently narrow 
to allow deans to exert intellectual 
leadership as well. Furthermore, the 
size of the faculty is usually sufficiently 
small (several hundred, at most) to 
enable the development of personal 
relationships in contrast to university-
wide appointments that can involve 
responsibility for thousands of faculty 
members, students, and staff. Hence, 
in contrast to a university president 
whose role is more akin to that of the 
mayor of a large city, a dean plays a 
more pastoral role as the head of a 
family (albeit a large and occasionally 
cantankerous one).
 My own experience as dean of 
Michigan’s College of Engineering 
was rather short-lived, since I had the 
privilege of serving for only five years 
before being drafted into the roles 
of university provost and president. 
However, my longer tenure as a faculty 
member in the College (now in my 
fourth decade) and my experience 
in recruiting, serving with, and 
leading deans from other disciplines 
provides a 360-degree perspective of 
this important university role. I hope 
these experiences will be of interest 
and possibly even of use to others 
considering assignments (or even 
careers) in academic administration.
      
Ann Arbor, Michigan   
Spring, 2003
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Chapter 1
The First Century:  1850 to 1950
Good, Gray Michigan
In March of 1968 I visited the 
University of Michigan for the first 
time to be interviewed for the position 
of assistant professor of nuclear 
engineering. Actually, at the time I was 
more interested in staying in California, 
in a faculty position at either Caltech 
or UC-Berkeley. But my Caltech faculty 
advisor asked me to interview at 
Michigan as a personal favor, since he 
had promised his colleagues on the 
Michigan faculty that he would send 
along one of his recent Ph.D. graduates 
as a potential faculty candidate.
 As I was to learn later, March is 
far from an ideal time to attempt to 
recruit faculty members to Michigan. 
The weather is usually terrible—cold, 
overcast, and wet. The streets and 
lawns have yet to recover from the 
beating they take from winter storms. 
It is a time that gives rise to one of 
the University’s less desirable names, 
“Good, Gray Michigan.”
 Yet on my visit, I found a very 
vibrant Department of Nuclear 
Engineering, generally ranked along 
with MIT as the leading program 
in the nation, with lots of energetic 
young faculty, and even more 
energetic and enthusiastic graduate 
students. As I was to learn later, the 
Department had scored a coup in 
graduate student recruiting that year, 
since one of its faculty members had 
served on the selection committee 
for the Atomic Energy Commission 
graduate fellowships and managed to 
obtain an advance list of all the award 
winners. The Department took the 
bold step of calling every winner on 
the list and inviting them to visit the 
University, wining and dining them, 
and eventually landing over two dozen 
AEC Fellows. A faculty position in 
my area, neutron transport theory, 
had become available when one of the 
Department’s most prominent faculty 
members had left in a huff for another 
university after his colleagues had 
called his annual bluff of threatening 
to quit if he didn’t get his way. Hence, 
it was clear that if I came to Michigan, 
I would have my pick of the very best 
graduate students in the nation.
 The facilities of the Department 
were also impressive, all located on 
the North Campus of the University, 
and clustered about the Phoenix 
Laboratory and its nuclear reactor, 
which provided superb experimental 
facilities. During my brief visit that 
spring I saw only the evergreen 
expanse of the North Campus, the high 
quality faculty, students, and facilities 
of the Department, and the home of 
the department chairman, before being 
hustled to the airport for my flight back 
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The College of Engineering, circa 2001
to California. The Michigan faculty 
members assured me that the rest of 
the College of Engineering would join 
the Department of Nuclear Engineering 
on the North Campus in a few years, 
and if I decided to come to Michigan, 
I should definitely plan on finding a 
house in north Ann Arbor.
 It would be many years later, long 
after I (rather, Anne) had accepted 
the offer of a faculty position at 
Michigan, toiled in the vineyards of 
teaching and research, and become 
involved in faculty service activities 
with the College of Engineering, 
that I became aware of just how 
atypical was my experience in nuclear 
engineering. During these latter 
years, my increasingly frequent visits 
to the Central Campus to serve on 
various faculty committees of the 
College of Engineering revealed the 
deplorable state of affairs faced by its 
other departments and programs. As 
I trudged up the stairs to meetings 
in West Engineering and East 
Engineering, I could see the ruts worn 
deep into the stone steps of these 
ancient buildings by generations of 
students and faculty. The classrooms 
were dark and musty, with broken 
blinds, cracked blackboards, and a 
total absence of amenities such as 
chalk (a terribly important tool for 
a theoretician such as myself). The 
laboratories, such as they were, looked 
old, dilapidated, and makeshift. The 
faculty looked even more ancient, 
dispirited, and apathetic. They had 
been promised time and time again 
by engineering deans and university 
presidents that their move into new 
facilities on the North Campus was just 
around the corner, only to find each 
time that the University simply had 
higher priorities for facilities, funding, 
and attention.
 Looking at the North Campus 
complex of the College of Engineering 
today, it is hard to imagine that 
these times ever existed. Stunning 
new buildings such as the Electrical 
Engineering and Computer Science 
Laboratory, the François-Xavier 
Bagnoud Building, the Lurie 
Engineering Center and Carillon Tower, 
and the Media Union not only make 
important architectural statements, but 
they provide truly outstanding facilities 
for teaching and research. Even the 
older buildings of the College have 
been completely renovated (including 
the Institute of Science and Technology 
complex, finally assigned to the College 
in the 1990s). Together with state-
of-the-art laboratories, a world-class 
computer system (the Computer Aided 
Engineering Network), and a library of 
the 21st Century in the Media Union, 
the College of Engineering today 
enjoys one of the finest environments 
for engineering education and research 
in the world.
 Moreover, the College enjoys a level 
of financial support unprecedented 
in its history, provided through a 
combination of strong support from 
the University, research grants and 
contracts, and private giving. The 
quality of the faculty, students, and 
programs of the College reflects 
these investments, and the College is 
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in “civil engineering and drawing.”2 
However, the state legislature 
provided little funding for the early 
University, and instruction in science 
and engineering lay dormant until 
the arrival of Henry Philip Tappan as 
its president in 1852. Tappan was a 
well-known philosopher, committed 
to building scholarly activity in the 
University and providing for instruction 
in both science and technology.  In 
his inaugural address he proposed 
“a scientific course parallel to the 
classical course containing...civil 
engineering, astronomy with the use 
of an observatory, and the application 
of chemistry and other sciences to 
agriculture and the industrial arts 
generally.”
   Upon the recommendation of a faculty 
member, Erastus O. Haven (later to 
become Tappan’s successor as president 
of the University), the regents appointed 
Alexander Winchell as professor 
of physics and civil engineering. 
However, when Winchell arrived in 
January, 1854 to begin teaching, it soon 
became apparent that he was a misfit. 
His own training had been classical, 
and his first “engineering course” at 
Michigan was, in reality, simply an 
introduction to English composition 
for engineering students. Furthermore, 
he had an abrasive personality and 
was soon involved in disputes both 
with the chair of Natural Sciences, 
Silas Douglas, and with Tappan.3 
After a year, Tappan concluded that 
Haven had led him astray and that 
Winchell was not qualified to teach 
civil engineering. Although several 
THE EARLY YEARS
generally ranked today among the top 
five engineering schools in the nation. 
 This remarkable transformation is 
really the focus of this book:  how it 
happened; the people, the events, the 
sacrifices and the commitments that 
made it possible. But to tell this story, 
and particularly, to set the stage for the 
renaissance of the College in the 1980s, 
it is necessary to travel back in time 
to the last century, during the earliest 
years of the University and its College 
of Engineering.
 For almost a century and a half, 
the College of Engineering at the 
University of Michigan has provided 
leadership in engineering education for 
the nation and the world through the 
quality and innovation of its programs; 
the teaching, research, and service 
of its faculty;  and the remarkable 
achievements of its graduates. 
Excellence and leadership in higher 
education over the decades can be 
traced to many factors: to outstanding 
faculty and students, to strong support 
and leadership, and, in the College’s 
case, to its presence within a great 
university. 
 The history of the College is a 
story of people and events, programs 
and places, and commitment and 
achievement. Although the focus of 
this book is on the more recent past, a 
time of personal experience, it is useful 
to provide a broader perspective by 
first summarizing the early history of 
engineering education at Michigan.
The Early Years
The College of Engineering at the 
University of Michigan usually 
identifies its formation in January, 1854, 
when the first classes in engineering 
were taught. However, to understand 
better the history of the College and 
the important role it has played for the 
nation and its university, it is useful 
to step back for a moment to consider 
both the evolution of engineering 
education in the United States as well 
as the evolution of the University of 
Michigan.
 The story of the evolution of 
engineering, from a military craft 
associated with the technology of war 
to broader civilian applications such 
as bridge construction, industrial 
technology, and transportation, can 
be found many places and need not 
be repeated here.1  Suffice it to note 
that the United States lagged behind 
Europe in the introduction of science 
and technology into the curriculum 
of its colleges and universities. The 
first American school to offer scientific 
instruction in engineering was 
West Point in 1802, followed by the 
Rensselear Polytechnic Institute (1824), 
Annapolis (1845), Harvard (1847) (later 
spun off as MIT), Dartmouth (1851), 
and Yale (1852), with Michigan’s first 
courses in 1854. 
 Actually, engineering education 
might be dated even earlier at 
Michigan, since the legislative charter 
for the University of Michigan adopted 
in 1837 provided for a professorship 
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University of Michigan (1850) (painting by Cropsey)
Alexander Winchell
of the Regents wanted to fire him, 
Tappan finally found a position for 
Winchell in Natural History (zoology, 
geology, and botany). Winchell 
continued to be a thorn in Tappan’s 
side, and he eventually played a 
role in conspiring with Haven and 
the Regents to undermine Tappan’s 
presidency.4  Winchell was succeeded 
first by William Peck, a lieutenant 
in the Topographical Engineers, and 
then in 1857 by DeVolson Wood, 
who is regarded by many as the true 
founder of engineering education at 
Michigan. Wood proposed, designed, 
and essentially taught single-
handedly a four-year curriculum in 
civil engineering offered through a 
department of engineering that was 
established in 1858 within the Literary 
College. Following Wood’s departure 
in 1872, the Department of Engineering 
was led by three faculty members who 
would guide its destiny for over three 
decades: Charles Greene, Joseph Davis, 
and Charles Denison. Greene was a 
professor of civil engineering, educated 
at Harvard and MIT, who would 
become the first dean of the College of 
Engineering in 1895. Davis was also a 
leading civil engineer who established 
the University camp in surveying, 
named Camp Davis in his honor, and 
located first in northern Michigan and 
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later moved to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 
where it continues to exist today as the 
University’s geology camp.
 Denison was an instructor in 
engineering drawing and taught for 
over forty years at the University, 
becoming one of the engineering 
faculty members most revered by 
the students. A lifelong bachelor, his 
fashionable clothing earned him the 
THE EARLY YEARS
A Surveying Class  - 1863
Camp Davis surveying camp 
(Pellston, Michigan)
nickname,  “Little Lord Chesterfield.”5
 Engineering classes were first taught 
in several rooms of the South College 
building previously used as student 
dormitories. Growth in the program 
finally persuaded then acting president 
Henry Frieze to recommend to the 
Regents that $2,555 be used for a 
modest engineering building to house 
laboratory facilities for mechanical 
engineering—or more accurately, a 
machine shop. A new faculty member, 
Mortimer Cooley,6 was put in change 
of the project, and the first engineering 
building was completed in 1882.
 Within a few years, additional 
laboratory space was necessary, and in 
1885 a permanent brick Engineering 
Shop was built on the east side of 
the little building.7  This was quickly 
enlarged in 1886, requiring the removal 
of Cooley’s “scientific blacksmith shop.” 
It should be noted that most instruction 
in the few science and engineering 
programs taught in American 
universities occurred primarily through 
lectures, supplemented only rarely by 
experiments performed entirely by the 
instructor. Michigan became the first 
university in the United States to offer 
real laboratory facilities and to require 
laboratory courses for its students. In 
fact, when the Chemical Laboratory 
was opened in 1856, it was the only 
such instructional facility in the nation.
 Key in the rapid growth of 
engineering education at Michigan 
during the last decades of the 19th 
Century was the interest and support of 
James Burrill Angell, who assumed the 
Plaques in the Engineering Archway honoring 
Wood and Denison
The first engineering shop
(Cooley’s “scientific blacksmith shop”) – 1882
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Land-Grant Act because of its provision 
of federal lands to the states for the 
establishment of public universities, 
called for the encouragement of 
instructional programs in “agriculture 
and the mechanic arts.” By 1880, there 
were 85 engineering schools in the 
United States, and by 1918 this number 
had grown to 126, 46 of which were in 
land grant colleges.9
Michigan presidency in 1871. Angell 
had once worked as a civil engineer 
in Boston and had even been offered 
a chair in civil engineering at Brown 
University, before becoming a professor 
of modern languages and literature. 
President Angell was keenly interested 
in the growth and development of the 
professional departments, recognizing 
their worth to the state and to society 
and providing them all the assistance 
within his power. 
 It was during Angell’s tenure that 
the Department of Engineering was 
set off from the Literary College in 
1895. More specifically, in 1895 the 
Regents resolved “that a school of 
Technology be organized, comprising 
the departments of Civil Engineering, 
Mechanical Engineering, and Electrical 
Engineering, and that Professor Charles 
E. Greene be appointed Dean.”8 The 
new College of Engineering and 
Architecture continued to grow during 
Angell’s tenure, adding departments 
of chemical engineering, naval 
architecture and marine engineering, 
and architectural engineering.
The Engineering Shops (1886)
The Engineering Building built on the old 
Dental School – 1891
 Ironically, both Greene and 
Cooley were reluctant to separate 
the Department of Engineering 
from LS&A, since they believed that 
an engineer’s education should be 
as broad as possible and that in a 
professional unit the tendency would 
be to narrow it. This was an issue 
that would return from time to time 
throughout the history of engineering 
at Michigan, including my own tenure 
as dean.
 Despite Angell’s strong support, 
it is also the case that engineering 
at Michigan frequently had to 
struggle with facilities inadequate to 
accommodate either its enrollment 
or the rapidly evolving nature of 
technology. Like the Literary College, 
it frequently had to make do with cast-
off buildings such as that vacated by 
the Dental College (one of the original 
professors’ houses on the campus) in 
1891, the old powerplant (including 
its coalbunker) in 1897 to house 
highway and automotive engineering, 
segments of the old University Hospital 
Pavilion for the surveying department 
and even a discarded elementary 
school (the Tappan School adjacent 
to East Engineering) in 1923.  Yet this 
pragmatic willingness to accept and 
utilize second-hand space could also 
be an asset, as the eventual move 
of the College of Engineering to the 
University’s North Campus was to 
demonstrate in the 1980s.
 The late 19th century was a 
particularly active time for engineering 
education across the nation. The Morrill 
Act of 1863, sometimes known as the 




The key player in the rapid progress of 
the College of Engineering during the 
early decades of the 20th Century was 
Mortimer Cooley, named as Greene’s 
successor as dean in 1903.   
    During Cooley’s tenure at Michigan 
both as faculty member and then 
dean, enrollments in the College grew 
from less than 30 to more than 1,800; 
the faculty grew from two instructors 
teaching several courses to more than 
160 professors and staff teaching 
hundreds of courses, and from a 
temporary shop of 1,720 square feet 
to over 500,000 square feet of well 
equipped buildings.
 Cooley was an academic leader of 
remarkable energy and vision. During 
his 24 years as dean, the College grew 
considerably in strength and reputation 
and its campus presence assumed the 
form that would characterize it until 
its move to the North Campus in the 
1980s. The West Engineering Building 
was completed in 1904.
and Aeronautical Engineering. This 
building was later expanded to 
accommodate the rapidly growing 
Department of Electrical Engineering.
   Cooley’s remarkable energy 
extended far beyond the University 
campus. Since he served as mayor 
of Ann Arbor and in 1924 was the 
Democratic candidate for the United 
States Senate, he was a well-known 
presence throughout the community 
and the state. Cooley also had strong 
views about the nature of engineering 
education. It was noted earlier that he 
had initially opposed the separation of 
engineering from the Literary College, 
believing in the importance of a well-
rounded education. He also believed 
that engineering should become a 
 This building would also be added 
to many times, first to accommodate 
the naval towing tank in 1910 and then 
later to accommodate various other 
programs.
 Throughout most of the history of 
the University, the arch through West 
Engineering (named after Denison but 
commonly called “the Engineering 
Arch”) would become the symbol of 
the College of Engineering.
 Under Cooley, the College continued 
to expand with the construction of 
East Engineering in 1923, built to 
accommodate the departments of 
Chemical Engineering, Metallurgy, 
A NEW CENTURY
Dean Mortimer Cooley
West Engineering and the Engineering Arch 
(1904)
Schematic of West Engineering 
East Engineering (1923)
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 The teaching, research, and service 
activities of the College were conducted 
through a growing constellation of 
academic departments and programs, 
each with a distinguished and in many 
cases fascinating history. Fortunately, 
most of these departments have 
chronicled their own history, available 
through both written reports and 
websites, so it is not necessary to 
go into great detail here. But a few 
comments are necessary. 
 It has already been noted that 
Civil Engineering and Mechanical 
Engineering played essentially the role 
of founders of the College, contributing 
the first two deans (Greene and Cooley) 
and enrolling its early students. They 
were joined by Electrical Engineering 
in 1888 and Chemical Engineering in 
1889. Although the University had 
introduced a chemistry curriculum 
in LS&A in 1884, it was discontinued 
in 1896, and from then until 1916 
when the chemistry degree was 
reinstated, all chemistry activity 
was in the Department of Chemical 
Engineering. In fact, throughout 
six-year curriculum, with the first two 
years devoted to cultural subjects, and 
the later years focused on professional 
education similar to Medicine or Law. 
(Perhaps it is not surprising that my 
own views of engineering education 
are very similar to those of Cooley!) 
 After finally stepping down as dean 
at the age of 73, Cooley was succeeded 
by the chairman of naval architecture, 
Charles Sadler, who served for the 
next decade. After the two-year tenure 
of Henry Anderson (of whom Cooley 
observed that “his health was such that 
he never should have taken the heavy 
responsibilities which he shouldered 
for so brief a time, and which without 
doubt greatly hastened his death”), 
the University recruited its first dean10 
from outside, Ivan Crawford, who 
had served in similar roles at the 
Universities of Idaho and Kansas. 
 Although the College enrollments 
continued to expand during the 
decades of Sadler, Anderson, and 
Crawford, there was relatively little 
new activity in either programmatic 
development or building. To some 
degree this is not surprising, since the 
Great Depression and World War II had 
a major impact on both the University 
and engineering education more 
generally. But it is also the case that 
Mortimer Cooley was simply a hard 
act to follow, and it was unlikely that 
the extraordinary growth of the College 
during his tenure would soon repeat 
itself.
most of the University’s history, the 
enrollment in chemical engineering 
generally outnumbered that in 
chemistry. Ironic indeed, therefore, 
that when both programs were finally 
provided with new facilities in the 
1980s, Chemical Engineering shared 
space with Materials and Metallurgical 
Engineering in a modest $12 million 
building on the North Campus while 
Chemistry received a new chemical 
sciences complex that was several times 
larger and worth $50 million. (This 
provides yet another demonstration 
that the closer the proximity of an 
academic unit to the president’s office, 
the more generously it is supported...)
 Electrical Engineering grew rapidly 
with the electrification of the nation 
and soon outgrew its space in the 
Physics Laboratory and later West 
Engineering. It also moved rapidly 
into newly emerging areas such as 
telecommunications. In fact, the first 
campus radio station was operated 
by Electrical Engineering (and, at one 
point, had future MIT president Jerome 
Weisner as its engineer and future 
CBS news reporter Mike Wallace as 
its on-air talent!).11  In 1947, a major 
wing was added to East Engineering to 
accommodate the department. Yet with 
the growth of the electronics industry 
and then computers, this department 
was to continue its growth to the 
point where today it comprises over 
30% of the enrollment of the College 
and spills out beyond the massive 
Electrical Engineering and Computer 
Science Building into several adjacent 
laboratories on the North Campus.
The College of Engineering’s Central Campus 
buildings (1940)
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nation in nuclear engineering (1957), 
computer engineering (1959), and 
integrated manufacturing (1986).
 The College also had a number of 
more specialized programs reflecting 
both the nature of engineering 
education and the needs and 
opportunities of the moment. For 
example, since mechanical drawing 
played such a major role in engineering 
practice, the College had a separate 
Department of Engineering Drawing, 
complete with blueprinting equipment 
and numerous drawing rooms in West 
Engineering. With the introduction of 
computer aided design, the department 
was gradually phased out in the 1970s.
 During the years of WWI, the College 
formed a Department of Military 
Science and Tactics. It also mobilized its 
resources in support of officer training 
during WWII. Since that time it has 
played a major role in supporting 
ROTC efforts on campus.
 Finally, during the 1920s, the 
College organized a Department 
of Engineering Research under 
the leadership of Albert E. White, 
a faculty member in metallurgical 
engineering. This activity evolved 
into a major research organization, 
the Engineering Research Institute, 
conducting research for both industry 
and the federal government in the 
years after WWII. However, eventually 
the increasing bureaucracy associated 
with federally sponsored research 
stimulated the University to launch its 
own Division of Research Development 
and Administration, reporting to the 
vice president for research, that took 
over all responsibilities for research 
administration campus-wide in the 
1950s.
 
The Significance of 
the College
To Engineering Education
The University of Michigan’s College 
of Engineering has long provided 
leadership for engineering education. 
It was not only among the first 
engineering programs in the United 
States, but throughout its century and 
a half of existence, has also been one 
of the largest (currently second in size 
only to Purdue’s), most comprehensive, 
and most innovative. The lists of 
“firsts” is much too long to document 
here, but several examples illustrate.
 As we have noted, the College was 
a leader in the introduction of new 
engineering programs, including the 
earliest programs in naval architecture 
A NEW CENTURY
 Although Dean Cooley first arrived 
at Michigan as professor of “iron 
shipbuilding,” the Department of 
Naval Architecture and Marine 
Engineering was not formed until 
1901. Cooley did have the foresight to 
provide for a 300-foot-long tank in the 
basement of the new West Engineering 
building where ship models could be 
towed and studied. The importance of 
shipping in the Great Lakes stimulated 
the rapid growth and prominence of 
the department.
 Michigan launched the first program 
in aeronautical engineering in the 
nation in 1911, created by a European 
engineer, Felix Pawlowski. Although 
the courses were first taught in naval 
architecture, a separate department 
was formed in 1930. Throughout its 
history, the Department of Aeronautical 
Engineering (and later Aerospace 
Engineering) has ranked among the 
top programs in the nation, graduating 
leaders of the aerospace industry 
such as Kelly Johnson (founder of the 
Lockheed Skunkworks and perhaps 
the most famous designer in American 
aviation), Willis Hawkins and Robert 
Fuhrman (both CEOs of Lockheed), 
and George Skurla (CEO of Grumman). 
 A program in industrial engineering 
was first introduced in 1926, and 
later, following the introduction 
of operations research methods in 
World War II, expanded to become 
the Department of Industrial and 
Operations Engineering. The College 
continued to be an innovator 
throughout the 20th Century, 
introducing the first programs in the 
Michigan training soldiers for World War I
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For example, Felix Pawloski offered 
the world’s first course in aeronautical 
engineering in 1916. Stephan 
Timoshenko essentially created the 
mathematical discipline of applied 
mechanics in the 1930s by applying 
rigorous mathematical methods to 
engineering mechanics. William 
Dow was a leader in electronics and 
an early pioneer in plasma devices. 
Homer Martin invented fluid catalytic 
cracking, an indispensable step in 
providing the aviation fuel essential 
to Allied victory in WWII. Claude 
Shannon developed the science 
of information theory, laying the 
foundation for digital communication. 
Donald Katz invented the methods 
used today for storing natural gas in 
underground storage fields. Ed Lesher 
built and piloted planes that held the 
world’s distance records.
 Chihiro Kikuchi invented the ruby 
maser, laying the foundation for 
today’s laser technology. Emmett Leith 
and Juris Upatnieks adapted radar 
technology to develop the first working 
holograms.
   And, of course, no history of the 
College would be complete without 
mentioning the contributions of 
Professor A. D. Moore, one of the 
pioneers of electrostatics, who served 
as a faculty member for almost half-a-
century (continuing into his 90s to ride 
his bike to his laboratory in the early 
morning hours).
(1881), electrical engineering 
(1890), chemical engineering (1898), 
aeronautical engineering (1914), nuclear 
engineering (1953), and computer 
engineering (1965). The College has 
also pioneered the development 
of unique facilities for engineering 
education and research, such as the first 
naval architecture towing tank (1904), 
the Willow Run Research Laboratories 
(1946) (later the Environmental 
Research Institute of Michigan), the 
Phoenix Laboratory and Ford Nuclear 
Reactor (1951), the Michigan Terminal 
System (MTS) time-sharing system 
(1963), the College’s Instructional 
Television System and Chrysler Center 
for Continuing Engineering Education, 
and the Computer Aided Engineering 
Network (1983).
 The contributions of faculty 
members to engineering education 
and research have been considerable. 
The College has long been known 
as the source of many of the major 
textbooks used for engineering 
education with prominent authors 
such as Stephan Timoshenko (applied 
mechanics), George Granger Brown 
(unit operations), Richard Sonntag and 
Gordon Van Wylen (thermodynamics), 
Joseph Shigley (design), Arnold Kuethe 
(aerodynamics), Lawrence Van Vlack 
(materials), Brice Carnihan and James 
Wilkes (computers), Vic Streeter (fluid 
dynamics), and Glenn Knoll (nuclear 
instrumentation), to mention only a 
few.
 Faculty members and graduates of 
the College have also made important 
contributions through their research. 
Professor Edward Lesher and his experimental 
aircraft
Professor Emmett Leigh and his holography 
apparatus
 
      A.D. Moore
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To the Nation, the State, and 
the Community
Faculty members of the College also 
have made important contributions 
to their nation, the State of Michigan, 
and the City of Ann Arbor. Federal 
agencies, commissions, and advisory 
bodies such as the National Science 
Board, the Space Sciences Board, 
and the National Science Foundation 
have benefited from the many faculty 
members who have served in various 
roles.
 Two members of the faculty have 
actually served as mayor of Ann Arbor: 
Mortimer Cooley and A. D. Moore. 
Many others have served as city council 
members, county commissioners, and 
school board members.
To the University
The College of Engineering has 
played a particularly important role 
in the history of the University. From 
its earliest days as the third degree 
program offered by the University 
(after LS&A and Medicine), it has 
enrolled roughly one-quarter of the 
University’s students. It has also 
had a major impact on the evolution 
of the academic programs of the 
University. For example, both the 
programs in architecture and art 
first were developed within the 
College (1906) and did not become 
independent schools until 1931 and 
1972, respectively. Similarly the 
College of Engineering played a major 
role in the development of programs 
in mathematics, finally merging its 
mathematics curriculum with that of 
LS&A in 1928. The University’s modern 
languages programs also trace their 
beginning to instruction in the College 
in German and French, later joining 
with the LS&A counterparts in 1929. 
Public health can be traced to early 
instruction offered by Engineering and 
Medicine in public health engineering 
and later a program leading to the 
degree of doctor of public health in 
1911. The College even participated 
directly with the School of Forestry 
and Conservation in developing joint 
programs in wood technology.
 The College of Engineering provided 
leadership for the University in many 
other ways. It was the first academic 
unit to establish a mentor system for 
first year students. Furthermore, it 
adopted an honor code system, based 
on the principle that “it is dishonorable 
for any student to receive credit for 
work which is not the result of his or 
her own effort.” This system derived 
its authority directly from the students, 
who both investigated possible 
violations and prescribed sanctions. It 
continues to operate today as a model 
for student responsibility and integrity.
 The engineering faculty also served 
the University in many other ways. 
During the early years, they operated 
and maintained the University power 
plant (as well as the water treatment 
facilities of the City of Ann Arbor). For 
most of the history of the University, 
engineering faculty members have 
served as the marshals for University 
commencement exercises, beginning 
with Dean Cooley himself. 
 And while engineering faculty 
members were never tapped for 
executive positions in the University 
(at least until I was selected as provost 
and then later elected as president 
of the University), they did serve in 
key positions of faculty governance 
such as the chair of the faculty Senate 
Assembly (Brymer Williams, Arch 
Naylor, and Harris McClamroch) and 
the Board in Control of Intercollegiate 
Athletics (George Springer, Dale 
Grimes, and Bruce Karnopp).
Dean Mortimer Cooley as Commencement 
Marshall
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The Deans of the College of Engineering
1895-1903    Charles Ezra Greene
1903-1928    Mortimer Elwin Cooley
1927-1928    George Washington Patterson, Acting Dean
1928-1937    Herbert Charles Sadler
1937-1939    Henry Clay Anderson
1940-1951    Ivan Charles Crawford
1951-1957    George Granger Brown
1957-1965    Stephen S. Attwood
1965-1972    Gordon Van Wylen
1972-1980    David V. Ragone
1980-1981    Hansford W. Farris, Acting Dean
1981-1986    James J. Duderstadt
1986-1989    Charles M. Vest
1989-1990    Daniel E. Atkins, III, Interim Dean
1990-1995    Peter M. Banks
1995-1996    Glen Knoll, Interim Dean
1996 -           Stephen W. Director
Charles Greene was a civil engineer 
and a member of the faculty for 31 
years. He became the first dean of the 
Department of Engineering in 1895. 
During his tenure the College added 
the departments of marine engineering 
and naval architecture and chemical 
engineering and the construction of the 
West Engineering was begun.
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Henry Clay Anderson (Dean, 1937-39)
Mortimer Cooley was a member of 
the faculty for 47 years, a mechanical 
engineer trained at Annapolis. Under 
his leadership East Engineering 
was built, East Hall was acquired, 
the departments of Aeronautical 
Engineering and Engineering Research 
were started, and the Mentor System 
and the Honor Code were instituted. 
The policy of selecting outstanding 
professional engineers for department 
heads was adopted. Cooley worked 
closely with Presidents Angell, 
Hutchins, and Burton to build the 
College during a time of dramatic 
enrollment growth and laid the 
foundation for the success of the 
College during the early half of the 
20th Century.
Charles Sadler was a naval architect 
and member of the faculty for 37 years, 
playing a major role in the design and 
construction of the towing tank. He 
was dean during the Great Depression. 
Despite continued enrollment growth 
during this period, the College budget 
declined and further development of its 
campus stalled.
Henry Anderson was a mechanical 
engineer who served the University for 
38 years. He served as dean for only 
two years before stepping down for 
health reasons.
Mortimer Cooley (Dean, 1903-1928) Charles Sadler (Dean, 1928-1937)
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Ivan Crawford was the first dean of the 
College from outside, a civil engineer 
and former dean at the Universities of 
Idaho (14 years) and Kansas (3 years). He 
led the College during the war years 
and then during the early stages of 
growth as returning veterans enrolled 
through the GI Bill.
Stephen Attwood became dean of the 
College in 1957, after obtaining his B.S. 
and M.S. from Michigan in 1918, then 
serving on the faculty and chairing the 
Department of Electrical Engineering 
for five years. This was a time of 
status quo for the College, largely 
solidifying the accomplishments in 
research, graduate education, and 
facilities launched under G. G. Brown. 
Attwood’s age and ill health limited his 
tenure as dean.
Ivan Crawford (Dean, 1940-1951)
George Granger Brown served on the 
Michigan faculty for over 37 years, 
as a leader in chemical engineering 
education and research (developing 
the key textbook for Unit Operations), 
then as chairman of the Department 
of Chemical and Metallurgical 
Engineering. As dean, he developed 
the early plans for the engineering 
laboratories on the North Campus 
and was key in building industrial 
support of the College. He also was 
instrumental in developing new 
programs such as science engineering 
and nuclear engineering. Although his 
tenure as dean was relatively short, he 
must be regarded as one of the most 
significant leaders of the College.
George Granger Brown (Dean, 1951-1957) Stephen Attwood (Dean, 1957-1965)
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Gordon Van Wylen served as faculty 
member and later chair of the 
Department of Mechanical Engineering, 
earning widespread recognition for 
his work in thermodynamics and 
authoring a widely used textbook 
on this subject. As dean, he led the 
College during a transition period 
from the high point of the space race 
to the days of student protests and 
hostility toward technology. Despite his 
concerted efforts, the College was able 
to make only modest progress toward 
completing its move to the North 
Campus. Van Wylen also presided over 
a shift in College priorities away from 
graduate education and research to 
undergraduate instruction. He stepped 
down in 1972 to become president of 
Hope College.
A former MIT graduate and faculty 
member, David Ragone came to the 
College as its dean after a brief, two-
year period as dean of engineering 
at Dartmouth. He was given the 
assignment of leading a major private 
fund-raising campaign to complete 
the move of the College to the North 
Campus. Unfortunately, the campaign 
was only a modest success, raising 
only $8 million for facilities, an amount 
inadequate to trigger the North 
Campus move. During the decade, 
the University support of the College 
declined precipitously (the College lost 
30% of its support, equivalent to the 
loss of roughly 70 faculty members). 
This led to a crisis situation by the 
time Ragone left to become president 
of Case Western Reserve University in 
1980. 
Since much of this book concerns my 
period as dean, I’ll only mention here 
that like Greene, Cooley, Sadler, and 
Brown, I had been a long-time faculty 
member of the College (although I 
assumed the deanship at the age of 
37). Several of the milestones during 
my tenure as dean include moving 
the College to the North Campus, 
tripling its base budget, hiring 120 new 
faculty, and boosting the rankings of its 
academic programs.
Gordon Van Wylen (Dean, 1965-1972) David Ragone (Dean, 1972-1980) James Johnson Duderstadt (Dean, 1981-1986)
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Charles Vest was also a long-standing 
faculty member in mechanical 
engineering, serving first as associate 
dean and then as dean of the College. 
During his brief tenure before being 
appointed as the University’s provost, 
he completed the North Campus 
move and recruited some of the 
College’s leading faculty members. In 
1990, he was named president of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
where he has served with great success 
for over a decade.
Peter Banks came to Michigan from 
Stanford, where he had been a faculty 
member in electrical engineering and 
a national leader in remote sensing. 
He was instrumental in several major 
efforts of the College, including the 
completion of the Lurie Engineering 
Center and Lurie Tower. He left the 
College to become the president of the 
Environmental Research Institute of 
Michigan.
Steven Director came to the College 
from a position as dean of engineering 
at Carnegie Mellon University. 
Under his leadership, the rankings 
of the College have continued 
to climb, with the launch of new 
programs in biomedical engineering, 
nanotechnology, and environmental 
systems.
Charles Vest (Dean, 1986-1989) Peter Banks (Dean, 1990-1995) Stephen W. Director (Dean, 1996-present)
17
required to insure the maintenance 
of a strong and adequate faculty for 
teaching, to furnish facilities and 
laboratory equipment; to encourage 
and foster graduate work; to encourage 
research in pure and applied sciences, 
and to meet other needs of the College. 
The general plan was to create a board 
composed of alumni and faculty 
members to secure endowments and 
to administer the funds acquired. 
However, once again, the dream was 
ahead of its time, and the effort to raise 
the endowment was not successful.
 
 However, good ideas keep coming 
back, and the College was to revisit 
the theme of building private support 
to augment state support again. In 
the 1970s, Dean David Ragone led a 
major fund-raising campaign aimed 
at moving the College to its North 
Campus site. Unfortunately, the 
campaign was launched during a 
national economic recession and only 
moderately successful (resulting in 
only one relatively modest building, 
the Dow Building). But private fund-
raising became a critical element of 
a far more ambitious and successful 
plan developed and executed in the 
EPILOGUE
Cooley Memorial Hall (proposed)
Epilogue
Despite the fact that during its first 
century the College of Engineering 
enrolled roughly 25% to 30% of the 
students attending the University 
and played an important role as a 
source or catalyst for other University 
programs (e.g., architecture, art, 
modern languages, chemistry, public 
health), the University rarely gave 
Engineering priority for resources 
or facilities.  Despite the demanding 
needs of its technology-intensive 
programs, the College frequently had 
to make do with cast-off facilities—e.g., 
Cooley’s scientific blacksmith shop, 
the power plant, the old Dental School, 
the old University pavilion hospital, 
and Tappan Elementary School. 
Occasionally an energetic dean (e.g. 
Cooley) or sympathetic president 
(Angell, Burton) would break this 
pattern, but for the most part, the 
College of Engineering, just as the 
Literary College, has languished in the 
shadow of the more generously favored 
professional schools such as Medicine, 
Dentistry, and Law.
 Yet there is a more disturbing trend 
in this history: the cyclic nature of 
University support of academic units 
that frequently has little correlation 
with either program needs or national 
priority. For example, despite the very 
significant enrollment growth in the 
College during the middle decades of 
the 20th Century, increasing from 1,400 
students in 1920 to over 4,000 students 
in 1950, and the clear importance of 
engineering education and research to 
national priorities such as economic 
recovery from the Depression and 
national defense during the war years, 
the College of Engineering spent 
these decades confined to budgets 
and facilities that were increasingly 
inadequate for either its enrollments 
and the technical needs of its programs.
 Early in the history of the College 
in 1872, as the University continued to 
suffer from inadequate state support, 
Interim President Henry Frieze 
suggested to DeVolson Wood that 
perhaps he should prepare a proposal 
to seek an endowment to support a 
school of engineering, similar to that 
supporting the Sheffield Scientific 
School at Yale. Wood’s proposal 
sought an endowment of $500,000 
for the purpose of establishing a 
school of technology. Unfortunately 
no donors came forward, nor did the 
state respond to the proposal. Hence 
the College would continue to evolve 
slowly, constrained by the weak public 
support of the University.
 Late in Cooley’s life, this dream 
of an endowed school was revisited. 
The University, after giving much 
thought to the problem created by 
the increasing inability of the state to 
provide money to keep the College 
of Engineering adequately funded, 
reached the conclusion that state funds 
must be supplemented by donated 
funds from other sources. The Board 
of Regents therefore approved the 
creation of the Mortimer E. Cooley 
Foundation. Its objectives were to 
supplement the regular funds as 
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1980s that aimed at building a strong 
and diversified base of state, private, 
federal, and tuition support for the 
College. As we will discuss in later 
chapters, this plan not only succeeded 
in moving the entire College of 
Engineering to the North Campus, 
but it increased its base support by 
several-fold during the 1980s, with a 
consequent increase in the quality of 
the College’s faculty, students, and 
programs.
 Sometimes it simply takes time to 
translate good ideas into action!
19
Chapter 2
The Post War Decades:  1945 to 1970
Like much of the rest of higher 
education, the fortunes and fate of 
the College of Engineering were very 
much influenced by the ever-changing 
nature of social issues and national 
priorities following WWII. From the 
GI Bill, the Cold War, the Nuclear Age, 
and the Space Race to the Great Society, 
Vietnam, student protests, and Earth 
Day, social change was in the winds, 
and higher education was blown along 
with the rest of society.
 The College of Engineering grew 
and flourished during the early part 
of this period, due in part to the 
importance of engineering education 
and research to national security, 
as well as to the forceful leadership 
of Dean George Granger Brown, a 
distinguished faculty member and 
chair of the Department of Chemical 
and Metallurgical Engineering. Yet this 
burst of momentum and growth was 
short-lived, as University priorities 
shifted in the late 1950s, and Brown’s 
strong leadership was cut short by 
his premature death in 1957. Stephen 
Attwood, a senior faculty member, 
former chair of electrical engineering, 
and acting dean of the College, 
was named dean of engineering, 
although he was already 62 at the 
time. Although Attwood served in the 
role for 8 years, it was not a time of 
significant progress for the College. 
He was followed by Gordon Van 
Wylen, another strong faculty member 
and chairman of the Department of 
Mechanical Engineering. However, the 
College continued to languish under 
Van Wylen’s leadership, both because 
of shifting University priorities, away 
from science and engineering and 
into the social and health professions 
(dentistry, social work, education, 
public health), and because of Van 
Wylen’s own efforts to refocus the 
College on undergraduate education 
and away from its traditional strengths 
in graduate education and research.
The Post-War Era
After World War II, the nation was 
faced with the challenge of assimilating 
large numbers of young veterans who 
were returning from overseas with a 
perspective different from any previous 
generation. They looked forward to a 
life with more promise and opportunity 
than even they or their parents had 
expected just a decade earlier during 
the Great Depression. Yet the American 
economy simply could not absorb 
the labor glut as the industrial war 
machine was dismantled. In part to 
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compensate the returning veterans who 
had interrupted their lives to serve the 
nation, and in part to buy time to create 
new jobs in a peacetime economy, 
Congress enacted the GI Bill to provide 
veterans with the opportunity for a 
college education, to repay a debt to 
those who had defended the nation.
 Few legislative acts have had the 
sweeping long-term effects on our 
society as the GI Bill. Millions of 
veterans, many without even a high 
school education, chose to attend 
college simply because it was their 
only option following the war. The 
law of unintended consequences was 
never better illustrated than in the 
results of this single act. Sleepy little 
college villages became busy cities, 
construction boomed, classrooms 
were overcrowded, and once-tranquil 
communities changed forever. Local 
economies changed to meet the needs 
of older students, and colleges took 
on a fresh face, albeit somewhat older 
and more mature. These older students 
brought a seriousness and commitment 
to higher education that was new 
and creative. They challenged the 
stodgy conservatism of the academy 
and prepared the way for change. 
Just as with the Morrill Act, the GI 
Bill represented an instance in which 
social and political change stimulated 
federal policy and investment with 
transforming impact on higher 
education.
 The Ann Arbor campus boomed, 
doubling in size, and then doubling 
yet again to over 30,000 students. To 
accommodate the expanding need 
for higher education, the University 
of Michigan established branch 
campuses in Flint and Dearborn, first 
appending upperclass programs to 
the local community colleges, but then 
later expanding these to four-year and 
eventually comprehensive campuses.
 In the decades following World War 
II, the federal government extended 
this social contract to broaden the 
opportunities for a college education 
through a series of other legislative 
actions such as the Higher Education 
Acts and federal financial aid programs 
such as the Pell Grants. The intent 
was to use higher education to help 
eliminate class distinction and racial 
discrimination by providing equal 
educational opportunity to diverse 
individuals and groups, thereby 
enabling all citizens to enjoy the 
benefits of a free society. During 
this period both public and private 
higher education expanded from 
the traditional role of educating the 
elite for leadership roles to providing 
mass education, a trend perhaps best 
captured by the belief of the Truman 
Commission in 1948 that every high 
school graduate should have the 
opportunity for a college education.
 The concern for national security did 
not subside in the wake of World War 
II, as new adversaries appeared and 
the Cold War smoldered. Drawing on 
the experience of the war years, the 
federal government turned once again 
to academic scientists for the science 
and technology necessary for national 
security. It offered the universities 
a partnership in which the federal 
government would sponsor research 
on the campuses in return for the 
knowledge base necessary to address 
national priorities. The universities 
responded by creating strong incentives 
for faculty to focus on research and 
graduate education in areas of national 
interest. The role of the federal 
government in university research and 
graduate education accelerated rapidly 
following the launch of Sputnik with 
the National Defense Education Act of 
1958. With each escalation in the arms 
race—the spread of nuclear weapons, 
Sputnik, ballistic missile technology—
the federal government increased its 
investment in campus-based research, 
and the culture of the university shifted 
further toward research and graduate 
education. A new form of institution 
evolved, the research university that 
today has become the dominant species 
of the higher education ecosystem.
 Change continued, as the first of 
the baby boomers reached college 
age in the early 1960s. The Higher 
Education Act of 1965 gave the federal 
government the role of ensuring 
access and affordability through 
nondiscrimination laws and student 
financial aid programs. Enrollments 
reached record numbers; faculty 
recruitment was a seller’s market; state 
appropriations were growing; and 
higher education was widely regarded 
as the sine qua non for success and 
fulfillment. Yet again, society would 
demand changes, as social unrest 
and upheaval struck the campuses in 
the late 1960s. Although causes were 
just—the civil rights movement and an 
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unpopular war in Vietnam—to much of 
America, the campus protests appeared 
as an attack on the establishment. 
The social contract through which 
the public granted autonomy to the 
university in return for its neutrality 
appeared to be undermined by the 
increasing political activism of many 
faculty members, perhaps manifested 
today by the public concern about 
political correctness on the campus. 
Yet, throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s, higher education flourished, 
sustained by strong social policies and 
public investment aimed at providing 
educational access and opportunity to a 
growing population. 
Responding to 
National Priorities and 
Opportunities
One of the most significant initiatives of 
the University following WWII was the 
Michigan Memorial Phoenix Project, 
a major nuclear research laboratory 
established by the University and 
funded by private gifts as a memorial 
to the 579 members of the Michigan 
family who had lost their lives in the 
war. Interestingly enough, it was a 
student committee that pressed the 
University to action on the matter and 
urged the Regents to accept the idea 
of the Phoenix Project after it was first 
developed and approved by student 
government. The students sought to 
commemorate the memory of those 
who made the supreme sacrifice by 
attempting to develop a project that 
would aid all mankind in living in a 
war-free world rather than to attempt 
to build “a mound of stone the purpose 
of which might soon be forgotten.”1
 In May, 1948, the Regents adopted 
a resolution that “the University of 
Michigan create a War Memorial 
Center to explore the ways and means 
by which the potentialities of atomic 
energy may become a beneficent 
influence in the life of man, to be 
known as the Phoenix Project of the 
University of Michigan.” Under the 
leadership of University President 
Alexander Ruthven and Albert Lang, 
president of the General Electric 
Company, the Phoenix Campaign 
quickly grew into a well-organized 
national effort that raised $6.5 million 
for a research building, a research 
endowment, and thanks to a one-
million-dollar gift from the Ford 
Motor Company, a nuclear reactor 
(called the Ford Nuclear Reactor). It 
is noteworthy that the membership of 
the fund-raising committee included 
three students who were all veterans of 
World War II. 
 Ruthven called the Phoenix project 
“the most important undertaking in the 
University’s history.” The University 
was paying tribute to the sacrifices 
of its men and women during the 
war by accepting the momentous 
responsibility of studying the peaceful 
applications of atomic energy. Even 
President Eisenhower highlighted the 
importance of the Phoenix Project: 
“Few causes are more urgent today 
and more noteworthy of your support. 
In war or in peace, the atomic research 
being done at the University of 
Michigan will strengthen America.”2
 The Phoenix Project Laboratory was 
constructed as one of the first buildings 
on the North Campus of the University.
Although all programs in the 
University were involved in the 
Michigan Memorial Phoenix Project, 
the College of Engineering had a 
particular responsibility to develop 
both instructional and research 
programs in nuclear energy. A 
professor of electrical engineering, 
Henry Gomberg, was named as the 
first director of the Phoenix Project. 
It is interesting that the actual plans 
for the nuclear reactor in the Phoenix 
Laboratory were classified during the 
early phases of its construction, and 
the associated Department of Nuclear 
Engineering that would utilize the 
facility was the first such program in 
the United States. It is also important 
The construction of the Phoenix Laboratory 
(upper left)
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to note that some 50 years later, the 
Phoenix Laboratory, the Ford Nuclear 
Reactor, and the Department of Nuclear 
Engineering all continue to make 
significant contributions to nuclear 
energy research and application, 
including the first observation of 
gravitationally induced quantum 
interference, seminal experiments 
involving neutron scattering, and the 
first demonstration of low-enrichment 
(non-weapons-grade) uranium 
fuel for research reactors, a major 
contribution to anti-proliferation 
efforts. The Phoenix Project enriched 
University life through the visits of 
distinguished scientists such as Robert 
Oppenheimer and Hans Bethe. It also 
provided support and facilities for 
the hundreds of nuclear engineers 
and scientists who have studied and 
trained in the Phoenix Laboratory. 
The Michigan Memorial Phoenix 
Project was recognized in 2001 by 
the American Nuclear Society as “a 
unique and pioneering atomic research 
program, as a permanent memorial to 
the University’s soldiers who fought 
and died in World War II, and as a 
symbol of the University of Michigan’s 
commitment to the peaceful and 
socially responsible use of science and 
technology.”3  The College of Engineering played an 
important role in other areas of national 
security during the post-war decades. 
Following World War II, the University 
developed laboratories at the site of 
the old Willow Run bomber plant to 
conduct research on the technologies 
of radar, infrared, acoustics, seismic, 
information processing, and navigation 
and guidance. Many of the faculty 
members of the College, particularly 
from the Department of Electrical 
Engineering, became actively involved 
in the Willow Run Laboratories’ Project 
Michigan, the effort to develop the 
technologies of radar, remote sensing, 
and satellite imaging. Michigan 
engineers developed some of the most 
important technologies of the 20th 
Century through this effort, including 
maser and laser technology (Chihiro 
Kikuchi), holography (Emmett Leith 
and Juris Upatniek), and stealth 
technology (Thomas Senior and Ted 
Birdsall). The close collaborations 
between the College and the Willow 
Run Laboratories greatly benefited both 
organizations, providing state-of-the-
art research experiences for students 
and faculty, while providing Willow 
Run with access to top engineering and 
scientific talent.
 Unfortunately, reacting to the 
turbulent anti-war protests of the 
1960s, the University decided to spin 
off the Willow Run Laboratories as 
an independent research laboratory, 
renamed the Environmental Research 
Laboratory of Michigan or ERIM. At 
the same time it also applied major 
restrictions to the ability of faculty and 
students to participate in classified 
research, which quickly led to the 
demise of such work on campus and 
greatly inhibited collaboration between 
the College and ERIM. As an aside, I 
have long believed that this decision to 
place the Willow Run Laboratories at 
arm’s length was not a wise decision 
on the University’s part. One need 
The fission chain reaction in the Ford Nuclear 
Reactor
The Ford Nuclear Reactor in the Phoenix 
Laboratory
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only look at the impact of other major 
national research laboratories on the 
quality of science and engineering 
programs at other top universities—
e.g., Lincoln Laboratory at MIT, the 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and 
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory at UC-
Berkeley, Argonne National Laboratory 
at the University of Chicago, and the 
NASA Ames Research Laboratory at 
Stanford—to realize that something 
important was lost in severing the 
University’s relationship with the 
Willow Run Laboratories.
 The College of Engineering also 
played an important role in the nation’s 
space program. Its aeronautical 
engineering program had long been 
a national leader, and as the space 
program began to develop in the 
1950s, the College renamed it the 
Department of Aerospace Engineering 
and added a number of new fields 
such as rocket propulsion, orbital 
mechanics, and space science. A major 
NASA laboratory in space physics was 
established, with extensive capabilities 
in upper atmosphere research and 
satellite instrumentation. The College 
conducted numerous tests with first 
high-altitude balloons and then rocket 
launches. In fact, the University 
acquired property on the Keweenaw 
Peninsula in upper Michigan for the 
purpose of launching satellites into 
polar Earth orbit. 
  The Department of Atmospheric 
and Space Science associated with the 
Space Physics Research Laboratory 
became one of the world leaders 
in space and planetary sciences 
(although as a predominantly science 
department, it sometimes was neither 
well understood nor appreciated by the 
College leadership at the time). 
 The College’s strong reputation 
in aerospace engineering and space 
science not only attracted significant 
funding from NASA but also the 
training responsibilities for a number 
of astronauts, including Jim McDivitt 
and Jack Lousma. In fact, the entire 
three-man crew of the Apollo 15 
moon mission consisted of Michigan 
engineering graduates, leading to the 
establishment of the first University 
of Michigan Alumni chapter in outer 
space!
 The College of Engineering also 
played a major role in the development 
and application of digital computing. 
The close relationship between the 
College and the Ford Motor Company 
through operation of the Ford Nuclear 
Reactor in the Phoenix Laboratory 
enabled students and faculty of the 
College to use the computers at the 
Ford Scientific Laboratory. Several 
faculty members had been involved 
in the early development of the digital 
computer, including Arthur Burks who 
participated in the development of 
the ENIAC computer (and arranged 
for 10% of it to be on permanent 
display in the College’s Electrical 
Engineering and Computer Science 
Laboratory). Furthermore, faculty 
members from chemical (Donald 
Katz), aerospace (Robert Howe), 
electrical, and computer engineering 
played important roles in developing 
specialized computers at Willow Run 
and elsewhere. 
 By the end of the 1950s, one could 
well make the case that the College 
of Engineering was a world leader in 
many of the most exotic areas of high 
technology: nuclear energy, aerospace 
engineering, space science, and 
computer engineering. Its graduates 
spread out to provide leadership in 
these fields across the nation, around 
the world, and even into outer space! 
Yet, what about those technologies 
of most direct relevance to Michigan Apollo 15: The Michigan Mission to the Moon
Upper atmosphere balloon experiments
24 A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE UM COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING
industry, e.g., automotive engineering 
and manufacturing engineering? 
 Ironically, Michigan’s efforts in 
these more traditional areas actually 
deteriorated during the decades 
following the war. Although the 
College built important facilities such 
as the Automotive Laboratory on 
the North Campus with its array of 
sophisticated automobile engine test 
cells, it was not generally regarded 
as a national leader. In numerous 
discussions with technology leaders in 
my role as dean of engineering during 
the 1980s, it became apparent that the 
College had decided to focus its efforts 
on rather conventional, even mundane, 
areas of research such as dynamometer 
testing and conventional combustion 
experiments, while other programs 
such as MIT and UC-Berkeley moved 
into very novel, science-based areas 
that would catch the wave created 
by pollution control requirements in 
the 1970s. While Michigan continued 
to hire rather traditional mechanical 
engineering faculty, MIT was 
hiring experts in areas of statistical 
mechanics, physical chemistry, and 
computer simulation. Similarly, in 
the area of manufacturing, Michigan 
focused on areas such as machine 
tool development and mechanical 
design rather than the emerging areas 
of numerically controlled machines 
and CAD/CAM. This stood in sharp 
contrast with the College’s leading-
edge activities in high-tech areas such 
as aerospace, electronics, and nuclear 
energy.
 There may be another explanation 
for the College’s tendency to focus 
on high technology rather than the 
needs of its backyard industry. The 
automotive and manufacturing 
industries of the 1950s and 1960s were 
based far more on in-house practical 
experience than scientific research. 
Furthermore, they provided far less 
support for university-based programs 
than rapidly growing industries in 
areas such as electronics, computers, 
and aerospace. Finally, most support 
for graduate education and research 
came from the federal government, 
through agencies such as the Atomic 
Energy Commission, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
the Department of Defense, and the 
National Science Foundation. The 
national security needs of the nation 
drove major investments in these 
high-tech areas of research, and the 
College responded by developing 
both programs and excellence in kind, 
perhaps to the neglect of the needs of 
local industry.
The North Campus
 As the University faced growing 
enrollments in the years following the 
war, it soon realized that its central 
campus site was simply too confined 
by the surrounding city of Ann Arbor 
to accommodate significant growth. 
The Regents agreed in the late 1940s 
to acquire 300 acres of farmland across 
the Huron River from the University 
Hospital, just in case the University 
needed the room to expand, although 
there were no immediate academic 
objectives for the use of this space. 
The farmland lying north of the University’s Ann Arbor Campus
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The noted Finnish architect, Eero 
Saarinen (director of the Cranbrook 
Institute and son of the former 
University faculty member, Eliel 
Saarinen) was retained in 1951 to 
develop a master plan for the site. It 
should be noted that Saarinen had 
recently completed the design for the 
General Motors Technical Center in 
Warren, Michigan, and his design for 
the University’s North Campus bears 
a striking resemblance to this earlier 
project.
 Although there were some 
early thoughts given to relocating 
the School of Education, Natural 
Resources, Music, and Fine Arts to 
the North Campus, the construction 
of the Michigan Memorial Phoenix 
Project soon repurposed the site for 
engineering research and eventually 
the entire College of Engineering. 
The first buildings were the Mortimer 
Cooley Electronics Laboratory (1951) 
(where much of the classified research 
associated with Willow Run was 
conducted), the Phoenix Laboratory 
(1955), the Automotive Laboratory 
(1957), the windtunnel and a small 
laboratory for Aerospace Engineering 
(1957), and the Fluids Laboratory 
(1958) (later renamed the G. G. Brown 
Laboratory).
 As enrollments continued to expand, 
the University launched a series of 
planning exercises that considered 
the relocation of additional academic 
programs to the North Campus. 
One plan even envisioned growth of 
the University to perhaps as many 
as 100,000 students, with the North 
Campus becoming one of a chain 
of campuses, similar in size to the 
Central Campus, and extending to the 
northeast of Ann Arbor.
 During the 1950s and 1960s the 
University built a number of large 
student dormitories and married 
student housing complexes on the 
North Campus. However, for most of 
this period, the Department of Nuclear 
Engineering was the only academic 
program located entirely on the North 
Campus, because of the proximity of 
the Phoenix Laboratory. 
 Although the College of Engineering 
was the first major University academic 
unit earmarked for moving to the 
North Campus, this objective was 
soon set aside in preference to other 
priorities. First, the School of Music 
was given a major new complex on 
the North Campus (1964) (its building 
designed by Eero Saarinen himself), 
followed soon afterwards by the 
School of Architecture and Design 
(and later in 1974, the School of Art 
when it separated from Architecture). 
The North Campus Commons (now 
renamed the Pierpont Commons) 
The original Saarinen master plan for the 
North Campus
Early development of the North Campus (the 
Cooley Laboratory in the foreground)
The Cooley Electronics Laboratory (1951)
Saarinen’s School of Music
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(1965) and the Chrysler Center for 
Continuing Engineering Education 
(1971) soon followed. The University 
also located other major research 
facilities on the North Campus, 
including the Cyclotron Laboratory 
(Physics), the Institute of Science and 
Technology (1963) (another Saarinen 
building), and the Highway Safety 
Research Institute (1965). 
 These latter two research institutes 
are of interest, since both were strongly 
opposed by the College of Engineering. 
They, along with the Phoenix 
Laboratory, which also fell under 
University authority, represented an 
effort by the University’s vice-president 
for research to build major research 
programs competing directly with 
the College for both state and federal 
funding. In each case, they led to 
significant weakening of the programs 
in the College associated with these 
areas.
 Perhaps the best illustration that the 
University had largely turned away 
from its early plans to move the College 
of Engineering to the North Campus 
is provided by the photograph, taken 
during the late 1960s.
The Schools of Architecture, Art, and 
Music are clearly visible, along with the 
Institute for Science and Technology. 
And where is Engineering? This can 
be seen in yet another photograph, 
taken at about the same time, which 
shows only four small buildings: the 
Cooley Electronics Laboratory, the 
Automotive Laboratory, the G. G. 
Brown Laboratory, and a small building 
for Aerospace Engineering.
The Schools of Architecture and Art
The Institute of Science and Technology
The Highway Safety Research Institute The North Campus (1970)




A recurrent theme of this book suggests 
that the priority given the needs of 
the College of Engineering waxed and 
waned not only with national priorities 
but as well by both University 
leadership and College leadership. The 
postwar years erosion in the support 
of the College began in the 1960s and 
accelerated into the 1970s. To be sure, 
this was a time when our nation was 
shifting from the Cold War and the 
space race as priorities to the Great 
Society and a range of social programs 
such as Medicare. The University 
responded by emphasizing academic 
programs in areas such as Education 
(recruiting as dean Wilbur Cohen, 
former head of the U. S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, who 
proceeded to double the size of the 
school), Social Work (moving it from 
Detroit and expanding it significantly), 
Dentistry (building the largest dental 
school in the nation), and Public 
Health. Similar commitments were 
made in the social sciences, particularly 
through the Institute for Social 
Research. Additional commitments 
were made in the 1970s to develop 
expensive graduate programs in 
Nursing and Pharmacy. And most 
significantly for Engineering’s goal 
of moving to the North Campus, the 
University decided to approach the 
state for a $180 million appropriation 
for a replacement University hospital. 
Both engineering and the physical 
sciences began to suffer from benign 
neglect (and, perhaps in some cases, 
outright malice of forethought, by some 
members of the central administration). 
But one cannot lay all of the blame 
on the University for the plight of the 
College. One of the first responsibilities 
of a dean of a school or college is to 
gain both the attention and support 
of the leaders of the University, and 
through them, open up opportunities 
for state, federal, and private support. 
Mortimer Cooley had done this at 
the turn of the century, working 
with Presidents Angell, Hutchins, 
and Burton to build much of the 
College’s Central Campus complex 
The replacement University hospital
and sustaining its reputation. G. G. 
Brown led the early effort to move the 
College to the North Campus, and 
perhaps more significantly, established 
Michigan Engineering as a leader 
in research and graduate education. 
Unfortunately, his successors (just as 
Cooley’s successors) were less able in 
their efforts to sustain this momentum 
and University priority, and the College 
suffered as a consequence.
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Chapter 3
Decline, Fall, and Revolution:  The 1970s
The 1970s were a difficult period for 
engineering education in general 
and the College of Engineering in 
particular. The end of the space race, 
an unpopular war in Vietnam, and an 
emerging environmental movement 
all converged to undermine public 
confidence in technology. While 
the image of Ph.D. scientists and 
engineers driving taxicabs was a 
myth, it was nevertheless true that 
public perception ran against careers 
in science and engineering. The Great 
Society commitments of the 1960s 
propelled national priorities away from 
investments in science and engineering 
and into health care and social services.
 The College of Engineering felt these 
shifting national priorities both through 
the decline in federal research support 
and in student interest in engineering 
careers in the early 1970s (although 
the corresponding enrollment drop 
was modest and brief). But even more 
significant was the continuation of 
the 1960s trend that saw University 
support of the College decline still 
further. In fact, during the 1970s, the 
College of Engineering would rank 
last among all academic units in the 
change in funding from the University. 
Although the College experienced 
surging enrollments during the latter 
years of the 1970s, growing by almost 
20% during the decade, the University 
actually cut its instructional budget 
by almost one-third. Furthermore, the 
long-awaited move of the College out 
of its decaying facilities in West and 
East Engineering and into new facilities 
on the North Campus stalled in the face 
of other University priorities (including 
major new buildings on the North 
Campus for the Schools of Music, Art, 
Architecture and Urban Planning, and 
even for research units such as the 
Institute of Science and Technology). 
Put more bluntly, the College had not 
only ceased to be a priority for the 
University, but it had dropped off the 
State Street radarscope entirely.
 I will return later to discuss the 
decline and fall of the College of 
Engineering during the 1970s, 
considering its antecedents, probable 
causes, and consequences. But first it 
is useful to take a detour for a brief 
biographical memoir, since this was 
precisely the period when Anne and 
I moved to Ann Arbor to begin my 
academic career as a new Assistant 
Professor of Nuclear Engineering.
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The Path to Ann Arbor
My path to Ann Arbor led from a 
small farm town in Missouri to Yale 
University in the East, then back to a 
top-secret nuclear research laboratory 
in the mountains of New Mexico, 
then on to Pasadena, and finally back 
across the country again to Michigan. 
Both Anne and I had grown up in 
Carrollton, Missouri, a small farm 
town (population 4,000) located about 
70 miles northeast of Kansas City. 
Carrollton was located on the Missouri 
River, in the heart of some of the richest 
farmland in the world. Most of its 
residents were involved in farming in 
one way or another. Anne was raised 
on a farm. Although my father was 
a highway paving contractor, my 
grandfather and other relatives all had 
farming backgrounds.
Yale University
In a strange twist of fate, rather than 
following in the Missouri traditions 
of my family, I headed east for college 
to Yale University—lured in part 
to play football. This requires some 
explanation. When I graduated from 
Carrollton High School, few in my 
town had ever considered going out of 
state to college—in fact, I was the first 
student from Carrollton ever to take 
the SATs. Largely at the encouragement 
of my family, I decided to apply to 
several of the more popular national 
universities, with a particular interest 
in Stanford (rather, in California). 
However, since I suspected the odds 
of acceptance were long, I also applied 
to several other schools, including 
Northwestern and Michigan. During 
the application process, I learned 
that blue-blood schools like Yale and 
Harvard were located in New England 
rather than England (where I had 
always thought they belonged with 
Oxford and Cambridge), so I decided 
on a whim to apply to Yale, knowing 
absolutely nothing whatsoever about 
it. Surprise, surprise, when not only 
did I receive an early acceptance to Yale 
(and also Stanford, as it turned out), 
but I also received a telegram (the first 
I had ever seen) from the Yale football 
coach encouraging me to attend and 
play football. The thought of playing 
football at an exotic institution like Yale 
was just too enticing, although one 
of Dan Devine’s coaches also called 
later to recruit me to Missouri (where 
I would have not only been on a team 
with our current Michigan football 
coach, Lloyd Carr, but likely trampled 
in the dust).
 So, sight-unseen, my parents put 
me on a TWA Constellation the next 
September—my first airplane trip. I 
flew to New York (again a first) and 
managed to find my way to Grand 
Central Station to take the train up to 
New Haven to enroll at Yale and to 
start freshman football practice. The 
old saying, “You can take the boy out 
of the country but not the country out 
of the boy!” certainly applied in my 
case.  Despite the prep-school, blue-
blood nature of Yale at that time, it had 
relatively little impact on my social 
sophistication, although it certainly 
Yale University 
Yale’s Old Number 71
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shook my academic confidence to 
the ground. However, after a shaky 
start, I managed to adjust to both the 
intellectual and social rigors of Old 
Blue—although football lasted only 
two years. In 1964, I graduated summa 
cum laude in electrical engineering 
and accepted an Atomic Energy 
Commission fellowship to attend 
graduate school at Caltech (turning 
down Stanford for the second time, 
which was later to become a regular 
occurrence as I rose up the academic 
ladder).
 A bit of explanation about 
my undergraduate education is 
appropriate here: A Yale “engineering” 
degree is a bit of an oxymoron. In fact, 
all undergraduates at Yale were not 
only required to take a broad liberal 
arts major, but also required to select a 
minor area of concentration in addition 
to their major. Since the minor and 
major concentrations had to be in 
different areas, I selected psychology 
as my minor area, with a specialization 
in child psychology. Many years later 
I would realize the fortuitous nature 
of this minor concentration since this 
training was of critical importance 
in my various roles in academic 
administration—not so much for 
understanding students, but rather for 
understanding the faculty (stimulus, 
response, reward, reinforcement...).
 So leaving Yale, the Ivy League, and 
the East Coast behind, I headed west, 
stopping in Missouri where Anne and I 
were married, following her graduation 
from the University of Missouri, and 
then heading for California. But first 
we stopped off in New Mexico, where 
I had a summer appointment as a 
visiting research physicist at the Los 
Alamos Scientific Laboratory.
Los Alamos
In the mid-1960s, atomic energy was 
still shrouded in top-secret security. 
In fact, I was required to qualify for 
an A.E.C. “Q” (top-secret) security 
clearance even to receive an Atomic 
Energy Commission Fellowship. 
Needless to say, security was an even 
higher priority at Los Alamos, where 
the town adjacent to the Laboratory 
housing the families of lab employees 
had only been opened to the public 
a few years earlier. In fact, families 
of visiting scientists lived in WW II 
vintage barracks dating from the days 
of the Manhattan Project.
  
 
 Even though we spent only a 
summer at Los Alamos, it proved to 
be one of those formative experiences 
with important later consequences. I 
worked in a technical group supporting 
the Rover nuclear rocket program, a 
top-secret program intended to develop 
and test rocket engines powered by 
nuclear fission reactors. During the 
mid-1960s, it was felt that after the 
successful completion of the Apollo 
program to land a man on the moon, 
a manned mission to the planet Mars 
would follow rapidly, perhaps as early 
as 1980. Many scientists believed that 
chemical rockets were inadequate for 
manned planetary missions because 
of the radiation exposure associated 
with extended space flight. Hence 
the nation had launched a major 
program to develop nuclear rockets 
for future interplanetary missions at 
Los Alamos. The Rover Program was 
quite successful in designing, building, 
and static-testing a sequence of nuclear 
rocket engines at the Nevada test 
site—the Kiwi engine rated at 1,000 
megawatts, the Phoebus engine 
rated at 5,000 megawatts (five times 
the power of today’s nuclear power 
plants), and eventually the NERVA 
rocket engine (for Nuclear Energy for 
Rocket Vehicle Applications). I worked 
on the test programs for these nuclear 
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (1964) Our Los Alamos apartment
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rocket engines, acquiring in the process 
a strong interest both in nuclear power 
and spaceflight.
 Since nuclear rocket development 
was classified as a secret project, I was 
required to record all of my work in 
bound notebooks, which were then 
locked in a safe each evening when 
I left the Laboratory. This routine 
of recording my work—and my 
thoughts—in bound notebooks became 
a habit that continued throughout my 
research as a faculty member and then 
later as an academic administrator. 
Today our bookshelves are filled with 
these notebooks, accumulating at a rate 
of several each year.
 There was another consequence 
of the Los Alamos work. During the 
1960s, as the United States became 
more heavily involved in the Vietnam 
war, the conditions for deferment 
from the draft became more and 
more restrictive. Because I held a Q 
security clearance and had had access 
to classified nuclear technology at Los 
Alamos, I received a deferment from 
the military draft because of critical 
skills and sensitive knowledge. In 
fact, after another summer research 
assignment in 1971 at the AEC’s 
other nuclear weapons laboratory 
at Livermore, I found that even my 
international travel became tightly 
restricted.
Caltech
After our summer experience at 
Los Alamos, Anne and I returned 
to Missouri to pile the rest of our 
belongings in our VW, and then off 
we went again across the country 
to Pasadena where I had an A.E.C. 
fellowship for graduate study at 
Caltech. Like many others, we had 
formed our image of Pasadena and 
Caltech from the television broadcasts 
of the Tournament of Roses Parade and 
the Rose Bowl, when the skies were 
blue and the San Gabriel Mountains 
ringing the city stood out sharp and 
clear. It was quite a contrast when we 
arrived in late August in the midst 
of a smog alert that continued for 
weeks, blotting out the mountains and 
trapping the heat.
 Although Pasadena was an 
important chapter in our family 
history—Anne’s early career in 
management and merchandising, my 
M.S. and Ph.D. degrees, the birth of 
the two Duderstadt daughters, Susan 
and Kathy—it spanned a remarkably 
short period of only four years. Part of 
California Institute of Technology
Thomas Laboratory at Caltech
The Phoebus Nuclear Rocket Engine
The NERVA nuclear rocket
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the reason was the Vietnam War. The 
threat of the draft always lurking in the 
background provided strong 
motivation for graduate students to 
complete their degrees as rapidly 
as possible. But it was also a time of 
ample job opportunities, with the space 
and defense programs in high gear, and 
universities continuing to expand their 
faculties.
 I took advantage of Caltech’s highly 
interdisciplinary character by earning 
my degrees in subjects spanning 
a range of topics in physics and 
mathematics. Since I had managed 
to complete my M.S. and Ph.D. in 
three years, my dissertation advisors 
suggested that I might want to spend 
an additional year as a postdoctoral 
fellow, broadening my research 
interests. This was also the traditional 
path toward a faculty position at 
Caltech. With this possibility in mind, 
I applied for and won a prestigious 
A.E.C. Postdoctoral Fellowship for 
the year 1968, with a generous stipend 
of $1,000 per month, roughly three 
times that of my graduate student 
support. We felt so flush that we rented 
a small house right across the street 
from Caltech with wonderful gardens 
(including two large avocado trees that 
would periodically rain fruit on the 
roof of the house). Ironically, this house 
is used today by Caltech as the office 
for its university treasurer.
 Although I was interested in 
completing my postdoctoral 
appointment before considering 
more permanent employment, with 
remaining on the faculty at Caltech a 
definite possibility, I agreed to two job 
interviews at the request of my Caltech 
faculty advisors: UC-Berkeley and 
Michigan. The Berkeley interview was 
hosted by the chair of their Department 
of Nuclear Engineering, Hans Mark, 
who was later to become Secretary of 
the Air Force and then President of the 
University of Texas. 
  The Michigan interview was more 
problematic. To be sure, Michigan’s 
Department of Nuclear Engineering 
was not only the first such program 
established in this country, but also it 
ranked among the top such programs 
in the world. Despite this, I was not 
particularly enthusiastic about visiting 
Michigan to explore the opportunity, 
particularly in the late winter cold. I 
agreed to do so as a favor to my thesis 
advisor, who portrayed Ann Arbor as 
“nirvana,” although not on the gray, 
drizzling day in March when I visited. 
However, Anne had grown weary 
of the smog and traffic of Southern 
California and longed to return to 
the Midwest. While I was flying back 
to California after the interview, the 
department chairman called Anne 
The Duderstadts’ Pasadena house 
Our daughters in Pasadena (1968)
Jim’s Caltech commencement 
(1968) The UM Department of Nuclear 
Engineering
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associate, and then full professor of 
nuclear engineering. My Department of 
Nuclear Engineering was ideally suited 
to the generalist approach of a Caltech 
education. It was small, research-
intensive, highly interdisciplinary, and 
almost totally focused on graduate 
education. Its reputation allowed it to 
attract both outstanding faculty and 
graduate students of unusual breadth 
and ability. Hence, it was well suited 
to my roving intellectual interests, first 
in nuclear systems analysis, then to 
nonequilibrium statistical  mechanics, 
on to laser-driven thermonuclear 
fusion, next to supercomputers, and 
so on. In the early stages, most of my 
work was highly theoretical, requiring 
only a blackboard and chalk. However 
my interests later evolved into using 
very large computers (so-called 
supercomputers) to simulate highly 
complex phenomena such as nuclear 
fission and thermonuclear fusion. 
Throughout this period I usually had 
five or six Ph.D. students working with 
me of comparable age who became 
closer friends than most of my faculty 
colleagues.
and told her they were going to make 
an offer. By the time I arrived back in 
Pasadena, Anne had already made 
up her mind. The Duderstadts were 
headed to Michigan.
On to Michigan
Although we had accepted Michigan’s 
offer in spring, 1968, I still had to 
finish the year at Caltech as an A.E.C. 
Postdoctoral Fellow. In November I 
was able to stop by Michigan on my 
way to Washington to receive the Mark 
Mills Prize for the outstanding Ph.D. 
dissertation in nuclear science. While in 
Ann Arbor I learned that the University 
was just completing some new 
housing units for married students, 
and that new faculty members were 
occasionally permitted to rent some 
of these townhouse apartments until 
they found more permanent residences. 
This seemed like the simplest solution 
to the housing question, and so, 
in December, 1968, we loaded our 
furniture and our VW onto a moving 
van in the 90 degree heat in Pasadena 
(a Santa Ana condition) and boarded 
a plane for Michigan. We arrived in a 
sub-zero blizzard and moved into the 
Northwood IV housing complex on 
the University of Michigan’s North 
Campus. 
 Interestingly enough, during 
the same week another new staff 
member arrived at the University: Bo 
Schembechler. I would later joke with 
Bo that the personnel department must 
have mixed the assignments for the two 
of us; I suggested that perhaps Bo was 
supposed to teach nuclear engineering, 
and I had been hired to coach football.
For the next decade, I climbed the 
usual academic ladder, progressing 
through the ranks as assistant, 
Northwood IV apartments (1969)
The Phoenix Memorial Laboratory Lecturing in nuclear engineering
35ON TO MICHIGAN
 In 1971 we returned to California, 
first for a brief period where I served 
as a visiting faculty member at 
Caltech and then for several months 
as a Visiting Research Physicist at 
the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. 
The Livermore experience was 
interesting from several perspectives. 
I was working in the top-secret Q 
Division, a group trying to develop 
the new technology of laser-driven 
thermonuclear fusion. Ironically, 
a small company in Ann Arbor, KMS 
Fusion, was also trying to develop 
this technology, in direct competition 
with the A.E.C. scientists at Livermore 
and Los Alamos. The classified and 
competitive nature of the work led 
to some bizarre situations in the 
subsequent months. For example, on 
one occasion I found myself forbidden 
to discuss my research with several 
Michigan colleagues with offices across 
the hall  who had served as consultants 
to KMS Fusion.  
 While many university faculty 
members focus on teaching only a few 
courses closely related to their area 
of expertise, I rarely taught the same 
course twice in a row. As a result, I not 
only ended up teaching most of the 
undergraduate and graduate
courses offered by our department,  
but I designed and developed many of 
them. I enjoyed creating new courses 
and curricula, including one of the 
first courses taught at the University 
on microcomputers, then the Apple 
II! Since I usually produced copious 
lecture notes for each of these courses, 
it was natural that I would soon be 
drawn to writing textbooks to expand 
my pedagogical efforts.
 Both the quality and quantity of my 
research and teaching were sufficient 
to propel me rapidly through the 
academic ranks, with promotion to 
Associate Professor in 1972 and to 
full Professor in 1975. I soon began to 
realize, however, that the traditional 
faculty role, while enjoyable for the 
moment, would probably not hold my 
attention for the longer term. Indeed, I 
always had great envy and admiration 
for my more senior colleagues who 
had been able to maintain both 
scholarly interest and momentum 
through the several decades of their 
careers. Perhaps it was my field of 
theoretical physics and mathematics 
that frequently led to burnout at an 
early age, or perhaps it was just a 
character flaw. Whatever the reason, 
I soon found my concentration and 
attention beginning to wander to 
other activities in the University 
as I began to be drawn into faculty 
service and eventually administrative 
activities. Fortunately, even though 
my traditional faculty career as a 
teacher and scholar only spanned the 
decade of 1970s, my research activities 
and publications, Ph.D. production 
(supervising 22 Ph.D.s), and writing 
(six textbooks and 60 research papers) 
built sufficient scholarly reputation to 
be recognized in later years with several 
of the nation’s top awards, including 
the E. O. Lawrence Award of the U. S. 
Department of Energy (the nation’s 
top award for nuclear research), the 
Arthur Holly Compton Prize of the 
American Nuclear Award (the top 
award for teaching in nuclear energy), 
As a researcher
As an author
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and the National Engineer of the Year 
award from the National Society of 
Professional Engineers. Finally, in 
1991 I was honored with the National 
Medal of Technology (the nation’s top 
award for career-long achievement in 
engineering and technology), presented 
by President Bush in a White House 
Rose Garden Ceremony.
 There were several key features 
of this first phase of my career that 
would have an impact later on my 
role as an academic leader. Perhaps 
most significant was that both my 
educational experiences and later my 
faculty career had been associated with 
institutions that were clearly among 
the very best in the world—Yale, 
Caltech, and the UM Department of 
Nuclear Engineering. I had developed 
a keen sense for not only being able 
to recognize excellence, but knowing 
first hand the commitment it takes to 
achieve it. Second, both my education 
and scholarly career had been in 
environments characterized by unusual 
intellectual breadth and creativity 
with exceptionally strong scientific 
foundations. Although occasionally 
I would later hear the complaint that 
“Duderstadt is a physicist, not an 
engineer,” in truth I was fortunate 
in being able to span both pure and 
applied scientific fields. And finally, my 
career had been spent in institutions 
with exceptionally strong programs 
in research and graduate education, 
a focus that had been lost in much of 
the College of Engineering. All of these 
experiences would serve me well as I 
moved into leadership roles during the 
1980s.
The Decline and Fall of the 
College of Engineering
As I noted earlier, the College of 
Engineering had already entered 
a state of decline during the 1960s, 
as it apparently lost favor with a 
University administration committed 
to Great Society themes (e.g., the health 
professions, social services, and K-12 
education) rather than science and 
technology. The erosion in University 
support became even more serious 
in the 1970s. While the rest of the 
University experienced a compound 
growth of +7% per year during this 
decade, the College of Engineering was 
cut at an average rate of -2% per year. 
During this decade, the instructional 
faculty of the College dropped from 
302 to 232 full-time-equivalent (FTE) 
faculty. Yet these cuts were in the face 
of a 44% growth in enrollments during 
this decade, driving instructional loads 
from 12 FYES/FTE in 1970 to 17.5 
FYES/FTE in 1980. Put another way, 
the College effectively lost 30% of its 
University support during the 1970s, 
leading to what would later be called 
“the Engineering Gap” of roughly 70 
faculty positions or an effective funding 
gap of $7 million per year, relative to 
other campus units.
Receiving the National Medal of Technology from President Bush (1991)
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 How might one explain such 
devastating erosion in University 
support? Certainly it was not due 
to any weakness in state support, 
since throughout the 1970s, state 
appropriations continued to increase at 
an adequate pace. In part some of the 
blame must rest with the University 
administration, which made the health 
sciences a clear priority. Schools such 
as Medicine, Dentistry, Nursing, 
Pharmacy, and Public Health were 
funded year after year with generous 
increases. The School of Dentistry 
benefited from the state funding of a 
new, massive complex (ironically at 
just that moment when the impact of 
fluoride began to reduce the needs for 
dental care). Medicine also was in a 
favored position, with a new hospital 
rising to the top of the University’s 
priority list for state capital outlay 
dollars. Nursing and Pharmacy 
received substantial budget increases 
to fund new graduate programs, while 
additional funds were shifted to Public 
Health to compensate for the loss of 
federal support.
 To some degree, the shift in 
University priorities away from 
science and engineering and into the 
health sciences was an understandable 
reflection of shifting national priorities, 
with the end of the Apollo space 
program, the withdrawal from an 
unpopular war in Vietnam, the 
environmental movement, and a 
decade of student protest targeting 
areas such as defense research. But 
it is also the case that the University 
administration was simply not paying 
attention to the impact of its budget 
decisions, since it continued to fund 
units such as the Schools of Education, 
Dentistry, and Natural Resources 
at generous levels even as their 
enrollments dropped precipitously 
throughout the 1970s. Although there 
was a perception that enrollments in 
the College dropped dramatically, 
thereby triggering the budget cuts, 
in reality engineering enrollments 
dropped only very slightly (less than 
8%) between 1970 and 1972-roughly 
the same enrollment dip experienced 
by most other academic units during 
this period. Furthermore, Engineering 
enrollments then began to steadily 
climb throughout the remainder of 
the decade, swelling over 44% to 5,600 
students, while the enrollments of other 
well-funded schools such as Education 
and Dentistry dropped by as much as 
a factor of two or more. Whether the 
University made a conscious effort to 
reduce the funding for Engineering (as 
some believe) or whether the central 
administration was simply asleep at 
the wheel is a debatable issue. But 
the result was that the College of 
Engineering suffered serious declines 
in faculty morale, research productivity, 
and reputation as a consequence of its 
neglect.
 Yet, here, it is important to 
understand that the College of 
Engineering was also partly a victim 
of its own behavior. The impact of 
this shift in University priorities was 
compounded by an internal shift in 
College priorities away from research 
and graduate education to focus 
instead on undergraduate education. 
For example, Ph.D. production in 
the College dropped in half over the 
decade, from 115 per year in 1972 to 
51 per year in 1980 (and fell far behind 
peer institutions such as Illinois, 
Purdue, MIT, and Stanford that were 
graduating 150 to 200 Ph.D.s per 
year). Although the faculty had grown 
substantially during the 1960s, many 
of the new professors had been hired 
primarily for their instructional skills 
rather than their scholarly abilities. 
Furthermore, during the 1960s and 
continuing into the 1970s, the College 
invested heavily in building its own 
Department of Humanities, with 
instruction not only in areas such as 
technical communication (rhetoric) 
but also in literature, history, and 
philosophy. Engineering students 
were required to take their humanities 
courses from this department rather 
than enrolling in the courses offered 
by the University’s College of 
Literature, Science, and Arts. In fact, 
the Department of Humanities was the 
only academic unit in UM Engineering 
to experience growth during the 1970s, 
growing by 20% to 30 faculty members 
by 1980 (and making it one of the 
largest departments in the College).
 Finally, the leadership of the College 
was simply not an effective advocate 
during the decades of the 1960s and 
1970s. Whether because of their 
lack of awareness of the serious of 
the situation, their temperament, or 
their inadequate effort in making the 
case for the College, Deans Stephen 
Attwood, Gordon Van Wylen, and 
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David Ragone were unable to persuade 
the University’s central administration 
to provide adequate funding for the 
College during their tenures.
 The College faced other challenges 
during the 1970s, foremost among them 
their urgent need for adequate facilities 
for its research and teaching activities. 
For all effective purposes, the North 
Campus move was stalled, dead in the 
water.
The North Campus Move
When Dean Gordon Van Wylen 
resigned to accept the presidency 
of Hope College, the University of 
Michigan, after a brief search, named 
David Ragone, the dean of engineering 
at Dartmouth, to be the next dean of the 
College. Ragone had been a consultant 
to Chrysler on automobile emissions 
control where he had become friends 
with George Heubner, a Chrysler vice-
president and husband of Gertrude 
Heubner, a University Regent. Heubner 
brought Ragone to the attention of 
President Robben Fleming and Vice 
President Allen Smith, and after a brief 
search, he was named dean.
 Ragone was given the mandate to 
launch a major fund-raising campaign 
that would be key to completing the 
move of the College to the North 
Campus. The University offered the 
following deal: if the College would 
raise $12 million in private support 
for the North Campus complex (out 
of a $20 million total campaign goal), 
the University would seek a $18 
million match from state funds to 
build a four-building complex that 
would be sufficient to move all of the 
departments to the North Campus. 
In this four-building plan, the largest 
building, Engineering Building I, 
would house Mechanical Engineering 
and Applied Mechanics, Civil 
Engineering, Industrial and Operations 
Engineering, Humanities, and the 
College administration. Engineering 
Building II (the only building which 
was actually built as the Dow 
Building) would contain Chemical and 
Metallurgical Engineering. Engineering 
Building III would be for Electrical and 
Computer Engineering and Nuclear 
Engineering, and Engineering Building 
IV would be for Naval Architecture 
(with a possible new towing tank on 
the North Campus).
 Here it should be acknowledged 
that there was considerable sentiment 
within the College against completing 
the North Campus move. Although 
the deteriorating quality of space 
in West and East Engineering was a 
major concern, many faculty members 
believed it important to remain 
in renovated space on the Central 
Campus close to their colleagues in 
LS&A (particularly physics, chemistry, 
and mathematics). Furthermore, many 
faculty members and students enjoyed 
the ambiance of the South University 
area and worried about the detached, 
sterile character of the North Campus. 
Ragone and his colleagues in the 
College administration dismissed these 
concerns, arguing that the interaction 
between the College and other Central 
Campus programs had been quite 
modest, and the isolation on the North 
Campus was a necessary inconvenience 
for obtaining higher quality space.1
 Ragone was smooth, worldly, and 
some would even say charming—
valuable attributes for successful fund-
raising. With Buildings I, II, III, and IV 
on the drawing boards, and a major 
fund-raising campaign in the works, 
there was optimism that the College 
would finally complete its three-decade 
long quest to move to the North 
Campus by the end of the 1970s. In fact, 
when I was hired by the University, 
both the dean and other faculty told 
me to be sure to find a house near the 
North Campus so I would not have 
to drive too far to work. Being more 
pragmatic souls, Anne and I decided to 
ignore this advice and bought a home 
on the south side of Ann Arbor near the 
best schools. 
 Ragone immediately hired a team 
of expensive fund-raising consultants 
who began to identify prospects for 
the upcoming fund-raising campaign 
Jim Knott and Dave Ragone announcing 
the Campaign
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aimed at raising a total of $20 million, 
of which $12 million would be the 
College’s share of the North Campus 
move. A retired General Motors 
executive, Jim Knott, agreed to chair the 
campaign volunteer effort. Yet, despite 
the initial optimism, the campaign was 
largely a bust. Part of the difficulty was 
that the campaign was launched just 
as the nation was entering a recession 
triggered by the OPEC oil embargo 
and the rise in energy prices. But it 
also soon became clear that Ragone 
really did not enjoy fund-raising, and it 
became increasingly hard to get him to 
solicit gifts from donors. His personal 
commitments to various corporate 
boards and advisory committees kept 
him away from campus for extended 
periods.  Hence he appointed a 
long-time faculty colleague, Maury 
Sinnott, to serve as associate dean for 
administration and delegated to him 
the operational responsibilities for the 
dean’s office.
 Although the campaign was launched 
with a flourish, the deepening recession 
and the wanderings of the dean soon 
slowed activity to a crawl. After several 
years it soon became apparent that only 
a miracle would save the fund-raising 
effort from embarrassment. But one 
of the true angels of the University, 
Dr. Harry Towsley, came to the rescue. 
The business manager of the College, 
Harold Harger, suggested that Ragone 
drop by to see Dr. Towsley, hat in hand, 
to talk about the faltering campaign. 
Towsley’s wife, Margaret, was the 
granddaughter of Herbert H. Dow, the 
founder of the Dow Chemical Company. 
The Towsleys had long been among 
the University’s most generous donors, 
and after Ragone’s visit, they contacted 
the Dow family and arranged for a $5 
million gift to fund the construction of 
a new building on the North Campus 
for Chemical and Metallurgical 
Engineering (so-called Building II 
in the original plan). In return, the 
building was named the Herbert H. 
Dow Laboratory. This would turn 
out to be essentially the only major 
accomplishment of the decade-long 
fund-raising effort. Although the 
College claimed raising $20 million, 
only $8.6 million was for construction, 
and over $3 million was in deferred 
gifts (e.g., future bequests). Less than 
$3 million was raised for endowment, 
probably the most urgent need of the 
College.
 The trials and tribulations of the 
North Campus move were made even 
more difficult by the decision of the 
central administration to bump the 
Replacement Hospital Project ahead 
of Engineering in priority for state 
funding, essentially backing away from 
their earlier commitment to Ragone. 
Although the State Legislature passed 
a resolution in 1977 stating that it 
would fund 60% of the $30 million 
project when the College had raised 
its $12 million, the University pushed 
this aside and sought instead a state 
contribution of $180 million toward 
the $300 million hospital construction 
project (a project second in magnitude 
only to the Mackinac Bridge in the 
state’s history). Not surprisingly, this 
mammoth request not only sidetracked 
the Engineering North Campus projects 
but effectively eliminated all state 
support for University capital projects 
for almost a decade. With inflation 
rapidly eroding the funds raised 
during the Campaign, the College 
decided to direct the entire amount 
(and then some) to the construction 
of the Dow building (Building II) and 
defer indefinitely any further effort 
to continue with the rest of the four-
building project.
 Hence the College approached 
the 1980s with only a very modest 
beachhead on the North Campus: 
several research buildings, the Phoenix 
Laboratory and Institute for Science 
and Technology (both of which really 
reported to the Vice President for 
Research), a modest concrete block 
building for Aerospace Engineering, 
Provost Billy Frye breaks ground for the 
Dow Building while Dean Ragone watches on, 
in the best of Chaplinesque styles…
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another small building for the water 
resources program (hopefully named 
Engineering Building 1-A), and the 
construction site for the Dow building. 
It is perhaps ironic that the activities 
of my own department and my own 
teaching and research were conducted 
entirely on the North Campus. In fact, I 
drove into Central Campus only a few 
times each year for various committee 
meetings, at least until I began to be 
drawn into University service activities 
in the late 1970s.
College only compounded this sense 
of detachment, since the blunt style 
of the dean’s administrators and their 
abrasive defense of the status quo 
further isolated the dean’s office from 
the concerns of the faculty.
 One by one, the College’s most 
outstanding junior faculty members 
began to look elsewhere. Yet even as 
this attrition accelerated, the leadership 
of the College seemed unconcerned. 
Typical was the experience of 
William Powers, the rising star of the 
Aerospace Department, who when 
he visited Ragone to point out the 
vast discrepancy between a recent 
offer from Ford and his current 
compensation in the College, was 
simply told, “Well, I would take the 
Ford job if I were you.” And so Powers 
did, eventually becoming Ford’s vice 
president for research and director of 
the Ford Scientific Laboratory!
 The discouragement of the junior 
faculty did not begin with Ragone and 
the 1970s, but actually can be traced 
back to the 1960s and the earlier tenure 
of Van Wylen. In interviews with many 
faculty members, it became clear that 
the lack of encouragement and support 
of junior faculty had been a problem 
in the College for many years. Both the 
College administration and several of 
the department chairs were portrayed 
as quite discouraging to junior faculty, 
especially in some of the larger 
departments where faculty attrition 
was particularly high.  
 From this perspective, the isolation 
of my own department, Nuclear 
Engineering, and its activities on the 
Revolution
As instructional loads soared and the 
faculty struggled with inadequate 
laboratories and classrooms and 
the inconvenience of Central 
Campus-North Campus split, the 
research activity and reputation of 
the College declined, and faculty 
morale plummeted. Particularly 
frustrated were younger faculty at 
the assistant professor and associate 
professor level who increasingly 
viewed the inadequate environment 
for teaching and research as harmful 
to their careers. Beyond the burden 
of inadequate facilities and crushing 
teaching loads, they also had to 
struggle against an apathetic cadre of 
senior faculty, many of whom were 
quite inactive in research, and yet  
resisted any change. The absence of 
rewards and incentives that recognized 
excellence and achievement rather than 
simply age and rank was particularly 
frustrating.
 The leadership of the College 
contributed to the low morale of junior 
faculty.  Ragone’s extensive travel soon 
convinced the faculty that he would 
be an absentee dean, with little direct 
involvement in College or University 
activities.  Ragone once observed that 
“In any political system, especially 
around universities, power belong to 
those who take it.” Unfortunately for 
the College, he chose not to follow this 
advice.
 Ragone’s decision to delegate to 
his associate dean most decisions 
involving detailed activities in the 
Engineering Building 1-A
The Aerospace Building 
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North Campus, far from the rest of the 
College and the dean, was a distinct 
advantage, since most of our faculty, 
including its senior members, were 
quite active in research and graduate 
education.  But even here it is worth 
noting that the malaise in the College 
and the absence of recognition for 
achievement and excellence took its 
toll.  Each year across the College, 
senior faculty members were paid 
more and more, while junior faculty 
members fell farther and farther 
behind.  It was clear that senior faculty 
had benefited not only from the more 
generous University support of the 
College in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
but also from a salary program that 
tended to reward years in rank rather 
than productivity and achievement. 
 By the late 1970s, the situation had 
become so desperate that a small 
group of the most active younger 
faculty finally agreed that something 
must be done. This group, consisting 
primarily of younger professors at the 
peak of their academic careers (and 
including Charles Vest, Scott Fogler, 
Dave Sonstegaard, John Meyers, and, 
of course, me), were appalled by the 
absence of leadership, by a dean’s office 
that seemed unable (or uninterested) in 
the decline of the College and the loss 
of some of its most valuable younger 
faculty. We decided to address the 
matter head-on by meeting directly 
with Ragone. The meeting was a 
bizarre one, in Ragone’s large office 
in West Engineering. Before we could 
get very far into our bill of particulars, 
Ragone informed us in confidence 
that he expected to be announced that 
weekend as the next president of Case 
Western Reserve University and would 
be gone within a few months. Needless 
to say, the meeting unraveled after that. 
(We later learned that several of our 
colleagues had been contacted by the 
CWRU presidential search committee 
about Ragone and had given him rave 
reviews, primarily to make certain that 
he was soon on his way.)
 Any near-term hopes of relief 
from Ragone’s departure were soon 
dashed when the University appointed 
Hansford Farris as interim dean.  
Although Farris was well respected, he 
was close to retirement and unlikely 
to challenge the status quo, leaving 
Sinnott in place to continue to run the 
College. However, even as the search 
for a new dean was launched, the new 
provost of the University, Billy E. Frye, 
had the wisdom also to appoint an 
external review committee to assess the 
state of the College. This committee’s 
work provided strong evidence of just 
how far the College had declined in the 
quality of its environment for education 
and research and how damaging that 
had been to its reputation. 
The State of the College, 
Circa 1980
By 1980, two decades of inadequate 
University support and weak 
leadership had taken their toll. As 
noted earlier, University support 
had declined by over 30%, creating 
a funding gap amounting to roughly 
70 faculty positions (or $7 million in 
General Fund budget, compared to 
an existing budget of $10 million). 
The North Campus move was stalled 
in midstream, with only two small 
departments completely on North 
Campus (nuclear engineering and 
aeronautical engineering), and many 
faculty were forced to commute back 
and forth between their research labs 
and their classrooms. An apathetic 
and ineffective College administration 
had largely ignored the plummeting 
morale of the faculty, and many of 
our most outstanding junior faculty 
members had left for more rewarding, 
appreciative, and supportive 
environments. The College leadership 
had compounded these difficulties 
first in the 1960s by hiring a large 
number of faculty who were active 
only in teaching and then later shifting 
resources into a growing Department of 
Humanities at the expense of our core 
disciplinary programs.
 The decimation of the junior faculty 
ranks, the source of our next generation 
of faculty, was compounded by a large 
cadre of senior faculty, inactive in 
scholarship or sponsored research, that 
not only resisted change but thwarted 
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attempts to achieve excellence. In 
many cases this “impacted wisdom 
group” had not only lost the capacity to 
recognize excellence—the best people 
and programs across the nation—but 
actually felt threatened and resisted 
attempts to hire people better than 
they were. The College had fallen 
far behind other leading engineering 
schools in the standard measures of 
quality: its sponsored research volume 
per faculty member had dropped to 
only a fraction of those of leading 
institutions; its Ph.D. production had 
dropped to only 25% of that of peer 
engineering schools. Its representation 
in national organizations such as the 
National Academy of Engineering was 
essentially nonexistent.
 The challenges facing the College 
were formidable. Engineering 
education was facing a new era in 
which major curriculum changes 
would be necessary to accommodate 
new fields such as manufacturing 
engineering, robotics, bioengineering, 
and microelectronics as well as new 
tools such as computers and networks. 
The competition for the best faculty 
and students would be severe. And 
yet beyond this, the College faced 
the unique challenges of inadequate 
University support: a stalled move 
to the North Campus trapping its 
programs in woefully inadequate 
facilities and dividing its faculty; 
an aging faculty that had lost the 
capacity to regenerate and improve 
itself; a frustrated and increasingly 
restive junior faculty; a culture that 
not only failed to recognize and 
reward excellence, but moreover 
actively discouraged innovation 
and entrepreneurial behavior; and 
the legacy of two decades of unwise 
decisions tending to emphasize areas 
of little relevance to excellence in 
the core of engineering education 
and scholarship (e.g., humanities 
instruction in Engineering rather than 
LS&A).
 Put more bluntly, two decades of 
benign neglect by the University of 
Michigan’s central administration 
had driven the decline and fall of the 
College to the point where it no longer 
had the capacity to achieve excellence. 
It had lost not simply the will, but 
even the understanding and desire to 
attract, retain, and develop outstanding 
faculty. Bold action was necessary if 
the College was to reclaim its historical 




A Late Evening Phone Call
Late one evening in the spring of 
1981, our phone rang. It was Billy E. 
Frye, provost of the University, with a 
request: “Jim, I would like to ask you 
to accept an appointment as dean of 
the College of Engineering…” Both 
Anne and I were surprised (perhaps 
shocked is a more apt description). 
To be sure, both of us had been quite 
active in University affairs for a decade. 
I had served on, been elected to, and 
chaired numerous University-wide 
committees. Anne had also been quite 
active as a leader in various University-
wide organizations such as the Faculty 
Women’s Club.
 Yet we were taken back by the 
request to become dean of an academic 
unit with over 300 faculty and staff, 
6,000 students, and a budget of $20 
million. My administrative experience 
was essentially zero. I had never been 
a department chairman. In fact, I did 
not even have my own secretary, and 
I had never supervised anybody other 
than Ph.D. students. Furthermore, I 
was only thirty-seven and relatively 
unknown inside the College. After 
all, I had spent my academic career 
at Michigan entirely on the North 
Campus, separated from the bulk of 
College activities and faculty on the 
Central Campus.
 Perhaps because of the naiveté and 
brash confidence of youth, I quickly 
accepted Frye’s offer. After all, for the 
last several years I had been one of 
a number of junior faculty members 
complaining loud and bitterly about 
the deplorable state of the College. 
Now my bet had been called. I had 
been challenged with an opportunity to 
actually do something about it.
Yet, although a relatively unknown 
quantity to the College of Engineering 
and clearly inexperienced as an 
administrator, in other ways I was 
exceptionally well prepared for this 
role. In fact, during the late 1970s I had 
worked closely with the leadership 
of the University across a broad 
array of complex issues, acquiring 
both experience and knowledge and 
building important relationships that 
would prove invaluable in the years to 
come. 
A Brief Career as a Campus 
Politician
Most faculty members are loath to 
become involved in University service 
activities. After all, we are attracted 
to academic careers because of a love 
for teaching and scholarship, not 
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administration and bureaucracy. Yet I 
also realized early that most scholars 
in my particular areas of theoretical 
physics and abstract mathematics 
had relatively short productive 
careers–typically only a decade or 
two–before they lost the creativity that 
frequently accompanies youth and fell 
into the ruts that had trapped their 
predecessors. Most of my best research 
was already behind me, at least in 
my current fields of interest. Hence 
my choice was to either broaden my 
academic interests (which I did, into 
areas such as computer simulation), 
shift into other areas of scholarly 
interest (which I also did, into writing 
textbooks), or explore other careers, 
including entering the dreaded swamp 
of academic administration.
College of Engineering Activities
Actually, although I did have some 
interest in academic administration, 
it was largely closed off to me. My 
department was a small one, and we 
already benefited from a relatively 
young and effective chairman in 
Glenn Knoll. (In fact I had chaired the 
search committee that resulted in his 
appointment, after Dean Ragone had 
first called me to note that although 
I was probably qualified to also be 
a candidate, at age 35 I was still too 
young. Little did he suspect that two 
years later I would move into his office 
instead.)
 The alternative was to become more 
actively involved in the myriad faculty 
service activities that characterize 
research universities. Of course I 
had been quite actively involved 
in department activities, chairing 
our curriculum, reactor safety, and 
department review committees. But 
by the mid-1970s I had graduated to 
College-wide activities, first chairing 
the College’s Curriculum Committee 
and then serving on several department 
review committees (including 
mechanical engineering, mathematics, 
and naval architecture). 
 Like most younger faculty 
members, I tended to approach each 
assignment with an activist agenda. 
For example, when I chaired the 
curriculum committee for the College 
of Engineering, we eliminated half 
of the courses in the College catalog 
on the grounds that they were 
rarely taught. Not surprisingly, the 
resistance to such actions was intense 
as senior faculty members fought 
tooth and nail against any changes. 
Yet the committee was insistent that 
“truth in advertising” demanded that 
the catalog reflect what was really 
taught, not what advertised a faculty 
member’s past efforts or future wishes. 
In much the same spirit, my efforts on 
the mathematics committee to insist 
that mathematics courses should be 
taught by mathematicians rather than 
by engineering faculty eventually 
led to a strengthening of the applied 
mathematics program at Michigan. 
 These early experiences also gave 
me my first taste of interacting with 
more senior academic administrators. 
Each term we would invite the dean to 
meet with the Curriculum Committee, 
and it was through these meetings 
that we began to understand the real 
nature of Ragone’s leadership. I also 
had the opportunity to develop an 
unusually broad understanding of the 
instructional activities of the College of 
Engineering across the full spectrum 
of its programs. It was through this 
experience that I also became better 
acquainted with the faculty of the 
College, since as chairman of the 
Curriculum Committee, I would have 
to appear at each faculty meeting to 
propose a series of motions associated 
with our instructional programs. None 
of these were particularly memorable, 
except for the time that I had to make 
the presentation the day after breaking 
my ankle in a challenge basketball 
game with our undergraduates.
University-Wide Activities
My involvement with broader 
University-wide issues began with 
my election to the Executive Board 
of the Rackham School of Graduate 
Studies. Here I should note that the 
Rackham Executive Board, whose 
members are elected by the entire 
faculty of the University, is one of 
the very few faculty bodies with real 
executive powers, in the sense that it is 
charged with making actual decisions 
rather than simply offering advice. The 
creation of new graduate programs, 
the closure of old programs, the 
awarding of fellowships and faculty 
research grants, and the evaluation 
of the quality of various graduate 
programs were typical responsibilities 
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of this board, which would meet for an 
afternoon each week with the Dean of 
the Graduate School, Alfred Sussman.
 I look back on this experience 
as one of the more intellectually 
stimulating and rewarding of my 
faculty service activities, since many 
of the University’s most distinguished 
faculty members were elected to serve 
on the Rackham Executive Board, 
and the issues it considered were 
both fascinating and consequential. 
It stimulated me to think more 
broadly about the University and 
higher education, while developing 
both a better understanding of and 
relationships with academic programs 
across the University. Because of the 
executive nature of our activities, 
we frequently met with deans and 
department chairs from various 
academic units. Here I should also note 
that I served on this body through two 
important transitions, first as Harold 
Shapiro succeeded Frank Rhodes as 
provost of the University, and then later 
as Shapiro succeeded Robben Fleming 
as president of the University. 
 But I had an even better ringside seat 
of the provost’s office, since I was asked 
to serve on and later chair the faculty 
advisory committee to the provost. The 
Academic Affairs Advisory Committee 
(AAAC) was a committee of the 
University’s Senate Assembly (the 
faculty senate), charged with advising 
the provost and undertaking studies 
on various issues of concern to the 
Office of Academic Affairs. Since the 
provost at Michigan was not only the 
chief academic officer but also the chief 
budget officer of the University, the 
AAAC could get into almost anything 
having to do with the University.1
 When I first joined the AAAC, 
Frank Rhodes was Vice President 
for Academic Affairs, but in 1976 
he left to accept the presidency at 
Cornell University2. After a brief 
period, during which the dean of 
the Rackham Graduate School, Al 
Sussman, served as Interim Vice 
President, Harold Shapiro was 
appointed to succeed Rhodes. Shapiro 
had been chairman of the Economics 
Department, but more key to his new 
role was the fact that he had served 
as chairman of the University’s 
Budget Priorities Committee, a joint 
faculty-administration committee with 
responsibilities for strategic budget 
planning. Furthermore, Shapiro had 
long led the effort to analyze economic 
models of the Michigan economy, 
and hence he was well aware of the 
challenges that the state would face 
in the years ahead. However I should 
also note that he was optimistic–at least 
when meeting with the AAAC–that 
any decline in state funding of the 
University would be short-lived, and 
that the 1980s would be a decade 
of strong state support (thereby 
demonstrating once again that the state 
of the economy is as unpredictable as 
the weather).
 After a year as a member of the 
AAAC, I was asked to chair the 
committee, which I did for the next 
two years, bridging the transition from 
Rhodes to Shapiro. During this period 
a broad array of issues came before our 
committee, including the policies for 
discontinuing academic programs, the 
evaluation of faculty teaching, more 
general faculty evaluation, and several 
budget-related issues. Although the 
committee responded to any requests 
from the provost, it also had the 
mandate to generate its own issues for 
study. 
 It was in this spirit that the AAAC 
launched a major study to evaluate the 
quality of the research environment on 
campus, including controversial issues 
such as indirect cost recovery and 
cost-sharing as well as administrative 
and technical support of research 
and faculty incentives for generating 
sponsored funding. This entire study 
was a bit sensitive since it overlapped 
several vice-presidential areas. 
Although we had strong support 
from the provost, we were somewhat 
threatening to both the vice presidential 
areas of research and finance. 
Nevertheless we plowed ahead, 
stirring up considerable interest, and 
releasing a hard-hitting report warning 
the University that it needed to move 
quickly to address the deteriorating 
state of the research environment before 
it lost both top faculty and research 
funding. This was an issue that I would 
continue to keep front-and-center 
both during my tenure as dean of 
engineering and eventually as provost 
and president. In fact, I believe that it 
was largely because of the persistence 
and effectiveness of this effort that 
we were able not only to improve the 
research environment on campus, 
but also to propel Michigan during 
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the 1980s up the ladder from eighth 
to eventually first in the nation in 
sponsored research activities, a position 
of leadership that the university was 
able to maintain throughout the 1990s.
 After three years on the AAAC 
(overlapping somewhat with my 
service on the Rackham Executive 
Board), I was asked to serve on the 
Budget Priorities Committee (BPC). 
This joint faculty-administrative 
committee was to play a particularly 
important role as the University 
entered a period of financial stress 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s 
with the weakening of the Michigan 
economy. Although the BPC reported 
to the provost, it advised all of the 
executive officers of the University 
on budget strategies. It was delegated 
executive authority during the years 
of economic retrenchment, reviewing 
academic and administrative units for 
major budget reductions including 
possible discontinuance. In fact, I was 
asked to chair one such review for 
the University Extension Service, a 
committee that included hard-nosed 
administrators such as Gil Whitaker, 
Dean of the School of Business 
Administration, Tom Dunn, chair of 
Chemistry, Judy Bardwick, associate 
dean of LS&A, and Ken Warner, a 
senior professor of Public Health. 
Ironically, the student member of the 
review committee was Brad Canale, 
then one of the leaders of student 
government and later to become the 
College of Engineering’s director of 
development.
 My final service assignment as a 
faculty member occurred just prior to 
being selected as dean of engineering. 
Two years before I had been elected as 
a member of the Senate Assembly, the 
University’s faculty governance. The 
month prior to my selection as dean, I 
had been nominated for membership 
on the Senate Assembly Committee 
on University Affairs (SACUA), the 
executive body for faculty governance. 
At the time I would probably have 
viewed my career as a faculty politician 
as just about complete had I been able 
to serve on SACUA and eventually be 
elected as its chair–the chair of faculty 
governance at the University. However, 
fate was to intervene in the form of 
Bill Frye’s phone call in March of 1981 
offering me the position of dean.
The Selection of a New 
Dean of Engineering
Aside from a brief meeting with 
the external review committee, my 
involvement with the search for Dave 
Ragone’s successor was quite limited. 
Although I vaguely remember brief 
meetings with the search committee, I 
naturally assumed that the committee 
would view as the leading internal 
candidates several of the chairs of our 
major departments (e.g., electrical 
engineering, mechanical engineering, 
industrial engineering). Therefore 
I was a bit surprised as the search 
approached its endgame phase when 
I learned through the grapevine that 
I was the only internal candidate, 
with Bill Brown, president of ERIM 
(and a former professor of electrical 
engineering at Michigan) and 
Robert White, chairman of electrical 
engineering at Stanford, the external 
candidates. It was natural to assume 
at this point that the University 
administration would go outside, and 
White seemed like the logical choice.
 As a finalist, I went through the 
usual process of interviews with Bill 
Frye and finally with the Regents. 
(Here my only memory is that while 
the Regents were courteous, they were 
not particularly attentive. In fact, I 
can recall that one Regent spent the 
entire interview reading the sports 
pages of the Michigan Daily, perhaps 
prophetic of my future dealings with 
the University Regents as president.) 
At this point, the search moved into 
the deliberation phase, and I put any 
thought of it aside, assuming that 
they would never appoint someone as 
young or inexperienced as I was.
 Yet looking back over these various 
roles, assignments, and responsibilities, 
it is clear that my experience, 
knowledge, and contacts went far 
beyond those of most faculty members. 
Although most of my teaching and 
research activities were confined 
to the Siberia of the University’s 
North Campus, my service activities 
spanned essentially all aspects of both 
the College of Engineering and the 
University of Michigan more generally. 
At the College level, my service as 
chair of the Curriculum Committee 
and then on several department 
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review committees gave me both a 
broad understanding of the academic 
programs as well as relationships with 
the various department chairs and 
deans of the College.
 Of even more importance was my 
service on perhaps the four most 
important faculty bodies in the 
University: the Rackham Executive 
Board, the Academic Affairs Advisory 
Committee, and Budget Priorities 
Committee, and the Senate Assembly. 
These bodies not only exposed me 
to a very broad array of academic, 
financial, policy, and political issues 
across the University, but also gave me 
valuable experience in leading groups 
of faculty from diverse disciplines and 
backgrounds as committee chairman. 
Furthermore, during the five years I 
spent in these activities, I was able to 
develop direct personal relationships 
with most of the leadership of the 
University, including President Harold 
Shapiro, Provost Billy Frye, most of the 
other executive officers, and many of 
the deans. Perhaps equally important 
were the relationships developed with 
key administrative staff in the offices 
of the president, provost, research, 
finance, and state relations.
 Hence, in retrospect, perhaps it is not 
so surprising that Bill Frye made that 
late night phone call in March, 1981. 
Yet I doubt that even Bill suspected the 
depth of my experience, knowledge, 
and networking in university affairs. 
But he would soon find this out.
 Actually, Anne has a far more logical 
explanation for my selection as dean. 
The chairman of the faculty dean 
search committee was Bill Richart, one 
of the College’s most distinguished 
faculty members. Although he had no 
idea who I was at the time, his wife, 
Betty, had worked closely with Anne in 
leadership roles in the Faculty Women’s 
Club. When Bill asked Betty if she had 
ever heard of this guy Duderstadt, she 
responded, “Well I don’t know him but 
I sure know his wife Anne. She’d make 
a really great dean’s wife. Put him on 
the list!” And he did.
Meeting My New Bosses
The day after Bill Frye’s phone call 
offering me the position of dean of 
engineering, I met with him to discuss 
details concerning the appointment. 
But first I met with Harold Shapiro for 
an hour or so at the President’s House. 
 His assessment of the weakened 
state of the College agreed with 
mine. He stressed the importance of 
“breaking out of the blocks fast” to 
deal with many of these issues, since 
he believed them to be quite critical. 
He encouraged experimentation and 
innovation, noting that he was willing 
to support unusual efforts for a single 
academic unit that might be more 
problematic for the entire University. 
He cautioned that at a time of serious 
budgetary constraint for the University, 
proposals to the central administration 
would be most effective if they 
included some degree of cost-sharing 
by the College. He wanted to be kept 
in the loop on major issues, and we 
Should I become dean?
The new dean’s team
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agreed to meet together with Bill Frye 
later in the term.
 The meeting with Bill Frye was 
more extensive for the obvious reason 
that he was now my new boss, since 
deans reported to the provost.  We 
began by discussing the usual details 
of my appointment, since in our brief 
conversation the night before, there had 
not been an opportunity to consider 
matters such as term of appointment, 
compensation, and the needs for 
resources. Most senior appointments 
involve such negotiations, in which 
the candidate tries to negotiate both 
the best possible personal situation 
as well as resources for the unit to be 
led. In fact, one of the most important 
responsibilities of a dean, provost, 
and president is to conduct these 
negotiations successfully and land the 
candidate, much like a big fish on a 
light fishing line. However, I threw an 
unusual twist into this first meeting 
by ignoring the normal negotiation 
protocols that characterize academic 
leadership appointments. When 
Frye had made his offer of the dean’s 
position, I responded immediately 
with, “Yes, I’ll do it.” As he raised the 
possibility of negotiating the details, 
I simply said, “Bill, I trust you, and I 
know you will help later when I need 
it.” This approach threw Billy Frye off 
balance, but as he was later to learn, I 
would indeed be back…many, many 
times.
 Our discussion then turned to the 
task at hand. Frye asked me to come 
back with a draft of a long-range 
budget plan by fall, identifying goals 
and objectives, what the College could 
do on its own, what support it needed 
from the University, and possible 
sources and estimates of outside 
support. Frye noted his desire to 
provide the College with relief from the 
6% cut then levied across all academic 
units to respond to the financial 
emergency triggered by declining state 
support, but noted that this might 
prove difficult. (As it turns out, we 
agreed later that we would take the full 
6% cut like all other academic units, but 
then Frye would give us the funds back 
to use for our own priorities.) 
 Frye acknowledged that the 
College was underfunded, but he 
was uncertain of the magnitude, 
suggesting it might be “as much as 
$1 million/year in base support.” 
(We were later to demonstrate that 
the real “engineering gap” was closer 
to $7 million/year, or roughly 50% 
of the current budget of the College. 
As challenging as this estimate was, 
it was the target for budget growth 
and restoration that we were to set, 
achieve, and exceed over the next 
several years.) In discussing the current 
state of the College, Frye raised his 
concern about the conscious effort by 
the College over the past decade to 
stress undergraduate instruction at the 
expense of graduate education and 
research, an action that seemed to be 
in contrast with peer institutions. He 
was aware of the precipitous decline 
in Ph.D. productivity and sponsored 
research support during the decade 
and believed one of my first priorities 
should be to change the course of the 
College back to stressing research and 
graduate education. We also agreed 
that we needed to differentiate more 
among faculty roles, lightening the 
President Harold Shapiro
Provost Billy Frye (in 1992)
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instructional load on those who were 
most active in research. 
 We discussed the starting date for 
my appointment as dean. Although 
the current interim dean, Bill Farris, 
wanted to serve until July, both Frye 
and I wanted to get on with it, so 
we set May 1 as the start date. Frye 
echoed Shapiro’s encouragement to 
start off with a bang—but he added the 
modifier “carefully.”
 Finally, we agreed to keep my 
selection as dean confidential until I 
was introduced at a special meeting of 
the College of Engineering faculty the 
following week. 
Listening and Learning
Thus read the memorandum circulated 
to the faculty on the following Monday. 
There was an unusually large turnout 
for a College faculty meeting, in part 
because there was great curiosity 
about whom Frye had selected. When 
I walked in the room with Frye, I 
suspect that there were many in the 
room who had no idea who I was, even 
though I had been a member of the 
College faculty for twelve years. But to 
many others, particularly among the 
junior faculty, there was the immediate 
recognition that Frye was going to take 
a chance and turn the reins of power 
over to “the young Turks.” I could see 
the smiles on their faces.
 After a brief introduction by Frye, 
I made some remarks to the faculty, 
intending both to reassure them 
as well as to let them know clearly 
and from the outset that my highest 
priority would be “the achievement of 
excellence, in education, scholarship, 
and research, and in the professional 
achievements of our faculty and 
students.” I acknowledged the current 
challenges of the College: inadequate 
funding, decaying physical facilities, 
obsolete equipment, and an overloaded 
faculty. I also suggested that as a 
College we had occasionally been 
more concerned with secondary goals 
such as the North Campus move or 
improving instructional efficiency 
than with the quality of our research 
and instructional programs. I went on 
to note a theme that I would sound 
again and again, first as dean, then as 
provost, and finally as president: “The 
key to excellence lies with people, 
with their abilities, their attitudes, and 
their commitment. Hence I believe the 
most appropriate role for the College 
administration is to attract outstanding 
faculty and students; provide the 
environment, encouragement, and 
support needed to push to the limits 
of their talents and dreams; and then 
get out of their way!” I pledged to 
work with the faculty to build an 
environment that not only allowed for 
excellence, creativity, and innovation, 
but actively stimulated, rewarded, and, 
indeed, demanded such efforts. 
March 16, 1981
MEMORANDUM
TO:  College of Engineering Faculty
FROM: Hansford W. Farris
RE: Special Meeting of the Faculty
On behalf of Vice President Billy E. Frye, we are calling a special 
meeting of the Faculty of the College of Engineering with regard 
to the search for an individual to serve the College as Dean of 
Engineering. Your attendance will be appreciated.
The meeting will be held in the usual place, Room 311 West 
Engineering, and near the usual time, 3:00 on Tuesday, March 17, 
1981. We regret the necessity for such short notice.
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 My remarks assured them that 
I intended to be a full-time dean, 
receptive and responsive to student 
and faculty needs and concerns and 
totally dedicated to working with them 
on behalf of the College. I concluded by 
stating my intent to open up new lines 
of communication with the faculty, to 
learn of their needs and concerns and 
to seek their advice and suggestions. 
(The complete text of this first speech to 
the faculty is provided in an appendix.)
 And listen I did, spending the 
next several weeks before formally 
assuming the position of dean by 
visiting every member of the faculty 
and administration who would 
meet with me, asking questions, and 
listening to their concerns and their 
aspirations in an effort to learn about 
the College and begin to develop a strategy. I was particularly interested 
in meeting with the current leadership 
of the College, the department chairs 
and my predecessor as dean to learn as 
much as I could. I realized that I probably 
would not agree with much that I heard, 
but at least I would understand where 
they were coming from. 
 To this end, I first began to meet 
regularly with the interim dean, Bill 
Farris, since he was a veteran who had 
spent most of his career in the College. 
 I also met regularly with the business 
manager of the College, Harold 
Harger, who was really the source of 
continuity in the College, the keeper of 
its corporate history, and, as we were to 
appreciate later, the wise old hand that 
kept those of us who were young Turks 
from flying off the edge.
 I remember well my first visits to the 
dean’s office in the College, trudging 
up stairs in West Engineering that were 
so old that they had ruts worn in them 
from a century of students and faculty. 
The sense of an old, musty, decaying 
building was almost overpowering, as 
was the gigantic paneled office of the 
dean, originally designed by Mortimer 
Cooley, and serving each dean since his 
time. I would note that this is the only 
office I had ever seen with seven—I 
counted them—seven doors. It was 
rumored that these doors had served 
well the previous dean, Dave Ragone, 
when he had to avoid faculty and 
students. But in reality, these doors, 
like the large, walk-in safe in the office, 
were relics of an age long past. It did 
not take long to realize that getting 
the College out of these quarters, truly Interim Dean Hansford Farris (on left)
The Dean’s Office in West Engineering
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Victorian both in age and design, 
would be an immediate priority.3 
  In many ways the administration 
of the College was equally Victorian 
in character. The two mainstays 
were Harold Harger and the dean’s 
executive secretary, Elaine Harden, 
two longtime administrators who had 
served engineering deans reaching 
back to the years of G. G. Brown and 
Stephen Attwood, and who were 
deeply loyal and committed to the 
College. However there was a much 
larger staff of more questionable value, 
largely recruited by Dave Ragone and 
his colleagues, for an array of activities 
ranging from fund-raising to corporate 
recruiting to personal speech-writing. 
And there were two associate deans, 
Maury Sinnott and Joe Eisley, who had 
assumed the thankless task of running 
the College in the dean’s absence.
 Here, I might note that my naiveté 
proved particularly valuable in dealing 
with these individuals. I naturally 
assumed that associate deans served 
at the pleasure of each new dean of 
engineering, so during my first meeting 
with each, I thanked them profusely for 
their service and offered to assist them 
in their return to the faculty in any 
way that I could prior to the beginning 
of the fall term. As I was to learn 
later, it was not general practice that 
there would be a complete turnover 
in associate deans with each new 
administration, but my ignorance of the 
traditions of academic administration 
immediately opened up positions into 
which I could recruit several of my 
young colleagues: Chuck Vest, Dan 
Atkins, and Scott Fogler.
 As I met with each member of the 
College administration, it rapidly 
became clear that they could be 
characterized as highly defensive, 
territorial, and distrustful of any and 
all comers. And little wonder. With 
an absentee dean, a central University 
administration that had beaten them 
down, and a faculty with low morale 
and high apathy, it was hard to be 
open and optimistic. Over the years 
the College had pulled apart from 
the rest of the University, teaching 
within the College many subjects 
more appropriate for LS&A such as 
humanities, writing, and mathematics; 
establishing its own alumni association 
separate from the University’s; and 
even refusing to transfer the records 
of the College over to the central 
University archives.
 My predecessor’s frequent absence 
from campus and tendency to 
over-delegate had created another 
administrative challenge. Like most of 
the University’s schools and colleges, 
the College of Engineering had an 
Executive Committee, comprised of 
four faculty members elected by the 
College faculty, who were charged with 
working with the dean on key policy 
matters. Since the faculty tended to 
elect its most senior and distinguished 
faculty to this body, it was a 
particularly valuable source of wisdom 
and advice. Yet the dean’s absence had 
allowed the Executive Committee to 
evolve into a management committee 
rather than an advisory body. It 
tended to delve into all matter of 
administrative detail, much to the 
consternation of the department chairs 
who believed (and rightly so) that 
they reported to the dean and not the 
College Executive Committee. They 
were particularly incensed that the 
Executive Committee had recently 
Elaine HardenHarold Harger
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taken a far more aggressive role in 
promotion and tenure decisions, 
reversing department decisions and 
recommendations on a large number of 
faculty members–although it was also 
clear that the standards for promotion 
had eroded quite considerably in 
several departments. Nevertheless, it 
became apparent that without strong 
leadership by the dean, the Executive 
Committee had filled the vacuum by 
becoming involved in many of the 
management details of the College. It 
would be a challenge to get it refocused 
on its proper role concerning policy 
issues. 
 The inappropriate involvement of 
the College Executive Committee in 
the detailed operations of the College 
was only one of many concerns that I 
heard from the department chairmen 
as I met with each one, going in 
each case to their office for extended 
discussions. The chairs felt isolated 
from the College administration, 
with little input to key decisions that 
affected their departments. They also 
were very cynical about Ragone’s effort 
on behalf of the College, suspecting 
that much of the deterioration in 
University support of Engineering 
had occurred because Ragone was not 
inclined to make a serious case to the 
central administration for adequate 
support. They viewed Sinnott largely 
as someone Ragone had put in place to 
make sure nothing happened while he 
was out of town. It was clear that the 
dean’s office had never had a plan or 
an objective, beyond the fund-raising 
campaign objectives. The dean’s low 
opinion of peer organizations such 
as the Big 10 Deans Council and the 
Engineering Deans Institute effectively 
cut the College off from contact with 
peer institutions. The chairmen were 
concerned that many important 
strategic issues such as College 
computing needs, technology transfer, 
and strengthening relationships with 
the science departments in LS&A were 
simply being ignored by an absentee 
dean and a defend-the-status-quo-fort 
administration.
 Despite my decision to replace the 
associate deans, I believed it important 
to keep the department chairmen 
in place to sustain the continuity of 
our academic programs. Besides, the 
general quality of the chairmen was 
high, due in part to the strong role that 
their department faculties had played 
in their selection. Yet, there were 
problems, and here too, my naivete 
may have had a practical benefit. In 
meeting with the department chairs, 
two of the most powerful chairmen, 
who had also been candidates for the 
dean’s position, attempted the usual 
power play by threatening me that 
they would step down if they didn’t 
get their way. I had been warned about 
this possibility (and had confirmed that 
their resignation would be no great loss 
for the College). Hence I thanked them 
for their service and asked them for 
help in searching for their successors, 
leaving each of them a bit stunned as I 
left their offices.
 My listening and learning went 
far beyond College administrators to 
include a significant fraction of the 
rank-and-file faculty of the College as 
well as student leaders and key alumni. 
Although there was considerable 
diversity concerning faculty attitudes, 
the feelings of frustration, alienation 
from the dean’s office, and pessimism 
about the future of the College were 
consistent with those I had heard 
from academic leaders. The sense 
of frustration was particularly acute 
among the junior and mid-career 
faculty, who saw few incentives for 
their achievements, continued erosion 
in the quality of the environment 
presented by the College for their 
research and teaching, and serious 
questions about whether it was in their 
best interests to remain at Michigan. 
Although there were many highly 
productive and distinguished senior 
faculty, there were many others in the 
senior ranks who had long since lost 
their scholarly momentum and were 
largely going through the motions, 
teaching the same courses in the same 
way that they had taught for years, 
and earning top dollar in a College 
compensation program that rewarded 
years in rank rather than achievement 
and excellence. 
 Students, too, displayed a similar 
sense of apathy toward the College. 
Little wonder, since their classes and 
laboratories were burdened by the 
inadequate space available in West 
Engineering and East Engineering 
and the frustration and apathy of the 
faculty frequently propagated into the 
curriculum. Engineering is a difficult 
and demanding major in the best of 
circumstances, and when facilities are 
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poor and the faculty is unhappy, it 
can be burdensome indeed. This was 
compounded by the loss of student 
class identity, as students were herded 
from one part of the curriculum to the 
next, without any sense of belonging to 
a professional school or a graduating 
class identity.
 There were also challenges beyond 
the campus. While many alumni had 
fond memories of their College years, 
the preoccupation of the fund-raising 
efforts of the 1970s, coupled with the 
failure to make any significant progress 
on the move to the North Campus, left 
them discouraged and disengaged. So 
too, industry sensed that the College 
had slipped during the 1960s and 
1970s, was no longer at the cutting edge 
in key areas, and was falling further 
and further behind key competitors 
such as Illinois, Purdue, Stanford, and 
MIT.
 Clearly our work was cut out for us!
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Suffice it to say that during the six 
weeks between my selection as dean 
and my first day in the dean’s office, 
my cram course on faculty, student, 
and external perspectives had revealed 
a situation even more critical than I 
had first imagined. Two decades of 
declining University support and 
ineffective College leadership had 
taken a serious toll on the quality of the 
academic programs of the College and 
the morale of faculty and students. 
 I remember well one of my early 
discussions with Harold Harger, the 
long-time College business manager, 
as I tried to understand just how the 
decline and fall of the College could 
have occurred. Harger had a conspiracy 
theory: He believed that the University 
administration had intentionally driven 
the College to the brink—whether 
because they believed it overfunded, 
or because they preferred to fund 
other priorities such as Dentistry and 
Medicine, or perhaps because they 
became irritated with earlier College 
leaders (an earlier administrator had 
referred to G. G. Brown, the College 
dean of the 1950s, as “the Great God 
Brown”). But whether from malice of 
forethought or simply benign neglect, 
the damage had been done.
 To meet the instructional needs 
imposed by rapidly growing 
enrollments during the 1970s in the 
face of year after year of budget cuts 
imposed by the central administration 
(averaging a 2% reduction in base 
budget each year through the 1970s), 
the College had been forced to 
cannibalize its ability to meet other 
needs. It cut 18 technical support 
staff and eliminated entirely the 
discretionary current account funds it 
provided to the departments. It raided 
salary programs in order to maintain 
instructional staff, with the largest 
impact on junior faculty. And yet it 
still lost the equivalent of 70 faculty 
positions through these budget cuts.
 Of course, part of the problem arose 
from the very effort of the College 
to optimize its operations within 
the constraint of whatever budget it 
was given by the University—an all-
too-natural tendency for engineers 
accustomed to making the best of any 
situation. Unlike LS&A, which built its 
budget during the 1970s by consistently 
overrunning accounts each year only 
to be bailed out at year-end by the 
provost, the College made whatever 
cuts were necessary to stay within 
the budget parameters given to it by 
the provost, to the detriment of its 
academic programs.
 Another consequence of inadequate 
support was the relative dearth of 
Chapter 5
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junior faculty hiring during the 
1970s. By 1980, over 200 College 
faculty members were at the full 
professor rank—tenured, at the top 
of the pay scale, and, in many cases, 
relatively inactive in research. Of 
course, the best of our faculty were 
highly mobile and subject to raids 
from other universities and industry 
because of the deteriorating research 
environment. But many other faculty 
members, who had been hired to 
meet growing instructional needs 
during the 1960s, did not have strong 
research interests or capability. In 
many cases, these instructional faculty 
members had fallen far behind in their 
rapidly evolving technical disciplines. 
Although outdated, they were tenured, 
in many cases outspoken squeaky 
wheels, and imposed an increasingly 
heavy burden on the shrinking number 
of faculty members attempting to 
sustain the momentum of the College’s 
graduate and research programs. 
 Yet achieving relief from the 
University administration would be 
a formidable challenge in the face of 
the financial crisis looming before the 
institution in the early 1980s. Harold 
Shapiro’s prediction of economic 
prosperity for the decade had collapsed 
under the weight of rising energy 
prices and a domestic automobile 
industry increasingly vulnerable to 
competition from Japan. I remember 
well a visit to General Motors where a 
senior GM executive boasted “As long 
as we can put a car on the showroom 
floor for fewer dollars per pound than 
anybody else in the world, America 
doesn’t need to worry.” The only 
problem was that people stopped 
buying cars by the pound and instead 
began to focus on quality. The entire 
domestic automobile industry went 
into the tank and drove the nation into 
recession.
 The old saying that “When the nation 
gets a cold, Detroit gets pneumonia!” 
had become true once again, as a 
national recession threw Michigan 
effectively into a depression in which 
tax revenues dwindled even as the 
welfare rolls expanded. Inflation was 
rampant, exploding to double-digit 
levels. The University of Michigan 
had already experienced a series of 
executive order budget cuts in its state 
appropriations and was expecting 
still further cuts on top of inadequate 
appropriations for several years to 
come. During this five-year period 
the University would lose effectively 
30% of its state support, with serious 
implications for its academic programs.
 This was compounded by the 
demographic changes in the number 
of high school graduates associated 
with the post-WWII baby boom and 
bust cycle. In particular, the number 
of high school graduates in Michigan 
would decline by over 25% by the mid-
1990s. This predicted decline eroded 
the political urgency to protect higher 
education from the deep cuts sweeping 
other state services.
 Harold Shapiro launched a three-
pronged strategy to cope with 
declining state support: First, the 
University ramped up tuition levels 
(and more quietly increased out-of-
state enrollments) to increase tuition 
revenues. Next, it launched a major 
University-wide fund-raising effort that 
would culminate in a major campaign 
destined to raise over $300 million 
during the 1980s. Finally, it launched a 
program of cost containment, program 
review, and reallocation (unfortunately 
referred to as the “smaller but better” 
strategy) to protect University 
priorities. As I noted in Chapter 4, the 
provost had lead responsibility for this 
program, with the Budget Priorities 
Committee serving as the key strategic 
support group.
 The College would have to cope 
with this environment of financial 
exigency in its effort to make the case 
for increased University support. As a 
clear sign of his understanding of our 
plight, Bill Frye had already offered 
to help by returning to the College 
as flexible dollars the 6% budget cut 
levied on all academic units. But in 
future years the political environment 
of shared hardship would require us 
to participate in the Five-Year Plan to 
reallocate 10% of all academic budgets, 
even as we benefited from budget 
growth fueled by this very reallocation.  
Getting ahead of my story a bit, we 
were eventually able to eliminate 
roughly $3 million of the $7 million 
Engineering Gap in annual support 
through University reallocation in 
response to our desperate appeals, 
even in this difficult budget climate. 
But to eliminate the remaining funding 
gap and to begin to build funding to 
more competitive levels, we would 
eventually have to turn to the state 
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decision to turn to the same group of 
junior faculty who had joined with me 
in earlier efforts to push the College 
to a more aggressive and enlightened 
commitment to faculty quality and 
achievement. The first member of this 
team was obvious: Chuck Vest. Both 
Chuck and I had joined the faculty at 
about the same time (although Chuck 
had received his Ph.D. at Michigan 
in Mechanical Engineering while I 
came from Caltech), worked up the 
promotion ladder side-by-side, and 
even shared the College’s award for 
outstanding junior faculty achievement 
(the Class of ‘39E Award). Chuck had 
also been a member of the dean search 
committee and was well aware of the 
challenges faced by the College. Of 
course it did not take a rocket scientist 
(or rather, a nuclear rocket scientist) to 
realize that Chuck had extraordinary 
leadership skills. He was later to 
succeed me as both dean of engineering 
and later as provost. He was lured 
away from Michigan to become 
for direct line item support (which we 
were fortunate to achieve through the 
state’s Research Excellence Fund to be 
discussed in the next chapter).
The Team
Immediately after being named as the 
new Dean of Engineering, I turned my 
attention to building the leadership 
team that would work with me in 
rebuilding the College. Since engineers 
are trained to work naturally in teams, 
I sought an administrative structure 
that would draw many of the College’s 
most energetic and talented faculty 
into leadership roles. I quickly settled 
on a structure patterned after the 
executive-legislative-judicial branch 
organization of the federal government. 
More specifically, I viewed the College 
deans (the dean, associate deans, 
business manager) as the executive 
branch, with executive responsibilities 
for leading and managing the college. I 
viewed the chairmen as comprising the 
legislative branch, akin to the Congress, 
representing the interests of their 
departments as key constituencies. 
Finally, the College Executive 
Committee was, in effect, the judiciary 
equivalent to the Supreme Court, with 
key responsibility for policy approval 
as well as the final authority on key 
decisions such as faculty promotion 
and tenure.
 My meetings with the chairmen 
confirmed my suspicion that they had 
not been adequately involved in key 
College decisions that had tended to 
be made (if at all) by the deans or the 
Executive Committee. I established 
the Chairmen’s Advisory Committee, 
a new body designed to provide both 
a forum and mechanism for chairmen 
involvement in College-wide issues. 
When I first formed this group, I 
proposed that it meet weekly with the 
deans for the first two months as we 
assembled the strategic plan for the 
College. Afterwards it would meet 
every two weeks. Although College 
rules prescribed a Standing Committee 
that included deans, chairmen, and 
other staff, this group was so large that 
two-way communication was very 
difficult, hence the need for the new 
chairmen’s committee.
 It was important for the Executive 
Committee to resume its appropriate 
role in policy matters and withdraw 
from direct involvement in 
management issues. I felt that if 
we could challenge the Executive 
Committee with substantive policy 
roles—and demonstrate competence 
in handling management issues—it 
would quickly retreat to its appropriate 
role. Here I would note, however, 
that after I left as dean, the Executive 
Committee would occasionally lapse 
once again into management details 
when not appropriately led from 
the dean’s office—a tendency not 
particularly surprising considering the 
strength of the senior faculty members 
usually elected to this body.
 My most immediate concern was 
building the team that would comprise 
the dean’s office. It was an easy 
THE TEAM
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president of MIT in the early 1990s, 
where he has served for many years 
as one of the true leaders of American 
higher education. Chuck agreed to 
accept the assignment of associate 
dean for academic affairs—in effect, 




    The second key appointment was 
Dan Atkins, a young professor of 
computer engineering, whom we 
brought into a new position of associate 
dean of research. Dan not only had 
extensive experience in attracting 
sponsored research support from the 
federal government and industry, 
but he also was at the cutting edge 
in computer technology, an area 
we realized would become of great 
importance to the College. Once again, 
Dan’s leadership and entrepreneurial 
skills were evident, and after a brief 
period as interim dean of the College, 
he was to become the founding dean 
of the University’s new School of 
Information. Beyond that, Dan was 
probably the most creative and original 
thinker on our team, frequently coming 
up with novel ways to solve very 
complex problems.
 The third member of the team was 
Scott Fogler, long recognized as one of 
the real national leaders in chemical 
engineering education (and yet another 
member of the young faculty who led 
the revolution in the College during 
the late 1970s). Scott agreed to accept 
the position of associate dean for 
educational affairs. After serving in this 
role for several years, he returned to 
become chairman of the Department of 
Chemical Engineering.
             
 Over the next several years we were 
to attract others into administrative 
roles in the College: Lynn Conway, 
a nationally recognized computer 
scientist from Xerox Palo Alto Research 
Center, who headed up our new 
initiatives effort, and Walt Hancock, 
a distinguished senior member and 
former chair of the Department of 
Industrial and Operations Engineering, 
who headed up our manufacturing 
science and engineering efforts. But 
it is worth noting here that all of the 
members of our original deans team 
were exceptionally young—all under 
the age of 40, and all at the peak of 
their academic careers. Yet they were 
willing to commit the time and effort, 
at the almost certain sacrifice of their 
scholarly momentum, to rebuild the 
College.
 The concept of leadership team was 
extended to include the department 
chairs and the College Executive 
Committee. The chairs along with 
the deans comprised the Chairmen’s 
Advisory Council, which met weekly 
or biweekly to consider college-wide 
issues such as resource acquisition, 
budget priorities, space allocation, and 
major strategic initiatives. We operated 
this as a principals only-no substitutes 
meeting where we could have a very 
candid discussion of important issues 
facing the College such as junior 
faculty development, the research 
environment, and fund-raising. In a 
similar way the deans met weekly with 
the College Executive Committee on 
policy matters such as promotion and 
tenure, and program evaluation. These 
meetings were not only valuable in 
tapping the wisdom and experience 
of some very capable people, but 
they were important in keeping the 
College leadership united as we 





planning.” Hence I believed it essential 
to give highest priority first to the 
development of just such a plan. 
Beginning with our initial draft, we 
worked closely with the deans and 
chairs throughout the summer of 
1981, with the target of completing 
the first version of such a plan by 
early fall. As it happens (and as it 
usually happened), we came in ahead 
of schedule, completing the plan in 
early August and submitting it to 
the University Executive Officers on 
August 18. We circulated complete 
copies of the plan and all of the 
supporting materials to the entire 
faculty of the College in January, 
after we had completed the early 
rounds of discussion with the central 
administration to make certain we were 
on the right track.
 The plan was accompanied by an 
array of memoranda to key University 
leaders on specific topics (e.g., 
The Plan
Although Bill Frye had asked me to 
come back with a detailed plan for the 
College by early fall, I began to work 
on this project almost immediately. In 
fact, within several weeks (mid-April, 
two weeks before I would begin my 
appointment as dean), we already had 
developed a detailed first draft of the 
plan. We continued to polish and revise 
the plan as I conducted my series of 
listening-and-learning discussions 
throughout the spring. Hence by the 
time I formally moved into the dean’s 
office on May 1, we already had a 
reasonably clear sense of where we 
needed to head.
 Although I was quite inexperienced 
as an administrator, I was determined 
to keep my focus on the developing 
plan and not become chained to the 
in-out basket and manipulated by the 
agendas that others would attempt to 
force upon us. In particular, I fought 
against the natural tendency to begin 
work immediately on the various 
and sundry matters that inevitably 
pile up during the interim period 
characterizing a change in leadership. 
If these items had waited for the many 
months of the dean search, they could 
certainly wait a few more weeks until 
the new administration was firmly 
established.
 The External Review Committee 
for the College had made specific 
mention in their 1980 report of the 
absence of planning in the College: “We 
saw no evidence of a comprehensive 
long-range plan or of any formalized 
eliminating the engineering funding 
“gap”, a special salary program to 
retain our best faculty, completing 
the North Campus move, seeking a 
component of the College’s indirect 
cost recovery to improve the research 
environment). Throughout the 1981-
1982 academic year we met with key 
elements of the central administration 
on each of these issues, including 
a major presentation of the plan to 
the entire Executive Officer team in 
November, a presentation concerning 
the North Campus move to the Plant 
Extension Committee (the Executive 
Officers sitting as a committee to 
consider capital facilities) in January, 
a presentation to the Budget Priorities 
Committee on the Engineering 
Gap, and a presentation to the 
Central Operating Committee of the 
University’s fund-raising campaign 
concerning the College’s development 
needs.
 Key in engaging faculty and 
maintaining the momentum of the 
planning process were a series of ad 
hoc faculty committees (so-called 
“hit-and-run” committees) to flesh 
out specific elements of the plan. 
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THE PLAN
The First Plan for the College Submitted to the 
Executive Officers in 1981
60 A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE UM COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING
Development and fund-raising
Primary research staff
The College computing environment
The possible transition of the College 
to a School of Engineering
These committees provided valuable 
insight and guidance in the further 
evolution of the plan. They also 
engaged a very large number of faculty 
members in the development of the 
plan, an activity that was essential for 
its support in later months.
 Here it should be stressed that I 
always viewed the strategic plan for 
the College as an organic document 
that would continue to evolve as our 
understanding of issues improved, as 
we achieved some of our early goals, 
and as we identified new goals and 
priorities. In this sense, the plan was 
important as much as a process to 
engage faculty, friends of the College, 
and the University administration as it 
was as a specific document. In fact, the 
planning document evolved through 
many versions, with each new version 
accompanied by new charts and tables 
measuring progress and success (or 
failure) developed and distributed each 
fall. As the plan evolved, it became 
quite a large document, with several 
hundred pages of narrative, supporting 
documentation, and accompanying 
proposals.
 Since the plan played such a 
critical role in our efforts to rebuild 
the College, it seems appropriate to 
describe some of its key elements. The 
plan began with three simple goals that 
remained consistent through the five 
years of my tenure as dean:
1. To achieve excellence in education, 
scholarship and research, and in the 
professional activities of our faculty 
and students.
2. To establish an environment within 
the College that not only allowed for 
excellence, creativity, and innovation, 
but actively stimulated, rewarded, 
and demanded such qualities.
3. To seek and obtain the resources 
necessary to support such an 
environment.
The general guidelines for the effort 
were identified as follows:
1. The College must keep as its 
primary objective the achievement 
of excellence in its research and 
instructional programs.
2. It must strive to maintain the 
flexibility to respond to changing 
needs and priorities.
3. It must be prepared to shift resources 
when necessary, possibly reducing 
or even eliminating some programs 
and activities in order to improve 
or initiate others. In such decisions, 
it must keep in mind the important 
criteria of quality, centrality, and 
cost-effectiveness.
We laid out a series of very specific 
goals for the 1980s:
1. To improve the quality, 
achievements, and reputation 
of the faculty of the College by 
implementing policies concerning 
hiring, promotion, tenure, and salary 
that strongly emphasized excellence.
2. To increase very substantially the 
quality and quantity of research 
performed by the College.
3. To shift the focus of the instructional 
programs of the College more 
toward upperclass/graduate-level 
education.
4. To rapidly and dramatically improve 
and enlarge the graduate programs 
of the College, particularly at the 
Ph.D. level.
5. To complete the move of the College 
to the North Campus within a three 
year period. 
6. To rebuild the equipment inventories 
and support staff lost through 
budget cuts over the past decade.
7. To greatly strengthen the College’s 
relationships with industry.
8. To establish an aggressive fund-
raising program aimed at securing 
support from both corporate and 
private donors. 
9. To restore a level of base funding 
for the College commensurate with 
our aspirations for quality and 
achievement.
 Here I might note at the outset 
that many of these goals were very 
ambitious, more along the line of 
what the business world would call 
strategic intent or stretch goals intended 
as much to drive major change in the 
College as to set the direction for our 
efforts. Yet, as ambitious as they were, 
we were not only able to achieve all of 
them by the mid-1980s, but we actually 
overshot our original goals in many 
respects. For example, the move of the 
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entire College of Engineering to the 
North Campus was completed in three 
years, with additional capital facilities 
added over the next decade that would 
give the College what some peers 
today regard as the leading engineering 
campus in the nation. Although we 
set as an initial target the elimination 
of the $7 million Engineering Gap in 
University support, we managed to 
increase the College’s General Fund 
budget from $13.2 million in 1980 to 
$34 million in 1985, almost a three-
fold increase. Doctorate production 
went from 51 Ph.D.s per year in 
1980 to 150 Ph.D.s in 1986. And the 
College’s reputation, as measured by 
the rankings of its various academic 
programs, rose rapidly from eighth in 
the nation to fifth in the nation today 
(with most of its programs ranked 
among the top five nationally).  A more 
thorough discussion of results will be 
provided after describing the execution 
of the plan in this and the next two 
chapters.
 Each of these specific goals 
was broken down into a series of 
specific actions accompanied by the 
identification of metrics that would tell 
us whether we were succeeding.  For 
example, under the general objective of 
improving the quality of faculty, there 
was a broad range of strategic and 
tactical actions, such as:
1. Developing and publicizing a 
rigorous policy for promotion 
and tenure review that placed 
heavy emphasis on research and 
scholarship.
2. Implementing a more flexible staffing 
policy that placed primary emphasis 
on faculty quality and programmatic 
needs rather than instructional load.
3. The implementation of special salary 
programs that recognized both merit 
and market pressures, particularly 
among junior faculty.
4. Implementing differential 
instructional load models that 
recognized the diversity of faculty 
activities in research and graduate 
education.
5. Implementing strong merit-based 
incentive programs that rewarded 
faculty with discretionary resources 
for achieving important College 
goals such as Ph.D. production and 
sponsored research funding.
6. Establishing strong lines of 
communication between the deans’ 
office and key faculty constituencies 
(particularly our top scholars and 
our junior faculty).
Even in its earliest drafts, the strategic 
plan we developed for the College 
was over 50 pages long (single-spaced) 
with over one hundred specific 
actions and sub-objectives. These were 
accompanied by an array of decision 
charts, identifying the key decisions 
necessary for execution of the plan at 
the College, the University, and also the 
state and federal levels.
 Also interesting is that even in this 
very early stage of planning, long 
before our deans’ team would move 
into the action phase, we were already 
considering some very bold initiatives. 
For example, we seriously considered 
the possibility of moving immediately 
to double the salaries of all of our 
assistant professors, reflecting our 
belief that they represented the future 
of the College and yet had been the 
most disadvantaged by the College 
salary programs. (Within two years 
we had actually achieved this goal.) 
We priced out the cost of providing 
every faculty member with a computer 
terminal or microcomputer (estimated 
then at roughly $1 million) to stimulate 
computer literacy in the College. 
(Within two years we had provided 
all faculty with a personal computer, 
encouraging them to keep it at home 
so that their families could also use 
it.) We launched a process to examine 
the possibility of a major co-operative 
education program for the College 
(thereby anticipating somewhat the 
later request by General Motors that 
the College assume responsibility for 
the General Motors Institute in Flint). 
As a final example, we considered the 
possibility of negotiating the ability to 
attach a surcharge to the tuition paid 
by engineering students that would 
flow directly to the College to support 
the more costly instruction associated 
with engineering education. (This 
would soon become the mechanism we 
used to finance the Computer Aided 
Engineering Network.)
 The notes from these early planning 
discussions contain pages and pages 
of ideas and proposals and possible 
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actions. As I will discuss later, many 
of these were quite “out of the box” 
(some possibly even beyond the 
lunatic fringe) and reflected the energy, 
creativity, and perhaps naiveté of our 
very young leadership team.
 Of course, not all of the early effort 
was devoted to the brainstorming 
process associated with strategic 
planning. Much of it was also aimed at 
more mundane, yet nevertheless very 
important, administrative matters. For 
example, we believed it very important 
to immediately put in place a fair and 
transparent process for allocating 
resources to the departments that 
would provide them with as much 
control and flexibility as possible. We 
were determined to bring to an end 
the allocation of resources through 
individual negotiations between the 
deans and the department chairs (in 
smoke-filled back rooms), instead 
preferring to work directly with the 
Chairmen’s Advisory Committee 
and the Executive Committee to 
develop rational allocation principles 
with strong incentives for resource 
generation and wise expenditures.
 We also faced the near-term 
challenge of deciding just how we 
would handle the 6% base cut to be 
levied against all academic units in 
the year ahead (although Frye had 
committed to giving us these funds 
back for other purposes as his first 
step toward restoring the General 
Fund support of the College.) Our 
predecessors had proposed to take 
the part of the cuts from a forced 
merger of two departments, Chemical 
Engineering and Metallurgical 
Engineering, that had formerly been 
together but by now had drifted far 
apart intellectually. They were also 
going to pass along the remainder of 
the cuts across-the-board to the various 
academic departments. We were 
skeptical about this plan and wanted to 
explore other alternatives including the 
possible discontinuance of some units. 
 But the development and execution 
of the strategic plan came first. And 
key in this effort would be making the 
case to the central administration of 
the University that they needed to take 
bold action to address the urgent needs 
of the College.
Making the Case
One of the lessons learned over the 
years and stressed in this book is that 
the College of Engineering thrives 
most when it has strong relationships 
with the University in general and the 
central administration in particular. 
It is when it turns its back on “State 
Street” (the term long used to describe 
the president, provost, and other 
executive officers of the University) and 
tries to go its own way, ignoring the 
important role it has played over the 
years as a key element of the University 
community, that it is most at risk.
 Although I was unaware of the earlier 
history of the College, I had spent 
much of the past five years heavily 
involved in central administration 
activities. I realized immediately that 
no matter how visionary and energetic 
our planning activities, our success in 
rebuilding the College would depend 
heavily on making the case to the 
central administration for support of 
the College.
 It is important here to understand 
the organization of the University’s 
administration. At the top of the 
hierarchy was the president, in this 
case Harold Shapiro, serving as chief 
executive officer of the University. 
 Although the president spent much 
of his time on external activities 
such as fund-raising and state and 
federal relations, he nevertheless was 
the final authority in all University 
matters and managed the process of 
seeking approval of major initiatives 
by the Board of Regents, when this 
was necessary. The provost and vice-
president for academic affairs—Billy 
President Harold Shapiro
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Frye in our case—was just as critical, 
since as both chief academic officer and 
chief budget officer, he was not only at 
the key decision point on most issues 
affecting the College, but he also held 
the purse strings. 
 Although other executive officers 
such as the vice-president and chief 
financial officer (Jim Brinkerhoff), the 
vice-president for research (Charles 
Overberger), the vice-president for 
development (Jon Cosovich), and the 
vice-president for government relations 
(Dick Kennedy) were not in direct 
line-reporting roles with the schools 
and colleges of the University, they 
were key players in many issues of 
great importance to the College. Such 
issues included the North Campus 
move (Brinkerhoff), the research 
environment (Overberger), private 
fund-raising (Cosovich), and seeking 
state support for buildings and 
operations (Kennedy). As dean, I made 
it a point to interact frequently with 
each of these executive officers, seeking 
to build a relationship of mutual trust 
and respect. 
 However, almost as significant 
was a cadre of key staff reporting to 
each vice-president, with whom I and 
the rest of my team would interact 
frequently both on lesser matters and 
to tee up major proposals and decisions 
for their bosses. Michigan was 
fortunate in being able to attract some 
truly extraordinary individuals into 
these administrative roles, including 
several who were considered among 
the very best in higher education, 
and we soon developed a great sense 
of respect for their experience and 
judgment. Of particular note here were 
Susan Lipschutz in the president’s 
office; Bob Holbrook and Bob Sauve 
in the provost’s office; Ralph Nichols 
and Keith Molin in the vp-government 
relations office; Paul Spradlin, Chandler 
Mathews, and Norman Herbert in the 
business and finance office; and Joe 
Roberson in the development office. 
 But perhaps the key person in 
our early effort to make the case for 
Engineering was Allen Spivey, one 
of the most distinguished faculty 
members in our School of Business 
Administration, who was on leave to 
the provost with the special assignment 
of heading up the University-wide 
planning effort as it navigated through 
the storm of state budget cuts to find 
its “smaller but better” landfall. Spivey 
had a keen sense of the nature of the 
University, writ large, and he was able 
to see the entire forest beyond the trees 
that distracted many others. He was 
an invaluable source of wisdom and 
advice throughout both our planning 
activities and our efforts to make the 
case for University support along a 
number of fronts.
 Since the success of such efforts is as 
dependent upon the nature of people 
as it is upon the rationale (or truth 
and justice) of the argument, it was 
important that we spun our case in the 
right way. I had learned from years 
of experience that academic leaders 
such as Bill Frye were more interested 
in intellectual arguments than data 
presentations. (Harold Shapiro was 
an exception, but even he made sure 
that the data did not obscure the 
substance of what an issue meant to 
the University.) I also had learned 
that consistency and persistence were 
sometimes more important than highly 
refined presentations. Hence we made 
it a point to interact as frequently as 
possible with both the president and 
provost and their staffs on a key set of 
issues, all carefully chosen as what we 
believed to be the key decision points.
 The first issue had to do with the 
University’s base budget support of 
the College, currently at a level of $13.2 
million (1980). Although both Shapiro 
and Frye believed the College to be 
seriously underfunded, they were 
uncertain as to the amount. It took 
only a few weeks for our new deans’ 
team to establish the magnitude of 
the Engineering Gap as roughly $7 
million, or about 30% of the target 
goal of $20 million in base support. 
MAKING THE CASE
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Needless to say, this estimate was 
far beyond anything that Frye had 
suspected, and we were worried that 
in a time of serious financial stress for 
the University, putting such a proposal 
on the table might freeze up the system 
and be rejected. Hence we instead 
decided to pursue an approach that 
more gradually moved the central 
administration to this conclusion, step 
by step.
 To this end, we began our lobbying 
effort by addressing very immediate 
needs, the first among them being 
the vulnerability of many of our best 
faculty to raids from other institutions 
and industry because of inadequate 
salaries (arising not only from 
inadequate University support but also 
from mismanagement of salary dollars 
by our predecessors who stressed 
faculty seniority over merit). In this 
case, extensive documentation was 
necessary to make our case, and we 
put together not only a comparison of 
College salaries with peer universities, 
but as well a list of recruiting offers that 
our key faculty had received in recent 
months.
 As I will discuss later, we were 
successful in making this case, and 
Frye provided us with $500,000 of 
special salary market adjustment 
funds in FY1981-82 and an additional 
adjustment of $450,000 in FY 1982-83. 
We continued to benefit from salary 
programs higher than the University 
average for the next several years.
 The second issue continued a battle 
I had been fighting for several years 
as chair of the Academic Affairs 
Advisory Committee: the environment 
for sponsored research on campus. 
Beyond reducing the centralized 
bureaucracy of the office of the vice 
president for research, the College 
sought a new process for allocating 
the roughly 35% of the overhead paid 
by the federal government that was 
currently being distributed across 
the University to support research 
activities. Although the research grants 
and contracts awarded faculty of the 
College generated roughly $9 million 
per year of overhead, none of this was 
returned to the College to support 
research activities (including that 
component earmarked as overhead 
at the department level). We urged 
the University to allocate these funds 
to academic units based on the level 
of their research activity (with an 
implication of several millions of 
dollars a year flowing directly to the 
College).
 The third issue we posed to the 
Executive Officers was the North 
Campus move. Here I should admit 
that we were ambivalent. Although 
the University had decided to relocate 
the College from its Central Campus 
facilities in West and East Engineering 
in 1950, and taken some initial steps 
in this direction by building several 
research buildings during the 1950s and 
1960s, the momentum of the move had 
largely stalled during the 1970s (in large 
part because the University pushed 
the College aside as a priority for state 
funding in favor of the Replacement 
Hospital Project). Only two academic 
units (Nuclear Engineering and 
Aerospace Engineering) were then 
located on the North Campus. Many 
faculty members were wasting hours 
every week commuting back and 
forth between campuses to conduct 
their research. Yet in surveys of the 
engineering faculty, the overwhelming 
majority felt that the decision to 
move to North Campus had been a 
mistake. They were concerned that the 
move would separate them from the 
sciences and key professional schools 
on the Central Campus. Furthermore 
there was a belief that if adequate 
investment had been made in their 
Central Campus facilities, no move 
would have been necessary. Although 
we both sympathized and to some 
extent agreed with these views, we also 
believed that it was too late to reverse 
the decision. The College was stalled in 
midstream, and it needed to complete 
the move before it sank still further in 
quality. Therefore we decided we had 
to develop a creative plan to complete 
the move and then exert maximum 
pressure on the central administration 
to gain their support of this plan.
 Finally, although we were concerned 
that the magnitude of the Engineering 
Gap was beyond the level that could 
be dealt with (or even imagined) by the 
University, we nevertheless believed 
that we needed to make every effort to 
convince the central administration that 
even during difficult financial times, it 
simply had to make progress toward 
this target, no matter how long it took 
to actually achieve it. We continued 
to build our case for a dramatic 
increase in University support and 
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kept strong pressure on the president, 
provost, and their staffs to persuade 
them to continue to chip away at the 
Engineering Gap.
 Following Shapiro’s advice, we 
made certain that each proposal to 
the University was accompanied 
by a strong statement of College 
commitment, participation, and 
sacrifice. For example, in making 
the case for additional support, we 
agreed to launch major program 
reviews of a number of College 
activities for possible elimination 
and fund-reallocation, ranging from 
discontinuing major but obsolete 
facilities such as “the foundry” 
(the process metallurgy lab) to 
discontinuing an entire department 
(the Department of Humanities). In 
presenting plans for the North Campus 
move, we immediately sacrificed 
the grandiose plans developed by 
the Ragone administration for four 
major new buildings, and instead 
proposed a series of reassignments 
and modifications of existing facilities 
that not only substantially reduced 
the price tag of the move, but reduced 
the number of new facilities to one 
(the so-called Engineering Building I). 
We eventually went even further and 
actually offered the University a $2 
million loan from College discretionary 
accounts to get the move started!
 Although we were firm in the 
pressure we applied to the central 
administration, we were rarely strident. 
Rather, we always tried to take an 
optimistic approach. For example, in 
late summer of 1981, after submitting 
our first version of the plan to the 
University, Chuck Vest and I met with 
Bill Frye to stress that:
“Our team is now together. We have 
high enthusiasm and high hopes. We 
know where we want to go; we have 
the plans for getting there, and we have 
taken the first steps in this direction. 
But we need your help at this point to 
go further.”
“We will leave behind a stamped, self-
addressed envelope for your response, 
although we also accept Visa or 
MasterCard.”
 Actually, Frye was very responsive, 
even in these first months of our 
tenure, providing relief from the 6% cut 
and substantial resources for a special 
market salary program, launching 
the University process necessary to 
evaluate and execute our plans for 
an expedited North Campus move, 
and even responding positively 
to our proposals for sponsored 
research incentives-with considerable 
opposition from the vice president for 
research. (More on this later.) Although 
Frye was clearly on our side, he 
occasionally asked our help either in 
modifying our proposals or working 
behind the scenes to gain broader 
support among some of his Executive 
Officer colleagues. For example, while 
he believed it politically acceptable to 
allocate new resources to the College 
justified by the crushing instructional 
burden posed by our exceptionally 
high enrollments, he was reluctant to 
allocate funds identified as research 
incentives or special salary programs. 
Of course, he stressed that use of these 
new funds, like the rest of our budget, 
was under our control, and if we 
chose to use them for a special salary 
program or research incentives, then, of 
course (wink) that was our prerogative.
The Engineering Gap
Of course, from a resource point 
of view, the elimination of the 
Engineering Gap—that is, the 
restoration of adequate funding for 
the College—was our highest priority. 
Earlier in this book we discussed 
the magnitude of the underfunding, 
estimated at $7 million of base funding 
or roughly 70 FTE faculty positions. 
We also suggested possible causes 
for the erosion in University support 
of the College occurring during the 
1970s and 1980s. We documented for 
the executive officers the negative 
impact of the Engineering Gap to the 
University: 1) the degree to which our 
research and instructional programs 
were handicapped by deteriorating 
physical facilities, the campus split, 
and a badly overloaded faculty; 2) the 
low faculty morale and apathy in the 
College; 3) the serious deterioration 
in research and graduate programs; 
and 4) the major turnover which had 
occurred in faculty (including loss of 
many junior faculty). Most seriously, 
we stressed to the provost the degree 
to which the faculty and staff of the 
College had been beaten down by a 
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programs, particularly at the graduate 
level. We had to act rapidly to retain 
our strongest junior faculty and to 
begin the effort to recruit outstanding 
senior faculty.
 This would be a very considerable 
challenge. In many parts of the 
College, the faculty had lost the ability 
not only to achieve excellence, but 
even to recognize it. Indeed, in some 
departments, they were actually 
threatened by excellence, to the degree 
that they resisted bringing in new 
faculty better than they were.
 There were some actions we could 
take immediately. I began the practice 
of meeting with the faculty of each 
department every academic year, both 
to hear their concerns and suggestions, 
and, in large part, to give them a pep 
talk, to boost their spirits. The entire 
deans’ team made a special effort to 
open lines of communication with 
junior faculty, and we would meet 
each term with this cadre. We also 
alerted the department chairs that 
we would be measuring their own 
performance (including their merit 
salary adjustments) by their success in 
developing their junior faculty.
 We significantly strengthened the 
requirements for promotion and 
tenure, although in such a way that 
we provided early feedback (and 
occasional warning) to junior faculty 
so that they could assess their progress. 
Actually, this particular effort was 
made much easier by the role that 
Harold Shapiro and then Bill Frye had 
played in strengthening the provost’s 
role in tenure and promotion decisions, 
decade of neglect by the University. 
They had lost the degree of intensity 
and drive necessary to achieve 
excellence.
 Harold Shapiro and Bill Frye 
accepted the seriousness of the 
Engineering Gap and its impact on 
the College. They also committed to 
taking action to address it. Yet they 
believed it important to build support 
among a broader campus constituency 
if restoration of support was to occur, 
and here they needed our help. It 
was clear that the usual quantitative 
arguments that we, as scientists or 
engineers, tended to use to document 
our case were not always compelling to 
people who thought more qualitatively. 
There was also sensitivity about the 
argument of equity, since there was 
always difficulty in cross-comparing 
the support of various schools and 
colleges. (An example here: How does 
one compare the support of Medicine 
with the support of Art?)
 As I indicated earlier, we were 
willing to settle for progress through 
a series of small steps, as long as the 
vector of support from State Street 
pointed toward eventual elimination 
of the Engineering Gap. And for a time 
we made good progress, with base 
budget increments of $1 to $2 million 
each year. But we also realized that it 
was likely that the University would 
eventually run out of the capacity to 
meet our needs, and we would need 
alternative plans (e.g., differential 
tuition or special state support).
The Faculty Challenge
One of our most immediate challenges 
concerned the state of the faculty. A 
decade of eroding support had left 
our faculty as worn as the stairs in old 
West Engineering. Many of our best 
faculty had become frustrated and 
had left for greener pastures. Others 
were on the brink. We realized we had 
to act rapidly to change the faculty 
culture. We had to convince our faculty 
members that excellence mattered once 
again and give them confidence that 
the College would not only support 
their efforts but reward them. We 
needed to shift the priorities of the 
College rapidly away from focusing 
simply on measures of instructional 
productivity and instead to the quality 
of our research and educational 
One of our typical charts portraying the 
Engineering Gap
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which had placed all of the University’s 
schools and colleges on alert that 
mediocrity would not be tolerated.
 Our most significant near-term 
action, however, was to completely 
overhaul the faculty reward system 
in the College. For years, faculty 
compensation had been determined 
primarily by time in rank. Full 
professors always made more than 
associate professors; all associate 
professors made more than assistant 
professors, and so on. Faculty members 
who had been in rank the longest were 
paid the most—unless, of course, they 
were administrators, in which case they 
were paid at the top of the scale.
 In the course of two years we turned 
this practice completely topsy-turvy, in 
such a way that compensation became 
primarily determined by productivity, 
achievement, and excellence. The 
complete restructuring of the College 
salary program was one of our boldest 
steps and deserves some attention 
here. We began by making an appeal 
to the provost, Bill Frye, explaining 
that unless we took bold action we 
were likely to lose some of our very 
best faculty to outside offers. We 
provided extensive documentation 
both of salary comparisons with peers 
as well as specific offers received from 
other institutions. In response, Frye 
provided us with a $500,000 base 
budget increment over and above the 
University-wide salary program for 
each of two years that we could use 
for special salary programs to address 
market needs.
 In each of the first two years we gave 
substantial market salary increases, 
beyond the normal University merit 
program, to all assistant and associate 
professors and to selected full 
professors of particular merit. When 
we began the program in FY1981-82, 
the average assistant and associate 
professor salaries were $22,000 and 
$30,000, respectively. In the first year, 
we gave each assistant professor a 
raise of $7,000; each associate professor 
received $7,500; and selected full 
professors received $8,000, on top of 
the usual merit program. In the second 
year we made similar adjustments of 
$5,000, $5,500, and $6,000 respectively, 
again superimposed on the normal 
merit program. The consequence 
was that in two years we essentially 
doubled the average assistant professor 
salary to $38,000 and the associate 
professor salary to $50,000. Since 
only those full professors with strong 
achievement received the special 
market adjustment, the College 
faculty salary scale was completely 
restructured so that compensation 
became strongly correlated with merit 
and achievement. Of course, this led 
to considerable compression, in the 
sense that associate and even some 
assistant professors passed inactive 
full professors in salary. But it also sent 
out the clear message that we intended 
to strongly reward excellence and 
achievement.
 Since we did not have the additional 
funds to award in a special market 
salary program in later years (although 
Bill Frye continued to fund the general 
merit salary increase program in the 
College for the next several years at 
a level several percent higher than 
other academic units), we shifted 
to an entirely merit-based reward 
structure. Each year, working with the 
department chairs, the deans and the 
College Executive Committee would 
grade the achievements of each of the 
300 faculty members of the College. We 
would then provide raises based on 
this absolute measure of achievement. 
Here I should note that we provided 
half of the raise in percentage increases 
and half in absolute amount, to prevent 
faculty of comparable achievement 
from drawing further apart simply 
because of base salary (e.g., to prevent 
the rich from becoming even richer).
 There was an interesting wrinkle to 
this new approach to faculty salaries. 
The State of Michigan’s Freedom 
of Information Law opened up our 
salary books to anyone who wished 
to see them. Each December, just 
before the Christmas holidays, the 
Michigan Daily would publish a special 
insert listing the salaries and raises 
of every faculty and staff member in 
the University. Many of our faculty 
members actually kept spreadsheets 
of their own salary relative to their 
colleagues. Both department chairmen 
and even the deans would occasionally 
be challenged by faculty who believed 
their salary was inappropriate. Hence 
we knew that we would always 
be held accountable for our salary 
decisions, and we made certain we had 
accurate documentation to support our 
recommendations.
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 There were three additional elements 
of our effort to strengthen the faculty. 
The first was a budget allocation 
matter: We adopted the policy that 
whenever a department released an 
untenured faculty member, the position 
would revert to the department (to 
remove any incentive to keep mediocre 
performers). On the other hand, 
positions that opened up because of 
faculty resignations or retirements 
reverted to the College for reallocation 
based on programmatic need.
 Second, we discarded the use of 
enrollment or instructional load in 
determining where to allocate new 
hunting licenses. We responded to 
enrollment fluctuations by allocating 
dollars for hiring flexible instructional 
staff (e.g., adjunct faculty or graduate 
teaching assistants), not new 
permanent faculty. Permanent faculty 
positions were allocated, in part, 
according to programmatic needs of the 
departments.1 I say, in part, because in 
later years we moved to what we called 
a “Target of Opportunity” program in 
which ten or so new faculty positions 
would be withheld by the College 
administration and then awarded to 
the very best candidates identified by 
the faculty, regardless of area. In this 
way we conveyed to the faculty our 
interest in hiring outstanding faculty, 
regardless of rank or disciplinary area. 
(Later, when I was serving as provost 
and then president, I used the same 
target-of-opportunity approach in 
minority faculty hiring.)
 Finally, we realized that we would 
simply be unable to improve the faculty 
rapidly enough if we could only recruit 
new faculty on additional budget 
dollars. Faculty turnover had to be part 
of the strategy. We simply had to find 
a way to encourage the retirement or 
resignation of inactive faculty members 
that no longer could keep pace with 
the College’s new expectations for 
excellence and achievement. Of 
course, the massive restructuring of 
the College salary structure stimulated 
some of these changes, since less active 
faculty members saw their salaries 
rapidly bypassed by more active 
junior faculty. But we also explored 
other mechanisms, offering inactive 
faculty financial incentives to take 
early retirement or assisting with 
outplacement services. We tried to be as 
compassionate as possible, since many 
of these individuals had been hired and 
had served the College during much 
different times when achievement was 
not so highly valued, particularly in 
research and graduate education. But 
we were determined to transform the 
College, and over a five-year period 
roughly 120 new faculty members 
joined the College, even though our 
total faculty headcount remained at 
300.
The North Campus Move
Although we viewed the effort to 
move the College of Engineering to 
the North Campus as a frustrating 
distraction from what should have 
been the College’s highest priorities 
of seeking excellence in its teaching 
and research, we nevertheless believed 
we had no choice but to bring this 30-
year saga to an end by completing the 
move as rapidly as possible. Although 
very few of our faculty and programs 
had actually been moved to the North 
Campus site, the commitments had 
been made long ago, and we saw no 
possibility that they could be reversed 
at this late date.
 After a thorough review of the 
existing plan to move the College into 
four new buildings, funded from state 
and private sources, we concluded 
that in the current budget climate, this 
plan was clearly both impractical and 
unworkable. The College’s fund-raising 
efforts of the 1970s had demonstrated 
how difficult it was to raise gifts 
for buildings, with only a relatively 
modest building for the Departments 
of Chemical Engineering and Materials 
and Metallurgical Engineering as the 
result (the Herbert H. Dow Building, 
then under construction and scheduled 
for completion in late 1982). 
 Furthermore, the impact of the 
Replacement Hospital Project on 
The Herbert H. Dow Building
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the state’s capacity to fund new 
construction in higher education would 
be long lasting and likely prevent 
major new construction until the state’s 
economy improved.
 Therefore we proposed a far 
more modest plan, based on the 
reassignment and renovation of several 
existing North Campus buildings:
• A small North Campus building 
housing the University’s research 
administration would be reassigned 
and renovated to accommodate 
the Department of Industrial and 
Operations Engineering (while 
research administration would be 
moved to the West Engineering 
building).
• G. G. Brown Laboratory would be 
extensively renovated, adding a third 
floor for offices and renovating its 
high bay research wing area so that it 
could accommodate the Departments 
of Mechanical Engineering and Civil 
Engineering.
 
• The College would build a library and  
instructional center (with additional 
classrooms) in the excavated, but 
uncompleted basement of the Dow 
Building
• An unused fraternity building 
adjacent to the North Campus, the 
Stearns Building, would be used to 
house the Engineering placement 
offices.
• The Department of Naval 
Architecture and Marine Engineering 
was moved into a small building 
adjacent to the old cyclotron 
laboratory.
• The College administration would 
move temporarily into the Chrysler 
Center for Continuing Education 
(compressing the deans offices and 
our staffs into about one-third the 
space that we had been using in West 
Engineering).
THE NORTH CAMPUS MOVE
Industrial and Operations Engineering 
(formerly Research Administration)
Adding a floor of offices to GG Brown Lab
The entrance to Civil Engineering in the high 
bay of GG Brown Lab
The Instructional Center in the Dow Building
The Stearns Building used for Engineering 
Placement
The old cyclotron laboratory on the North 
Campus
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 Executing these actions would 
result in the relocation of all of the 
College, with the exception of Electrical 
and Computer Engineering to the 
North Campus, within 18 months. 
We proposed that the University 
elevate to its highest priority the state 
capital outlay request to Lansing for 
Engineering Building I, which would 
be used to house this very large 
department. That is, we proposed 
that the earlier state commitment of 
$18 million (appropriately scaled for 
inflation) be used for a single building.
 Although this plan required some 
modest expenditure by the University 
for the necessary renovations as well as 
the reassignment of space belonging to 
other units, we believed it to be a very 
pragmatic and efficient approach to 
completing the North Campus move in 
a relatively short time period. It would 
also release to the University all of the 
College’s Central Campus space, with 
the exception of the naval architecture 
towing tank in the basement of West 
Engineering.
 We were invited to make a 
presentation on our plan to the 
Executive Officers in January, 1982, 
as they sat as the Plant Extension 
Committee. Chuck Vest made the 
presentation, and I then summed 
up the case by stating that a positive 
response by the University to our 
proposal could finally bring to an 
end the agony posed by the College’s 
division across two campuses for 
the past 30 years and its struggle to 
conduct its research and instructional 
programs in physical facilities which 
were clearly inadequate for quality 
engineering education. We stressed 
that the College had reached the crisis 
point where it was no longer capable 
of handling its exploding enrollments 
while maintaining even marginally 
adequate programs in antiquated 
facilities on the Central Campus. 
We also noted that the recent ABET 
accreditation visit had expressed their 
amazement that quality students and 
faculty could be attracted to learn and 
work in such dismal facilities.
 Normally such a complex plan 
would take many months of 
negotiation before a University 
decision. But two factors quickly 
put this plan on the fast track. First, 
just two weeks earlier on Christmas 
Eve, an arsonist had burned to the 
ground the University’s Economics 
Building, adjacent to West Engineering. 
Ironically I had been taking an early 
The new Dean’s Office (in the Chrysler Center) A bit of a contrast in size from West Engineering
Chuck Vest preparing to move to the North 
Campus
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Christmas morning jog over to the 
Central Campus when I noticed the 
smoke, and jogged over to find Bob 
Holbrook, associate vice president for 
academic affairs and also a faculty 
member in economics, amidst a group 
of firemen and police, watching his 
office go up in flames. This event put 
great pressure to find new quarters 
for the Economics facility, and our 
proposed rapid departure from East 
and West Engineering could provide 
just such an opportunity.
 Second, we were fully prepared for 
the expected early reaction from Bill 
Frye when he moaned that he just 
did not know where he could find 
the funds for these projects in the 
face of other budget pressures. We 
immediately responded with an offer 
to lend the University $2 million from 
the College’s discretionary funds to 
get the projects started. Frye quickly 
responded, “You’ve got a deal!” And 
we were off and running. (I should 
also note that some months later Frye 
mysteriously found $2 million in his 
own accounts, so we never actually had 
to transfer the funds for the loan.) 
 Within two months Dick Kennedy 
and his state relations officer Ralph 
Nichols were able to ignite the state 
capital outlay process for Engineering 
Building I, getting language into 
the state budget bill for $500,000 of 
planning funds to begin the project. 
There were still many hurdles to 
overcome in getting final legislative 
approval of what was to be a $30 
million state-funded project, including 
persuading the governor that this 
building should be identified as his 
highest priority, but the North Campus 
move train was now rolling, and if we 
could keep it on schedule (and on the 
track), we anticipated that the entire 
College would finally complete its 
move by early 1986.
The Research Environment
One of the most difficult battles we 
had to fight involved changing the 
University’s policies on sponsored 
research funding. My earlier AAAC 
committee on research incentives 
had documented the deteriorating 
environment for sponsored research 
on campus, increasingly burdened by 
the bureaucracies of the office of the 
vice president for research, inadequate 
support for sponsored research project 
development and management, the 
plight of primary research staff, and 
the absence of strong incentives to 
generate sponsored research funding. 
Among many recommendations, one 
that stood out as most controversial 
and yet probably most significant 
was the recommendation that the 
University return to academic units and 
principal investigators some portion 
of the indirect cost or overhead they 
recovered from federal agencies, in 
proportion to the amount of sponsored 
research conducted by the unit.
 Of course we knew that this 
overhead, in theory at least, was 
recovered to pay past overhead costs 
in conducting federally sponsored 
research. But we also knew that in the 
University’s budget, roughly 35% of 
this recovery was reinvested in research 
activities, both to cover cost-sharing 
and overruns as well as to support new 
research development. However this 
allocation was largely at the whims 
of the vice president for research and 
was not correlated with the success of 
a unit in generating research funding. 
Furthermore, over the past decade, 
the College had received none of these 
funds, despite the fact that it generated 
roughly 30% of the overhead paid to 
the University ($8 million in 1980). 
Hence our proposal was a simple 
one: allocate the 35% of indirect cost 
recovery based on the volume of a 
unit’s sponsored research activity, 
minus its overruns, cost-sharing, and 
underrecovery, and then allow the 
academic units to utilize these funds 
in such a way as to create maximum 
incentives for sponsored research 
activities.
 Although this made perfect sense 
(at least to us) and was the practice 
adopted by many other universities, 
our proposal was very strongly 
resisted by the vice president for 
research (Charles Overberger) who 
viewed such action as a clear threat 
to his power base. After a great deal 
of effort, we were able to persuade 
Harold Shapiro, Bill Frye, and even 
Jim Brinkerhoff that our proposal 
made sense. But they were also leery 
of triggering a battle among the 
Executive Officers since Overberger 
so strongly opposed this proposal.  
Allen Spivey was an important ally 
on this matter, since he believed quite 
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strongly it was supportable both on 
the grounds of strengthening research 
incentives and decentralizing control 
of these resources to the unit level 
where they would do the most good. 
He also kept us apprised of debate 
among the Executive Officers. (As 
he put it, “Great battles are being 
fought” on our behalf!) In the end, 
however, Shapiro finally decided that 
the risk of alienating Overberger was 
too great to implement the proposal 
on a University-wide basis, and he 
left it to Bill Frye to find another less 
direct response to our proposal using 
Engineering as a special case.
 At first Frye decided to commit $1 
million of additional base funding to 
the College over three years, with the 
understanding that we could use it 
for any purpose we chose, including 
providing research incentives to our 
departments and faculty. (Even this 
was controversial, since Overberger 
strongly opposed any relief for the 
College.) Spivey then pulled out of 
his pocket a series of charts he had 
compiled demonstrating that while the 
compound growth rate in University 
support for academic units ranged 
from 7% to 10% per year throughout 
the 1970s, the College had actually been 
cut 2% per year, even as its enrollments 
were growing by 44%. After seeing 
these data, Frye agreed to raise the 
commitment to $2 million over three 
years, and then after further thought he 
front-loaded the commitment to a $2 
million base increase over two years. 
Frye was able to push this commitment 
through the Executive Officers (and 
over Overberger) with Shapiro’s help.
 In subsequent discussions, Frye 
agreed that we could use the entire 
amount for any purpose, so we 
responded that we would use the 
entire amount as research incentives 
to stimulate, develop, and sustain 
sponsored research. We also were able 
to reach an agreement, in principle, 
that after two years this support would 
continue to increase and be correlated 
with the volume of our sponsored 
research activities. Hence, although for 
political reasons we could not publicly 
label these funds as “the return of 35% 
of our indirect costs” to use as research 
incentives, we achieved essentially the 
same objective.
 However, because of the political 
sensitivity of the vice president for 
research and perhaps other deans 
to Frye’s very unusual commitment 
to Engineering, he asked us to keep 
this action at a low profile. He also 
suggested that it would be helpful 
if the College could continue its 
efforts to bite the bullet and reallocate 
internal resources to highest priorities, 
as they were asking other units to 
do. The Department of Humanities 
was the obvious candidate for such 
considerations. (More on this topic in a 
moment.)
 We immediately began to develop 
policies for the allocation of these 
resources. We decided that the entire 
amount should go back to both the 
departments and individual faculty 
as discretionary funds indexed to 
their actual indirect cost recovery 
on research grants (minus any cost-
sharing or overruns). For individual 
faculty, we also added funds indexed 
to Ph.D. production and graduate 
student support. Each faculty member 
participating in sponsored research 
was provided with an account 
containing the discretionary funds 
allocated through this program, under 
their complete control. This program 
continues to the present day, although 
we modified it slightly during my 
last year as dean by agreeing to pick 
up in addition the tuition support of 
all graduate students supported on 
research grants.
 The final issue involving the research 
environment involved the plight of 
research scientists, faculty members 
whose entire appointment consisted 
of research supported by sponsored 
research grants and contracts. In the 
past these faculty members, many of 
whom were quite distinguished, had 
been treated much like second-class 
citizens, without the opportunity to 
supervise graduate students or to 
have any employment security in the 
event that a grant was not renewed. 
We modified these policies (with the 
help of the Graduate School) and 
created a fund that could be used to 
provide support for a limited period, 
depending on years of service, in the 
event of the loss of grant funding. We 
also modified completely the standards 
and process for promotion, to bring it 
in parallel with instructional faculty, 
thereby providing both higher visibility 
and prestige to research scientists. 
Again, most of these practices and 
policies remain in place today.
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And As If This Was Not 
Enough...
Although most of the first six months of 
my tenure as dean focused on strategic 
internal priorities—e.g., building the 
team, developing the plan, making the 
case, and dealing with our most critical 
priorities—a number of other important 
issues arose as opportunities and 
challenges with serious implications 
for the future of the College. Some of 
these were rather surprising external 
opportunities such as the state effort to 
build a robotics research center in Ann 
Arbor (later to become the Industrial 
Technology Institute) and a proposal 
from General Motors for the College to 
take over the General Motors Institute 
as a “branch campus” in Flint. Some 
involved internal matters, such as 
the launch of a series of reviews for 
possible program discontinuance of 
academic units such as the Department 
of Humanities. Several of our activities 
really involved leftover matters, such 
as rebuilding the development (fund-
raising) activities of the College and 
merging them into the planning for 
the University-wide Campaign for 
Michigan, and preparing for the major 
accreditation review of the College’s 
academic programs by ABET (the 
Accreditation Board on Engineering 
and Technology) scheduled for fall 
of 1981. And much of our effort was 
directed to beginning to modify the 
culture of the College to create once 
again a sense of optimism, excitement, 
and commitment to excellence.
The Robotics Institute (The Industrial 
Technology Institute)
Within a week after my selection as 
dean (and even before I formally began 
my appointment), Harold Shapiro 
called to ask me to lead an effort to 
respond to a major state initiative to 
build a “world-class research institute 
on robotics and industrial automation” 
in Ann Arbor. He suggested that the 
startup costs for the robotics institute 
would be roughly $50 million with 
annual operating costs of $15 M/year, 
funded jointly from state sources and 
private foundations and corporations. 
He asked me to lead a team of 
Michigan engineering faculty to 
develop both a plan and a proposal for 
such an institute.
 Clearly this was a BIG deal, so I 
immediately pulled together a small 
team of faculty leaders including 
George Haddad, Don Chaffin, Dick 
Volz, and Ken Ludema to scope out the 
task.
 The origin for the concept went back 
to a High Tech Task Force, established 
by Governor Milliken, and consisting 
of a number of leaders of higher 
education, business, and industry 
(including Harold Shapiro) with the 
charge of developing a technology-
based strategy for strengthening and 
diversifying the Michigan economy. 
After several meetings the group 
focused on industrial automation 
as a key area for investment (and 
later added to this two more areas of 
focus in biotechnology and advanced 
materials). The intent was to establish a 
world-class center in robotics research 
in Ann Arbor, funded with an initial 
investment of $200 million for the first 
10 years, and then evolving to a self-
supporting status after this. The hope 
was that a major research park would 
form about this institute, resulting 
in numerous spinoff companies and 
technology transfer to Michigan 
industry.
 Of course, as with any public 
initiative of this magnitude, politics 
quickly entered, with lots of lobbying 
to change the location to Detroit, 
or to establish additional centers of 
excellence in other parts of the state 
(East Lansing, Midland, Grand Rapids, 
the Upper Pennisula). Although 
Shapiro and others managed to 
convince the group that such an 
effort would only survive if located 
adjacent to a world-class research 
university with strong capabilities 
in engineering (i.e., the University of 
Michigan), there was great resistance 
from many members of the Task 
Force to any close relationship with 
the University. These members were 
adamant that the robotics institute be 
formed independent of the University, 
both because of concern that the 
politics would kill the effort if this were 
perceived to benefit the University 
too greatly, and because of their 
skepticism that the University culture 
and administration would scuddle the 
effort and attempt to grab the funding 
for themselves.
 Yet, as good soldiers, our team in 
the College moved ahead to develop 
a plan. As it turns out, we already 
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had formed within the College a 
closely related activity known as the 
Center for Research on Integrated 
Manufacturing (CRIM), which spanned 
a number of areas such as robotics, 
industrial automation, CAD/CAM, 
and management information systems. 
Therefore the technical and financial 
plan for the robotics institute was 
straightforward enough. As the 
funding was assembled (including $20 
million from the state and $50 million 
from Michigan private foundations), 
a faculty member from electrical 
engineering, Arch Naylor, was 
selected as the startup director, and 
the University provided the necessary 
facilities and administrative support.
 Yet, even though the College played 
a key role in designing the robotics 
institute (later named the Industrial 
Technology Institute or ITI), housing 
it during its incubation stage, and 
supporting its activities, we were 
hampered by the insistence of the High 
Tech Task Force that the institute had 
to be financially independent of the 
University. From the very beginning, 
financial firewalls were constructed 
between ITI and the College that 
prevented the flow of any funding 
between the two organizations. 
Although faculty and graduate 
students were sought as research 
staff, these were retained much like 
hired hands, working on narrow 
topics of interest to ITI staff rather that 
participating as equals in developing 
and conducting a joint research agenda. 
It soon became apparent that the 
barriers constructed between ITI and 
the College made it very unattractive 
for faculty participation, and despite 
strong encouragement on our part, the 
faculty soon began to back away.
 Throughout the 1980s, the College 
was to make every effort to make 
ITI a success. I served on its board of 
directors and assisted in the recruiting 
of a permanent director. The Kellogg 
Foundation made a $40 million gift to 
the effort, joined by the Dow and the 
Upjohn Foundations at $10 million 
each. The University provided ITI with 
a site on the North Campus, adjacent 
to the College, for a modern glass 
and steel laboratory building, and we 
continued to encourage faculty and 
graduate students to participate in their 
activity. But those on the High Tech 
Task Force continued to oppose any 
direct financial relationship between 
the College and ITI, and its relatively 
small size as an independent research 
center left it overburdened with 
administrative costs and unable to 
compete for competitive grants. After 
fifteen years of modest activities, it was 
eventually phased out.
 In the meantime, however, the 
College used the expertise developed in 
designing ITI to build its own internal 
Center for Research on Integrated 
Manufacturing into one of the strongest 
programs in the nation. Faculty were 
recruited, graduate students were 
trained, and grants were received that 
soon made the program a national 
leader, as evidenced by the awarding 
of a major NSF Engineering Research 
Center grant in the early 1990s. 
 As a parenthetical note, although 
the College played a key role in 
helping to design and build ITI, we 
were frustrated by the constraints 
placed upon the effort by the state. 
The irony was that at a time when the 
College was desperately seeking to 
recover from a decade of inadequate 
support, the state along with 
Michigan foundations made a massive 
investment (eventually totaling over 
$100 million) in a new research center, 
kept at arm’s length from College 
programs and in many ways directly 
competitive with them. In the end, 
the far greater faculty and graduate 
student strength of the College 
managed to build a truly world-class 
center in industrial automation using 
internal funds. One can only imagine 
what could have been accomplished 
if the state had decided instead to 
build ITI within the College to take 
advantage of these significant assets.
The Industrial Technology Institute
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The General Motors Institute
Our next major fire drill was triggered 
only one month after I began my 
tenure as dean by yet another phone 
call from Harold Shapiro. He had 
picked up intelligence that General 
Motors was looking for a way out of 
their corporate university, the General 
Motors Institute. Located in Flint, 
GMI conducted an undergraduate 
engineering program for roughly 2,500 
students in a co-operative education 
mode, in which students would attend 
school half-time and work in General 
Motors plants half-time. Over the years, 
GMI had produced not only much 
of the first-line management for GM, 
but it had created throughout the GM 
management a GMI “mafia.” General 
Motors was concerned not only about 
the roughly $25 million per year it 
spent to subsidize GMI but also about 
the inbreeding of its management team 
attributed to GMI graduates.
 Shapiro’s concerns were somewhat 
different. He was worried that GM 
might put pressure on the Governor 
and Legislature to provide state 
funding for GMI, yet another drain on 
the state coffers during a very difficult 
period for public higher education. He 
was also worried that the University of 
Michigan’s Flint campus might make 
a play for GMI, thereby expanding its 
programs with a major engineering 
program that would compete with both 
UM Dearborn and UM Ann Arbor. 
He therefore encouraged me to begin 
quiet discussions with General Motors 
to see what I could learn and whether 
we could influence GM’s eventual 
decision.
 I contacted two GM staff who had 
worked with the College in the past 
and confirmed Shapiro’s intelligence. 
Based on their advice, I sent a letter 
to a senior GM vice president stating 
that if GM was seriously considering 
alternatives to the GMI operation, the 
College would be willing to work with 
GM to develop appropriate transitional 
and long-term arrangements. Within 
a few days GM responded with an 
invitation to visit GM headquarters in 
Detroit to discuss the matter with two 
of their executive vice presidents, Steve 
Fuller and Dave Collier, who had the 
direct responsibility for GMI.
 Chuck Vest and I drove into Detroit, 
and after a luncheon with polite 
discussion, Collier handed us across 
the table a piece of paper that stated 
that General Motors would give the 
College GMI, along with $25 million, 
if we would take it off their hands. 
They stressed that they wanted to keep 
GMI a quality operation and therefore 
wanted it to become a part of the 
UMAA College of Engineering, not 
UM Flint. Although Chuck and I were 
a bit taken back by the proposal, we 
agreed to discuss the offer with Shapiro 
and give the matter very serious 
consideration.
 At this point the fire drill began. 
Immediately after returning to Ann 
Arbor, we arranged a meeting with 
Shapiro and other executive officers to 
discuss the GM proposal. The matter 
was complicated by the fact that 
the University was preparing a $10 
million request for a General Motors 
contribution to the upcoming fund-
raising campaign. Not only would the 
size of the GM gift determine similar 
contributions from Ford and Chrysler, 
both Engineering and Business would 
be the lead programs in the solicitation.
 We concluded that just as we 
would hope that GM would give the 
Michigan fund-raising proposal serious 
consideration, we should devote 
considerable effort to evaluating the 
GMI proposal. I contacted General 
Motors to begin a several-month 
process of carefully assessing GMI, 
the quality of its students, faculty, and 
programs; its financial and facilities 
assets; and the pros and cons of various 
alternatives. On the positive side, 
we found that the students were of 
exceptionally high quality (particularly 
the minority students in the program), 
attracted in part because of the co-op 
nature of the education and the 
assurance of a significant job in General 
Motors. However, balanced against this 
was a faculty that was quite different 
in character than the research-focused 
faculty in the College. Furthermore, 
GMI was a very expensive operation, 
with staff benefits characteristic of 
General Motor’s executive programs 
rather than higher education.
 In the end, we concluded that we 
could indeed absorb GMI and operate 
it as a branch campus of the College, 
but we could only maintain the quality 
of their programs by requiring their 
students to transfer to the Ann Arbor 
campus for the final years of their 
studies, in particular engineering 
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disciplines. That is, we would create a 
3-2 program, in which students would 
attend GMI and be taught by GMI 
faculty for the first three years and then 
transfer to Ann Arbor for the final two 
years to finish their degree, all within 
the existing co-op education model 
(50% study, 50% work). However, 
we also believed that we could not 
absorb the additional enrollments 
without additional resources, and for 
this reason we asked General Motors 
to commit to providing a $100 million 
endowment for the GMI component 
over a ten-year period.
 Although Harold Shapiro liked the 
plan, he was a bit taken back by the 
idea of asking GM for $100 million. (In 
fact, he characterized it as “highway 
robbery.”) However, we finally 
convinced him that this was quite 
reasonable, and he agreed to present 
our proposal to Roger Smith, then CEO 
of General Motors. Smith’s reaction to 
the proposal was very encouraging. 
He stressed that Michigan was the 
only university GM had approached, 
and he was delighted to receive not 
only a quality proposal but a highly 
creative effort with ideas they had 
not considered. The request for $100 
million did not scare him, and he was 
very intrigued about the 3-2 concept. 
He believed this to be an excellent 
response to General Motors’ needs.
 Over the next several months GM 
considered the Michigan proposal, 
along with other options, very 
carefully. In the end, however, they 
decided to back away for political 
reasons. GM was in the midst of a 
series of very difficult negotiations with 
the UAW, seeking concessions during 
a difficult financial period for the 
automotive industry. The leadership 
of GM was populated by several GMI 
graduates, and Smith worried that 
the Michigan proposal, which would 
essentially end GMI’s existence as an 
independent college, might divide the 
leadership team at an awkward time. 
Hence GM decided to try to reconfigure 
GMI as an independent private 
college, opening its enrollment to other 
companies. I must say that we were not 
disappointed. The process of absorbing 
GMI (not to mention the frequent 
commutes to Flint) would have been 
highly distracting as we attempted 
to achieve our important strategic 
objectives.
The Department of Humanities
Another of our early tasks was to 
assess the viability of the College’s 
Department of Humanities, an 
academic unit providing service 
instruction to undergraduates not only 
in skills such as English composition, 
but in literature (Great Books, 
Shakespeare, Chaucer, Science Fiction, 
British and American Writers, among 
many other courses), philosophy, and 
history. Although this unit clearly 
duplicated courses offered by LS&A, 
it was one of the few priorities of both 
deans Van Wylen and Ragone, and 
the department had grown to over 
30 instructional faculty members. 
Engineering students were required 
to take their humanities electives from 
this Department rather than from 
LS&A, isolating them from the rest of 
the University.
 The University’s central 
administration had long been skeptical 
about the quality of the College’s 
humanities programs. Student course 
evaluations gave low marks to the 
required courses on Great Books and 
technical writing, and few engineering 
students would have taken the courses 
had they not been required, preferring 
to take their humanities and social 
science courses in LS&A with students 
from other majors. Assessments of 
faculty quality portrayed the unit as 
a “second-rate English department,” 
with only two or three of the faculty 
with credentials comparable to those of 
their LS&A colleagues. 
 Beyond the quality and centrality 
of the Humanities Department, I had 
yet another concern. By offering our 
own courses in humanities and social 
sciences and requiring our students to 
take these courses, we were isolating 
engineering students from students 
in other programs such as those 
offered by LS&A. I believed strongly 
that one of the great benefits of a 
college education at a comprehensive 
university such as Michigan was 
to experience a broad range of 
academic subjects, to rub shoulders 
with students with quite different 
interests, and to take advantage of all 
the University had to offer. Ironically, 
the first two deans of the College, 
Charles Greene and Mortimer Cooley 
had also worried about separating 
the early Department of Engineering 
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out of LS&A and establishing it as a 
separate college for just this reason. I 
viewed the Department of Humanities 
as a regressive activity, a waste of 
valuable College resources and, more 
seriously, antithetical to the concept 
of a liberal education that should be 
the underpinning for undergraduate 
education.
 These views were well known, and 
the Department was not surprised 
when I first met with them in fall of 
1981 to warn them that the continued 
existence of a predominantly service 
department, duplicated elsewhere in 
the University, was in great doubt in 
the face of our urgent budget needs. 
The University had a well-established 
and highly cumbersome process to 
discontinue academic programs that, 
in effect, put the unit on trial in what 
most felt was an awkward public 
display. But we preferred a different 
approach. We would present to the 
Department a “statement of intent,” 
with a proposed course of action to:    
1) transfer all instructional activities of 
the Department to LS&A, 2) continue 
all tenured appointments of faculty 
in the College (although they would 
teach in LS&A) until faculty members 
retired, transferred, or resigned, and 
3) retain the technical communications 
component of the Department, but 
seek to redirect it toward the new tools 
beginning to appear such as computers 
and networks. We would then ask the 
Department to choose between this 
action and the formal discontinuance 
review process. We had little doubt that 
most faculty members would prefer 
the former approach, since it was both 
compassionate and low key.
 Although Bill Frye found our 
approach very appealing, he was 
eventually persuaded by the University 
attorneys that we had no choice but 
to go through the formal academic 
program discontinuance process, 
complete with a formal review 
committee, open hearings, appeals, 
and the other elements of due process. 
We therefore began such a process in 
late 1981, which eventually concluded 
with our original suggestion. All 
instructional activities to LS&A—
thereby allowing Engineering students 
to take their humanities electives along 
with other University students—and 
the Humanities faculty were gradually 
phased out through transfers and 
retirements. Although we had to 
transfer some of the budget for the 
Department to LS&A to compensate 
for the additional instructional load 
from engineering students, in the end 
we were able to reallocate roughly 
half the budget of the Department to 
the engineering departments of the 
College. Furthermore, through this 
discontinuance action we demonstrated 
both to the central administration and 
to rest of the University our willingness 
to take strong action to reallocate 
resources to our highest priorities. 
This helped to make the decision of 
the central administration to provide 
substantial budget relief to the College 
more politically acceptable.
 Here it is important to note that 
the Humanities Department was 
not the only program examined 
for major restructuring or possible 
discontinuance. We also reviewed 
and discontinued the separate 
degree programs in computer-aided 
design and environmental sciences. 
Reviews were also conducted of the 
Departments of Naval Architecture, 
Chemical Engineering, Materials 
and Metallurgical Engineering, and 
Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, 
with the possibility of restructuring, 
redirecting, or merging these 
departments with other academic 
programs.
Development
I noted earlier my concern that the 
College had focused too much of 
its attention on development—i.e., 
private fund-raising—during the 
1970s instead of making the effort 
to build strong support within 
the central administration and in 
Lansing. Although I was determined 
not to repeat this mistake and allow 
most of my time to be consumed by 
development activities, I realized this 
would nevertheless be an important 
responsibility. Here we faced two 
immediate challenges: First, the 
development capability of the College 
had been largely dismantled following 
the campaign of the 1970s, with little 
remaining in the way of development 
staff or volunteer networks. Second, 
the University was spinning up a major 
University-wide fund-raising campaign 
for the 1980s that did not yet include 
the College, since an interim dean 
could really not speak to Engineering’s 
development priorities.
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 Hence I had to move rapidly to 
rebuild a development team, identify 
our key objectives, and lobby the 
central administration to get these 
included in the University-wide effort. 
Over the longer term, I realized that 
private fund-raising would be a critical 
component of our strategy. In fact, even 
in my earliest speeches to alumni I 
began to weave in language suggesting 
that the College would become 
increasingly a “privately supported 
island in a public university sea.” 
 The first step involved rebuilding 
relationships with industry, focusing 
first upon General Motors, Ford, and 
Chrysler. Of course, I had already 
developed contacts at the very highest 
level of General Motors because of our 
discussions concerning GMI. Ironically, 
however, this put a temporary dent 
in our efforts to build support of 
the College because General Motors 
decided to delay a decision on our $5 
million request until the GMI matter 
was settled, although they went 
ahead and made a commitment to the 
Business School. As the months wore 
on, I became increasingly frustrated, 
to the point where I even contacted 
Roger Smith to express our concern.2 
We were finally able to break through 
the GM bureaucracy when Bob Eaton, 
then head of the GM Tech Center (and 
later to become CEO of Chrysler) was 
assigned as our corporate contact. Bob 
worked hard to build the necessary 
relationships that eventually resulted 
in a $3 million gift to establish our 
Computer Aided Engineering Network.
 Relationships with Ford were easier 
to develop, both because of their close 
proximity to Ann Arbor (indeed, it 
was estimated that over 200 members 
of Ford’s senior management lived in 
or near Ann Arbor) and also because 
we had excellent contacts such as Bill 
Powers (who had left the College for 
Ford during the Ragone days). Chrysler 
was also a company with which 
the College had long had excellent 
relationships because of the efforts 
of Chrysler executives with strong 
College ties such as Harry Chesbrough, 
George Heubner, and Hal Sperlich. The 
challenge was Chrysler’s precarious 
financial condition, as it avoided 
bankruptcy only with the help of a 
bailout by the federal government. 
Nevertheless, even during tough times 
for the company, we maintained our 
flow of graduates and consultants 
to Chrysler, and when Lee Iacocca 
finally turned the company around, 
they began to support the College 
once again. (I remember well one visit 
to Chrysler headquarters when I was 
seated on a couch between Iacocca and 
Bob Lutz, each of whom was blowing 
smoke in my face from foot-long cigars. 
Guess the automobile industry was just 
not my style.)
 As one of the nation’s leading 
engineering colleges, we also had 
strong relationships with other 
industries such as the electronics and 
computer industry (e.g. IBM, Intel, 
Motorola), the aerospace industry 
(Lockheed, Boeing), the energy 
industry (Exxon, Mobil, Schlumberger), 
and the manufacturing industry (3-M, 
General Electric, Dupont). I was to 
spend an increasing fraction of my 
time traveling to visit these companies, 
building relationships with their 
leadership, and seeking their support.
 As I became more experienced 
in fund-raising and developing 
relationships with industry, I became 
aware of one of the more puzzling 
aspects of the College’s history. 
Although we were located right in the 
backyard of the automobile industry, 
our strongest relationships were with 
high-tech industries such as aerospace 
and electronics. In fact, for a time, 
Michigan was the largest source of 
engineers to the California aerospace 
industry. And the level of our support 
was always greater from these 
industries than from GM, Ford, and 
Chrysler. Perhaps part of the reason 
was that the majority of our faculty 
worked on cutting-edge research 
supported by the federal government, 
and this tended to be in high-tech areas 
related to the defense industry. It may 
also have been due to the “familiarity 
breeds contempt” syndrome, in which 
companies preferred to look beyond 
their backyard for college relations.
 Equally important was rebuilding 
relationships with alumni of the 
College in general and key donors in 
particular. Once again, much of this 
activity had been largely abandoned 
during the late 1970s and had to be 
rebuilt again from scratch. One of the 
first steps was to integrate the College’s 
alumni within the broader University 
of Michigan Alumni Association, since 
they had been separated during the 
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earlier paranoid days. We also had to 
rebuild the lists of key donor prospects 
with the capacity for major gifts.
 In an effort to rebuild our capacity 
for fund-raising, I decided to go with 
intelligence, energy, and loyalty rather 
than experience, and hired Brad 
Canale, a recent UM graduate (and 
leader of student government) who had 
just come off a year of fund-raising for 
the Republican Party in Ohio. We began 
to work with the central administration 
to weave the College’s efforts into the 
planning for the broader University-
wide Campaign for Michigan. 
Although we included support for 
the student instructional center we 
intended to build in the basement 
of the Dow Building as a priority, 
most of our efforts aimed at building 
support for people:  scholarships and 
fellowships for students and endowed 
chairs for faculty.
The Early Results
By the start of the Fall Term in 
1981, we had already made very 
substantial progress.  Our leadership 
team had been assembled. The plan 
for rebuilding the College had been 
developed and presented to the 
Executive Officers. The proposals in 
key areas—eliminating the Engineering 
Gap, implementing a special faculty 
salary program, completing the North 
Campus move, and securing University 
support of research incentives in the 
College—had been developed and 
presented to the Executive Officers, 
and we were well along in building the 
necessary support among key officers 
and their staff for eventual action.
 Hence, I was able to begin the first 
faculty meeting in the fall by stating: 
“Today I don’t want to dwell on the 
past. The litany of our difficulties and 
problems is all too familiar to you. 
Rather I would like to point to the 
future, where we think we should 
head, the actions we propose for 
getting there, and review with you 
some of the steps we have already 
taken in that direction.” Throughout 
the next several months we were able 
to secure the first set of University 
decisions so that by the end of our first 
year in the dean’s office, we had great 
confidence that we would be successful 
in completing the ambitious agenda we 
had set for the College.
 During the summer Frye had agreed 
to return to the College the 6% budget 
cut levied on all academic units 
($629,000). He had responded to our 
request for a special salary program 
($500,000) and would do so again the 
following year ($450,000) so that we 
were able to totally restructure the 
College’s salary program, essentially 
doubling the salaries of assistant and 
associate professors and providing our 
most outstanding senior faculty with 
compensation sufficient to protect them 
against market competition from other 
institutions.
 Our plans for the North Campus 
move were approved by the Executive 
Officers (initially with our offer of a 
$2 million loan), and the University 
had successfully reactivated the state 
capital outlay process for Engineering 
Building I (a $30 million project). The 
plan would succeed in moving all but 
Electrical and Computer Engineering to 
the North Campus in 18 months, with 
this large department then moving into 
Engineering Building I when it was 
completed in early 1986.
 Although we had been unsuccessful 
in persuading the Executive Officers 
to adopt our proposal for the return 
of sponsored research overhead as a 
research incentive across the entire 
University, we did accomplish this for 
the College as a special case, with a $2 
million base increase commitment over 
two years. We were able to double the 
number of technical support staff and 
equipment funds during the first year 
as well while addressing the needs 
and concerns of primary research staff. 
We were able to successfully navigate 
our engineering program accreditation 
process, and our development activities 
were once again up and running.Brad Canale with Anne
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 It is worth noting that the series of 
budget commitments we were able to 
achieve during the first year would 
increase the College’s base budget by 
almost $4.9 million over the next two 
years, amounting to a 36% increase 
(during a period in which most 
University academic units were losing 
support with the “smaller but better” 
retrenchment effort). While this did not 
erase the Engineering Gap (estimated 
at $7 million), it was an excellent start 
and demonstrated the very strong 
support provided by Bill Frye and 
Harold Shapiro. In fact, when Frye 
visited the faculty in spring of 1981, I 
made certain that the faculty realized 
just how significant his efforts were 
to rebuild the College during a most 
difficult time for the University.
Some Early Lessons 
Learned
Although our leadership team was 
inexperienced, we were committed, 
energetic, and willing to learn from 
each experience...and each mistake. 
Among the valuable lessons from that 
first year were the following:
First Get the Commitment 
from the Top
Our major objective during the first 
year was establishing the College 
of Engineering as a high priority of 
the University. We realized that until 
this was accomplished, most of the 
rest of our agenda would simply not 
be possible. And key in this effort 
was making the case for the College 
directly to the top leadership of the 
University, to Harold Shapiro and Bill 
Frye. Once we had earned their respect, 
commitment, and support, the other 
components of our plan began to fall 
rapidly into place.
Consistency and Persistence
Like contemporary politicians, we 
believed it essential to “stay on 
message.” Once we had defined the 
primary objectives through the early 
planning process, we were persistent 
in our efforts to make the case for these 
objectives. For example, the elimination 
of the Engineering Gap was stressed in 
essentially every meeting we had with 
the provost and his staff. (The term 
itself eventually became a familiar—
and to some dreaded—refrain on 
State Street.) The effort to go after the 
return of overhead funds as research 
incentives was pushed in a similar 
fashion. The message was always the 
same, unwavering and relentless.
Speed and Timing Are Everything
Looking back on the year, the pace 
of our activities seems incredible. 
For example, the day after I was 
selected as dean, I began working 
on a plan for the college, meeting 
with department chairs, faculty, and 
Some of the Many College Planning Documents
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administrators to seek their advice 
and council and preparing the first 
draft within a month, even before 
I moved into the dean’s office. The 
deans’ leadership team, including 
the associate deans, the Chairmen’s 
Advisory Committee, and key staff 
appointments, was in place by the end 
of the next month. The full plan was 
submitted to the Executive Officers, 
along with the specific proposals 
for each of our major objectives, by 
August. And we were successful in 
achieving a positive response to each 
of our proposals and executing the 
first steps (e.g., special salary program, 
research incentives, first phases of 
the North Campus move) by the end 
of the first year. During this hectic 
period we also managed to rebuild 
relationships with industry, launch a 
major new development program, and 
deal with a broad array of personnel 
matters. And along the way, we 
also built a new robotics research 
institute for the state (the Industrial 
technology Institute), worked with 
General Motors to determine the 
future of the General Motors Institute, 
completed a discontinuance review 
of the Department of Humanities, 
and successfully completed an ABET 
accreditation review of all of our 
academic programs. (And all the while 
I was keeping earlier commitments 
to two weeks of lectures in London 
and three weeks of lectures to the 
French Atomic Energy Commission in 
Chartres.)
 It was clear from this first year that 
to take advantage of the opportunities 
that would enable us to achieve our 
objectives for the College, we needed 
to move very rapidly. Timing was 
everything. Windows of opportunity 
open and close very rapidly. And as 
we were soon to learn, the pace and 
timing of opportunities would become 
even more critical as we began to enter 
the political worlds of Lansing and 
Washington.
Thinking Outside the Box
One of our greatest challenges was 
learning how to keep the pressure on 
the central administration (and later 
the state) without overloading the 
system. If we asked for too much at 
once, the system would lock up into 
indecisiveness. We had to learn how to 
manage the flow of our requests.
 But beyond that, we also learned 
that sometimes, in order to break a 
logjam of indecision, we had to think 
outside of the box. It took a great deal 
of creativity and ingenuity to keep the 
decision process moving ahead. For 
example, when the University was 
frozen on its decision concerning the 
North Campus move, we offered to 
loan them $2 million to get the show 
on the road. When Harold Shapiro and 
Bill Frye were unwilling to challenge 
the vice president for research over our 
proposal for research incentives, we 
found a way to accomplish the same 
objective while avoiding Executive 
Officer politics. 
 In addition to creativity, there were 
also times when we needed to be 
prepared to push all of our chips into 
the center of the table. An example here 
was our special salary program, which 
completely restructured the College 
salaries, reestablishing achievement and 
excellence as the primary determinants 
of compensation. To double the salaries 
of assistant and associate professors to 
the point where they passed the salaries 
of many less active senior faculty was 
controversial, particularly when the 
state’s Freedom of Information Law 
required us to publish all salaries. 
Depleting our entire discretionary 
funding capacity to get the North 
Campus move started was an example 
of yet another major (but successful) 
gamble.
 We were to encounter many similar 
situations, requiring both creativity and 
boldness, in subsequent years. But we 
had learned our lessons well during this 
first year of leadership.
The Importance of Teamwork
As I noted earlier, engineers are 
accustomed to working closely as 
teams to which each member brings 
unique talents and skills. Our core 
team consisted of the deans (JJD, 
Chuck Vest, Dan Atkins, Scott Fogler, 
and Hal Harger). Although each of 
us had particular responsibilities and 
assignments, we worked together on 
major strategic issues, trusting one 
another, backing each other up, and 
sharing and exchanging roles when 
necessary. For example, each member of 
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the team developed close relationships 
with key members of the central 
administration. I handled the Executive 
Officers (Harold Shapiro, Bill Frye, Jim 
Brinkerhoff, and such). Chuck Vest 
developed close relationships with key 
staff, including Paul Spradlin (Plant), 
Allen Spivey, Bob Holbrook, and Bob 
Sauve (provost), Ralph Nichols and 
Keith Molin (state relations). Both Dan 
Atkins and Scott Folger formed the 
bonds with key people in their areas 
(research, instruction). Dan also had 
key relationships with people at the 
state and federal level, including the 
Governor and his staff. And Hal Harger 
had invaluable, longstanding relations 
with key staff in the business, finance, 
and plant operations administration. 
These relationships with staff were 
critical not only for building support 
within the central administration, but 
also allowed us to float trial balloons 
without risking confrontation or 





    It is also important to note that 
the concept of teamwork extended 
far beyond the core deans’ team. We 
regarded both the department chairs 
and the College Executive Committee 
as important elements of the extended 
leadership team of the College. The 
active involvement of these faculty 
members in our major initiatives 
earned their active support and 
allowed the College to move ahead 
together.
The Importance of Experience
Although our team may have been 
inexperienced in administration, we 
did bring to the dean’s office extensive 
experience in working on College-wide 
and University-wide issues with the 
president, provost, and other Executive 
Officers and central administration 
staff. Not only did this make us a 
“known quantity” to key decision 
makers, but we also knew where the 
real decisions would be made and how 
to influence them. It seems unlikely 
that someone coming from outside the 
University (or with experience only at 
the College level) could have moved 
so rapidly to establish Engineering as a 
University priority.
The New Tools
Since my research in science and 
engineering had always been heavily 
dependent upon computers, it was 
natural that I would bring tools based 
on information technology into my 
leadership roles.  Immediately after 
I moved into Mortimer Cooley’s old 
dean’s office, I asked to have a word 
processing terminal installed on my 
desk. (It was one of the first A. B. Dick 
systems.) Since I had been an early 
user of microcomputers, I also brought 
over an Apple II computer with the 
first VisiCalc spreadsheet software to 
use in budget analysis. In fact, when 
Allen Spivey first shared with us his 
own hand-calculations of the relative 
ebb and flow of University support 
of various academic programs in the 
1970s, we immediately began to obtain 
this information on our own and enter 
it into VisiCalc and then later Lotus and 
Excel when the IBM PC appeared.
 But we really moved into high gear 
when the deans’ office began using 
the new Lisa computers, which were 
essentially a commercial version of the 
powerful Alto computers developed 
at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center 
and capable of very sophisticated 
graphics, analysis, and desktop 
publishing. We began to prepare very 
extensive charts and tables not only 
documenting the Engineering Gap, 
but actually developing far more 
sophisticated databases and analyses 
of the University budget than were 
available to the provost and others 
in the central administration. The 
Executive Officers soon learned that we 
knew more about University budgeting 
that they did and would occasionally 
turn to us for help. (I might note 
that we provided the first extensive 
documentation to Frye that LS&A was 
also seriously underfunded.) 
Several of the department chairs of the College 
(Erdogen Gulari, Steve Pollock, William Kuhn, 
Glenn Knoll, Walton Hancock)
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 We gained such a reputation for 
supporting our efforts with extensive 
data, charts, and documentation that 
when I left the dean’s office to become 
provost, the College of Engineering 
presented me with a large brass plaque 
containing a number of our key budget 
charts.
 Yet another important tool involved 
idea processors, such as Thinktank 
and later MORE. These were akin to 
outlining software that supported 
brainstorming and free-flowing 
discussions. We would frequently use 
them in group discussions to develop 
and refine new ideas.
 But certainly the most important 
tool that rapidly became fundamental 
to our effort was electronic mail. 
Since we rapidly equipped all 
faculty members in the College with 
personal computers, we were able to 
communicate instantaneously and 
effectively using e-mail. In fact, by the 
time I left the dean’s office, we had 
created a culture within the College in 
which most informal communications 
used this technology. I was later to take 
this technology with me as provost and 
then as president, thereby driving its 
rapid use across the entire University.
 
Where To Next?
We had completed the first year of 
our plan with incredible success on 
all fronts: funding, faculty morale, 
facilities, etc. Most significant of all, 
we had established the College clearly 
as one of the highest priorities of the 
University. Although I was concerned 
about being too forceful at times 
in portraying the Engineering Gap 
and making the case for increased 
University support, Frye quietly urged 
me to keep up the attack. He believed 
that we had every right to chastise 
both the University administration 
and even the Regents for the deep cuts 
experienced by the College during the 
1970s. This gave him the ammunition 
to take supportive actions that would 
have otherwise been very difficult 
politically.
 Yet I did have my worries. Despite 
our rapid progress, there were times 
when I felt we had taken one step 
forward, only to take two back. The 
inertia of the University administration 
and the College were daunting. 
Furthermore, it seemed that each time 
we finally managed to plug one hole in 
the dike of the College, several others 
would spring a leak. There were just 
so many things to be done, and they 
all had to be done immediately (or 
so it seemed). The amount of trivia 
flowing through the dean’s office was 
sometimes overwhelming. One of my 
colleagues complained that sometimes 
the College behaved as if it were one 
continuous faculty meeting. We had 
to take care that in our efforts to swat 
gnats, we were not distracted from 
the strategic plan and what was really 
important.
 There were also concerns about 
internal dynamics of the College. We 
had been able to take some pretty 
tough actions (e.g., the special salary 
program and the discontinuance of 
Humanities) in part because of the 
apathy of the faculty; they were simply 
beaten down. But there was growing 
One of our many charts demonstrating the 
erosion in base support of the College of 
Engineering
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recognition throughout the College and 
the University of just how dangerous 
we really were, since we not only 
intended to do precisely what we said 
we would, but we could actually bring 
it off. We had raised not only morale 
but also expectations, and we would 
lose credibility rapidly if we did not 
produce.
 But I had a more serious concern: 
Despite the clear commitment of 
Shapiro and Frye, I was beginning to 
worry about our continued progress. 
The deteriorating state economy had 
led to a series of increasingly painful 
cuts in our state appropriation that 
was eroding the University’s capacity 
to respond to our needs. Over the 
longer term, there was the potential of 
budget relief as the University’s effort 
to reallocate funds through program 
reduction and discontinuance freed 
up new capacity. But in the near term, 
the University might not be able to do 
much more. 
 Hence, I began to suspect that the 
real key to completing the agenda we 
had set out for the College would lie 
in Lansing. We would have to consider 
going directly to the Governor and 
the State Legislature for assistance, if 
we could get permission from Shapiro 
and Frye for such an effort. I became 
convinced that we would have to go 
ourselves, since I was not confident that 
the University would (or could) make 
our case for us.
 This growing recognition marked 
a major shift in strategy, away from 
focusing entirely on efforts to build 
strong internal University support 
(although this would still be important) 
and toward taking our case directly to 
Lansing. Of course, we realized that the 
University was a highly political beast, 
and we had to keep sufficient pressure 
on State Street to avoid backsliding. But 
as it would turn out, a direct approach 
to Lansing would be the second key to 
the success of the College in the 1980s, 
since through this new effort we would 
not only be able to pry loose the state 
funding for Engineering Building I and 
the completion of the North Campus 
move, but we would also achieve 
the Research Excellence Fund, which 
would provide an $8.5 million increase 
in the base budget of the College as 




Mr. Duderstadt and Mr. Vest Go to Lansing
Like many scientists and engineers, 
I tend to keep track of agendas and 
progress with “To Do” lists and “Goals 
Achieved” charts. As we emerged 
from our first year in the deans’ office, 
I noticed that while the achievement 
chart rapidly filled with smiley faces, 
the To Do lists became longer and 
longer (although most items were 
rapidly checked off). After several years 
the items in these lists numbered in 
the hundreds, a sign that the more we 
accomplished, the more new objectives 
were added to the list.
 During the first year in the deans’ 
office, we had focused primarily on 
firmly establishing the College as a 
priority of the University, restoring 
adequate support for its programs, 
and executing a plan that would 
complete the North Campus move. It 
was now time to deal with other key 
issues. Foremost among these would 
be improving the quality of the faculty. 
Although we were confident that the 
quality and morale of our junior faculty 
were now very high, we believed we 
needed far more strength among our 
senior faculty.
 We also needed to address the 
intellectual directions of the College. 
Of course the detailed nature of the 
teaching and research programs 
of the College were determined at 
the grassroots level by the activities 
of the faculty. However the major 
intellectual thrusts of the College, 
particularly its new initiatives, could 
be stimulated and shaped by the 
College administration. We had already 
demonstrated this through the effort 
to build programs in robotics and 
integrated manufacturing. We now 
needed to focus on other high-priority 
areas and opportunities.
 Finally, although we had made great 
progress toward restoring adequate 
support of the College and launching 
the sequence of actions that would 
complete the North Campus move, 
these tasks were far from complete. 
Backsliding was always a concern. The 
continuing financial crisis facing the 
University because of the weakened 
state economy made it clear that we 
needed a new strategy if we were to 
achieve these goals.
Rebuilding the Faculty
As I have noted, one of the most 
important actions we took during 
the first year was to implement a 
special faculty salary program to 
address market pressures on our 
most productive and valuable faculty 
members, particularly at the junior 
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level.  We were able to continue these 
special programs throughout our years 
in the deans’ office. To demonstrate the 
impact of this effort, it is interesting to 
compare the differential between the 
College of Engineering faculty salary 
increases and those of the University at 
large during the 1981-1985 period:
Through these salary programs, as 
well as the growing sense of optimism 
associated with the new priority given 
the College by the University, we were 
able to hold on to our best people. But 
it was also clear that we needed to 
build the quality of the faculty through 
new faculty hires at all levels, but 
particularly at the senior faculty level.
 The first step in this direction was 
to modify the way in which new 
faculty positions were allocated to the 
departments. We sought to decouple 
the hiring of permanent faculty from 
the more immediate (and volatile) 
fluctuations of instructional loads. 
To this end, we first agreed to fund 
a fixed percentage of all ongoing, 
permanent faculty salaries in the 
various departments (initially at 
85%, assuming that faculty members 
would use sponsored research funds 
to support the remaining 15% of their 
appointment). We then allocated one-
time dollars to departments for flexible 
staff based on their instructional loads. 
attract these superstars, including 
laboratory space, graduate assistant 
support, and even endowed chairs.
 Unfortunately, the College had only 
a handful of endowed chairs at the 
time, although this was to become our 
highest fund-raising priority in the 
years to come. In an effort to stretch 
these chairs, we developed a new 
policy in which the income from the 
endowment would be used to support 
a discretionary fund for each chair 
holder (typically $20,000 per year 
or so) rather than support a portion 
of their base salary. This not only 
made the chairs highly attractive to 
candidates, but it also avoided losing 
the base funding for the position. We 
tried to achieve a balance between 
awarding chairs to current faculty 
and using them to recruit new faculty. 
We also tended to favor awarding 
chairs to “stars on the rise” rather than 
“Mandarins,” that is, senior faculty of 
great distinction whose contributions 
were largely behind them.
 Although the College had 
considerable difficulty in attracting 
outstanding senior faculty during 
the 1970s, with the new University 
priority and sense of optimism, our 
success picked up. Among the senior 
appointments during this
early period were John Hayes, Albert 
Schultz, Gerry Faeth, Ron Gibala, 
Pallab Battacharya, Fawwaz Ulaby, 
Semyon Meerkov, Duncan Steele, Lynn 
Conway, John Barker, Terry Brockett, 
Tony England, and Gerard Mourou.
 As we intensified both the incentives 
and expectations for excellence and 
Year      81-82      82-83      83-84      84-85
UM         5.5%       5.0%       5.0%       5.0%
Eng       12.0%      9.5%       8.5%       8.5%
Finally we allocated a certain number 
of new faculty positions each year, 
responding to department proposals 
based on programmatic considerations. 
We consciously avoided any tendency 
to spread new positions out uniformly 
among the departments, but rather 
allocated them to our highest priorities. 
For example, in our first year with 
the new system, we allocated 9 of 30 
new faculty positions to Electrical and 
Computer Engineering. (This was 
one of the very few times I ever saw 
the energetic chair of the department, 
George Haddad, at a loss for words. 
In the past he had always made an 
impassioned appeal for the new 
positions needed by his growing 
department, knowing that he would 
be given only a small fraction of the 
positions he requested. When he made 
his annual appeal to our new team, we 
responded by immediately granting his 
full request!)
 We also added a new wrinkle: 
the target of opportunity program. 
We wanted to provide maximum 
incentives for the departments to go 
after the very best people, particularly 
at the senior faculty level. So each 
year we would set aside roughly ten 
positions and allow departments 
to compete for them based on the 
quality of the candidate. That is, we 
allocated ten new positions each year 
based on absolute quality rather than 
programmatic need (or instructional 
load), responding to specific proposals 
from the departments. We also offered 
to help the departments with putting 
together competitive packages to 
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make further progress in erasing the 
Engineering Gap.
 As I noted earlier, we entered 
the FY82-83 budget year with 
commitments from the provost to 
increase our budget by $1 million 
for the research incentive program, a 
salary program growth of $450,000 (for 
the second year of the special market 
program), and roughly $510,000 for 
equipment and technical staff for a total 
growth of $1,950,000 (+15% growth). 
For the next year, FY83-84, we sought 
and achieved a growth of $2,785,000 
(+18%), which included $1 million from 
the computer user fee that we began 
charging engineering students for the 
Computer Aided Engineering Network 
(discussed in the next chapter). We 
were pleased with this budget growth, 
particularly during such difficult 
financial times for the University. But 
we were also concerned that future 
growth would become more difficult. 
And so it was, since in FY84-85, Frye 
was only able to provide us with a 
budget growth of $1,700,000 (+ 10%), 
although we were able to augment this 
with an additional $1,510,000 from the 
special computer fee. 
 Although we believed that Bill 
Frye and his staff had the capacity to 
do more, we feared that they did not 
have the capacity to understand how 
to do it. Hence we began to explore 
other ways to make our case for 
additional support. One of the more 
interesting approaches was to develop 
an “all funds” accounting process that 
balanced the revenue generated by 
the College (roughly $74 million in the 
achievement, it was clear that many 
faculty members hired in the 1950s 
and 1960s were no longer competitive. 
We worked closely with department 
chairs to address each of these cases, 
sometimes providing them with the 
capacity for early retirement, assisting 
in outplacement, or finding them 
other positions within the University. 
Not infrequently the final negotiation 
would end up on the desk of the dean 
(me) or associate dean (Chuck Vest). 
 At the same time, we began a more 
strategic effort to identify and develop 
the future leadership of the College. 
We actually maintained “depth charts” 
for key academic leadership position 
such as department chairs and deans. 
Drawing on our own experience, 
we tried to encourage faculty with 
leadership potential to become engaged 
first in the array of various faculty 
committees both at the College and 
University level.
 Finally, it is interesting to note that 
many of the ideas we used to rapidly 
improve the quality of our faculty 
were adopted by other academic units 
across the University and beyond. 
Some were even taken along by those 
of us who went on to more senior 
academic leadership positions, such 
as the target of opportunity program 
that would soon become the backbone 
of the University’s minority faculty 
recruiting program when I became 
provost. Our philosophy on faculty 
compensation also propagated across 
the University, namely that the proper 
goal was to strive to achieve a salary 
for each faculty member that was 
comparable to that received by their 
colleagues of comparable achievement 
and reputation at peer institutions. 
We believed this policy achieved the 
proper balance between merit and 
market considerations.
Budget Woes
As we entered the second year 
in the deans’ office, the Michigan 
economy continued its downward 
plunge. Although Governor Milliken 
had been warned that tax revenues 
would not be sufficient to meet state 
obligations, he refused to support tax 
increases and instead began to issue a 
series of executive order cuts in state 
appropriations. Since these were issued 
after the start of the fiscal year, when 
expenditure commitments had already 
been made, they were particularly 
painful to education. Bill Frye was 
forced to accelerate the Five-Year Plan 
of reallocation, and all academic units 
(including Engineering) were warned 
that there would be no relief.
 Our total budget cut for the five-year 
period was $530,604. We had already 
been given credit for the first 6% cut 
(that is, we had taken the cut and then 
been given the funds back), leaving 
roughly $50,000 cuts over each of the 
next four years, so this would not be 
difficult to accommodate. However, 
far more serious was the degree to 
which the deteriorating state budget 
situation would constrain Frye’s efforts 
to provide the College with relief and 
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form of tuition, state appropriation, 
research grants, and gifts) against 
the University expenditures for our 
activities ($58 million). We made the 
case that we had become, in effect, a 
“profit center”, generating roughly $16 
million each year for the University. 
We attempted to make the case for 
the return of some of this “profit” 
back to the College to eliminate the 
Engineering Gap.
 A second approach was effectively 
to walk the University out on a limb by 
taking a very calculated and deliberate 
gamble to maintain the pace of our 
staffing and facilities programs by 
expending our entire discretionary 
capacity at year-end to close the books. 
This demonstrated to the central 
administration both that we would 
continue to behave in a financially 
responsible fashion with no overruns 
or deficits, and at the same time, that 
we were not kidding when we said we 
were willing to bet the ranch to keep 
our momentum going.
 Although these pressures persuaded 
Bill Frye that we were still far short 
of where we needed to be in erasing 
the Engineering Gap, he preferred to 
maintain a “positive ambiguity” rather 
than commit to an inadequate number. 
Fortunately, he (and we) also had a 
good sense of humor, when on one 
of our many forays to State Street, he 
presented us with a blank check:
More significantly, he and Harold 
Shapiro finally were willing to let us go 
directly to Lansing to see if we could 




Chuck and Jim Go To 
Lansing
Our first adventure into state politics 
occurred in 1982, during the depths of 
the Michigan recession, when Harold 
Shapiro agreed to let Chuck Vest and 
me go to Lansing in an attempt to gain 
support for Engineering Building I 
(EBI). Since the University had already 
expended most of its political capital 
in the effort to obtain the $180 million 
for the Replacement Hospital Project, 
state funding of the $30 EBI project 
seemed like a long shot. Shapiro felt 
there was nothing to lose by letting us 
try. To make certain we did not get into 
any trouble, Dick Kennedy assigned a 
long-time Lansing political pro, Keith 
Molin, to accompany us and show us 
the ropes.
 We began what would become 
increasingly frequent and regular trips 
to Lansing, to meet key members of 
the Legislature and the Governor’s 
office, and their staffs. The objective 
was to reactivate the capital outlay 
process for EBI and then to maintain its 
progress through the complex political 
process leading to authorization 
and appropriation for an actual 
construction start. Shortly after we 
began to travel to Lansing with Molin, 
Ralph Nichols brought us a glimmer of 
hope: the project had actually appeared 
on the list of capital outlay projects to 
be considered during the last year of 
the Milliken administration.
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 We also learned well the old boxing 
adage: “Train hard, fight easy!”, 
since each time we were called to 
testify before one key committee or 
another, we would work for days on 
the presentation, only to find when 
we arrived at the hearing that our 
testimony would not be necessary 
after all. Yet another lesson: Sometimes 
not having to testify can be the most 
positive sign of all that the political 
process has been sufficiently well 
greased that a project will slide through 
without comment.
 Fortunately, we were able to get to 
key members of the new Blanchard 
 It was quite a learning experience, 
preparing us well for later efforts in 
both Lansing and Washington. Many of 
our meetings involved formal briefings 
of key legislators and staff. At other 
times we would lie in wait near the 
doors to the legislative chambers, along 
with dozens of other lobbyists, and 
simply try to catch members with a 
brief word. In some cases, we worked 
at a social level, such as the night 
Chuck, Keith, and I spent with three 
senior members of the Joint Capital 
Outlay Committee drinking together 
late into the evening at a bar in East 
Lansing. Whatever it took.
administration and convince them 
that EBI could be a critical element 
of their economic development 
plan, which was based heavily on 
technology. In Governor Blanchard’s 
first capital outlay request, EBI was 
given the highest priority. Furthermore, 
Blanchard moved quickly to pass an 
increase in the state income tax to 
stabilize the budget, thereby providing 
funds for capital outlay projects such 
as ours to move ahead (although the 
tax increase eventually resulted in the 
recall of two legislators). We learned 
how important it was to hit critical 
decision points at just the right time. It 
was also important to avoid any actions 
that might require an unnecessary 
trip back for another approval by 
the Joint Capital Outlay Committee. 
An example here was the site of the 
project. Although we were going after 
a building considerably larger than that 
first proposed for Engineering Building 
I in the original four-building plan of 
the 1970s, we kept it on precisely the 
same site footprint to avoid any need 
for reconsideration by JCOC. Although 
EBI today (now called the Electrical 
Engineering and Computer Science 
building) looks a bit cramped between 
two adjacent buildings, it was built on 
schedule and to specifications, and that 
was the key objective.
 The final goal was achieved in 
June of 1983, when the EBI project 
received the final construction start 
authorization from the Legislature. 
Governor Blanchard flew in by 
helicopter to turn the first shovel of 
dirt at the construction start ceremony, 
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and the bulldozers quickly converged 
on the site. The final piece of the North 
Campus move puzzle was now in 
place!
The Research Excellence 
Fund
Our experience in Lansing would serve 
us well in yet another adventure in 
state politics that was to prove even 
more important for the future of the 
College: the Research Excellence Fund. 
Harold Shapiro had been sufficiently 
impressed with our ability to persuade 
Lansing to fund Engineering Building I 
that he agreed to let us continue our 
efforts to make our case to the new 
Blanchard administration for more 
funding for the College. Bill Frye was 
a bit more reluctant to turn us loose, 
since he was worried that any success 
we might have in Lansing would come 
out of the general state appropriation 
to the University. But Shapiro 
convinced him to let us try, and off we 
went again.
 Actually, I was already a frequent 
visitor to Lansing on a similar mission: 
an effort launched by the Michigan 
Society of Professional Engineers 
Harold Shapiro, Governor James Blanchard, 
and the Dean break ground for EBI
Artist’s conception of Engineering Building I
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to seek a special appropriation for 
equipment at Michigan’s colleges 
of engineering. John Selby, CEO of 
Consumers Power and chair of MSPE, 
and I spent many days traveling about 
the state (in John’s company plane), 
meeting with CEOs and legislators, 
in an effort to enlist their support 
for a major “Engineering Excellence 
Fund” that would provide $10 million 
a year for equipping the state’s 
engineering colleges. We participated 
in several legislative hearings along 
with representatives from industry, 
and while we would always get a 
warm reception along with assurances 
from key legislative leaders that they 
supported the effort, the money never 
came through. But this effort was not 
wasted, since many of the arguments 
and contacts would become useful as 
the new Blanchard administration came 
to Lansing.
 We had also been involved in 
conversations with a number of 
members of the Blanchard team even 
before he was elected, as they tried to 
understand better the needs of the state 
and develop their strategy for the first 
term. Shortly after Blanchard moved 
into the state house, two major task 
forces were launched, one concerning 
the economic future of the state chaired 
by Doug Ross (who would become 
the director of the state Department 
of Commerce), and one concerning 
the future of higher education in 
Michigan, chaired by Philip Power (son 
of former University Regent Eugene 
Power and husband of then Regent 
Sarah Power). We worked closely with 
both committees to see if we could 
position the College of Engineering as a 
component of both strategies.
 Chuck, Dan, and I began to 
develop close relationships with the 
Blanchard team (particularly Doug 
Ross, Pete Plasterik, Ralph Gerson, 
Jamie Kenworthy, Peter Eckstein, 
Pete Walters, and Bob Naftely). Dan 
worked closely with Blanchard in an 
effort to go after the Semiconductor 
Research Institute (which eventually 
ended up in Austin). Chuck and I met 
frequently with Kenworthy, Plaskterik, 
and Power as they developed the 
high-tech elements of the broader 
strategy of economic development 
designed to create jobs. Through 
these discussions we managed to get 
specific mention of the College in the 
strategic plan developed by Doug 
Ross: “Michigan must invest heavily 
in centers of applied research, with 
special emphasis on developing the 
University of Michigan’s College of 
Engineering as a world leader in this 
field.” Furthermore, Philip Power 
managed to get specific mention of the 
concept of a “research excellence fund,” 
in which the state would invest in 
centers of excellence within its research 
universities.
 As this momentum began to build, 
we touched bases again with Shapiro, 
both to make certain he still supported 
the effort and to ask for his specific 
help in keeping this issue before 
Blanchard. We also asked for the help 
of Dick Kennedy and his team to help 
with the effort both to get the Research 
Excellence Fund established as an 
element of the Governor’s strategy, 
and to win legislative support for the 
concept. Our code name for this effort 
was the “MIT of the Midwest” plan, 
with a target of achieving a special state 
appropriation in our base of roughly 
$8 to $9 million through the Research 
Excellence Fund mechanism.
 As the planning for the Research 
Excellence Fund began to take shape, it 
was finally announced as a $25 million 
initiative that would channel funds for 
research centers of excellence to the 
state’s four research universities, with 
$11.25 million coming to the University 
of Michigan. Of this amount, $8.5 
million would be earmarked for the 
College of Engineering; $2.25 million 
for molecular genetics; and $0.5 million 
for the LS&A component of the new 
applied physics program. Since we 
would eventually have to submit 
specific requests for our $8.5 million 
share, we proposed at an early stage 
that these funds would be used to 
support our Center for Research on 
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Integrated Manufacturing (CRIM), a 
new Center for Machine Intelligence, 
and a Center for Advanced Electronics 
and Optics Technology (which would 
fund much of the equipment and 
staffing required for the solid state 
electronics laboratory planned as the 
centerpiece for Engineering Building 
I). As we began to work the concept 
through the state legislature, it became 
apparent that roughly $3 million would 
have to be added to buy off the smaller 
state universities. We worked hard to 
build awareness and support for the 
Research Excellence Fund among our 
friends in industry as well as in labor 
(through contacts I had developed with 
the UAW with Philip Power’s help). 
Similarly, we contacted members of the 
University’s Regents to make certain 
they understood and supported the 
effort.
 Everything seemed all set for 
approval by the legislature in spring, 
1985. But then in the typical midnight 
massacre that happens in state politics, 
when the bill finally came out of the 
Senate-House conference committee, 
it had been cut to shreds, and the 
University ended up with only $6.6 
million, designated for the College. 
Both the speaker of the house (Gary 
Owen) and the state budget director 
(Bob Naftely) pledged to go after the 
additional funding in a supplemental 
appropriation, but we knew we 
would actually have two battles on 
our hands: first to continue to work 
to make certain that the supplemental 
appropriation restored the full $8.5 
million for the College, and next a 
battle within the University to keep 
Bill Frye from caving into pressure 
to divert the $6.6 million to other 
University needs. Here it is important 
to understand that the University’s 
constitutional autonomy technically 
gives it authority to override legislative 
intent in an appropriation (although 
at the risk of alienating Lansing). We 
fought hard on both fronts, and with 
the strong support of the Governor, 
put considerable pressure on the 
University to carry out the original 
intent of the Research Excellence Fund 
(with Shapiro’s support, although 
with considerable reluctance on Frye’s 
part). Frye eventually announced 
at a meeting of the deans that the 
University intended to follow the intent 
of the Legislature by allocating the full 
$6.6 million (and the supplemental 
appropriation, if it was approved) to 
the College of Engineering, although he 
was not pleased by such targeted state 
support. 
 The supplemental appropriation 
came through in late 1985, boosting our 
share to $8.5 million (plus $0.5 million 
for applied physics, which was 50% a 
College program). Shortly thereafter, 
Bob Naftely announced that he was 
wiring the Research Excellence Fund 
into the future base budgets of the 
research universities so that it would 
not suffer from political mischief each 
budget cycle. Of course we still had 
to go through a proposal submission 
process for our three centers, but this 
was only a formality. The $8.5 million 
was already in our base.
 It is likely that had I remained as 
Dean of Engineering, I would have 
had to fight the battle again and again 
each year to keep the University from 
dispersing to other units the $8.5 
million allocated through the Research 
Excellence Fund to the College. After 
all, the provost could have simply 
allowed us to keep the $8.5 million, 
and then reduced our budget in other 
areas. However, once again fate seemed 
to take care of the College, because 
by the time the next budget cycle was 
underway, I had succeeded Bill Frye 
as provost.  Both I and Chuck Vest 
(who succeeded me as provost when 
I became president) made certain that 
the $8.5 million was locked firmly into 
the base of the College for the future, 
where it remains today (although 
no longer identified as the research 
excellence fund).
 Although we fought and won many 
battles during the early 1980s, this was 
a particularly important victory. With 
this $8.5 million increase (actually, 
$9.1 million with applied physics), we 
not only erased the Engineering Gap. 
We obliterated it! Over a four-year 
period, we had managed to increase 
the College’s base support from the 
University from $13.2 million to $34 
million per year—almost tripling 
it—while raising almost $70 million 
in University, state, and private 
contributions to complete the move to 
the North Campus. 
 It is important to understand 
that while the $8.5 million from the 
Research Excellence Fund was initially 
targeted to support our programs 
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in automation, manufacturing, 
electronics, and optics, in reality these 
funds were quite flexible (particularly 
in subsequent years when we managed 
to get the Research Excellence Fund 
designation removed from this 
component of our appropriation). 
This budget line would increase each 
year with the state appropriation. I 
believed the flexibility of these funds 
was very important and urged my 
successors that the Research Excellence 
Fund budget line continue to be used 
as “venture capital” by the College 
to support new initiatives, rather 
than committed to the base support 
of ongoing activities such as faculty 
salaries. Unfortunately, in later years, 
the fund was gradually shifted to just 
such base support, thereby losing 
the advantages of its extraordinary 
flexibility and instead funding growth 
of the College. Nevertheless, the 
College still benefited very greatly 
through the significant growth in its 
base support.
 Two final comments are in order. 
Although the Research Excellence 
Fund had a specific purpose to 
fund differentially the activities of 
the state’s research universities, the 
political process eventually took over 
and leveled this temporary increase 
out so that it disappeared into the 
higher education appropriation base. 
Although the College of Engineering 
benefited greatly, there was no 
additional benefit for the rest of the 
University. After a few years, the 
University of Michigan’s share of the 
state appropriation fell back to its 
historical level of 24% of each state 
higher education dollar. Second, 
although Blanchard had been a real 
champion of the College in the funding 
of Engineering Building I and the 
Research Excellence Fund, these would 
be among the last of his positive higher 
education initiatives. In his later years 
as Governor, he would learn from 
polling that he could get far more 
votes by holding down tuition levels 
than adequately funding the state’s 
public colleges and universities. In fact, 
even as the Research Excellence Fund 
completed its final stages of approval, 
Blanchard was already signaling to the 
state’s universities that he would hold 
hostage their capital projects unless 
they froze their tuitions (a difficult 
thing to do during a time of sub-
inflationary state appropriations).
On to Washington
A disappointment during the first 
years of our new deans’ team was the 
lack of success in efforts to win major 
competitions for federal research 
centers. We first tried to win one of the 
NSF Centers in Computing Research 
or a Material Research Laboratories, 
without success. When the NSF 
Engineering Research Center program 
was announced, with an emphasis on 
manufacturing, we thought we were 
well positioned to win, but again we 
fell short. Finally, we submitted a 
proposal that was ranked near the top 
for a national supercomputer center, 
but we eventually lost the political 
end game that generally accompanies 
such competition. Not to say we didn’t 
win other major efforts, including 
an Air Force Center of Excellence 
in Manufacturing Technology and 
a Science and Technology Center in 
Ultrafast Optics. But our win-loss 
record was not good during these first 
years.
 In part we realized that this reflected 
both a weakness in the strength 
of our senior faculty as well as the 
College’s ability to form faculty into 
interdisciplinary teams to go after 
these very large grants. We were able 
to overcome some of this by recruiting 
superstars at the senior level (such 
as Gerard Mourou who won the NSF 
STC in Ultrafast Optics). But there 
was another problem. We simply did 
not have the clout in Washington that 
we needed to be competitive in these 
national competitions. Neither the 
vice president for research nor the 
University’s federal relations team 
were very helpful on these efforts.
 Therefore I accepted the 
responsibility to build the University’s 
presence in Washington. Dan Atkins 
was a neighbor of Bob Teeter, a senior 
advisor to the Reagan administration, 
and through his efforts, I was 
appointed by the President to serve 
on the National Science Board. This 
body served not only as the board 
of directors for the National Science 
Foundation, but it also was the nation’s 
primary source of independent advice 
on scientific matters. Its members 
included many distinguished scientists 
and leaders of industry and higher 
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education. They were each appointed 
by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate to serve six-year terms. I was 
eventually to serve 12 years on the 
National Science Board, chairing it for 
three years during my second term.
 Through the National Science Board, 
I was quickly able to develop both 
key insight and relationships with 
the federal government. Although 
I always took great care to avoid 
conflict of interest, my rapidly growing 
knowledge and experience in federal 
affairs, as well as my contacts, were to 
prove invaluable to the College (just as 
they were later to the University, when 
as provost and president Michigan rose 
to a position as the nation’s leading 
university in research activity).
A Few Remaining Doubts 
in Midstream
By almost any measure, we should 
have been very satisfied with our 
progress toward our original objectives 
by the mid-1980s. The North Campus 
move was essentially finished, with 
only the completion of construction 
of Engineering Building I remaining 
(scheduled for early 1986). We had 
gone far beyond our original goal 
of eliminating the Engineering Gap 
and managed to triple the University 
support in just four years. Our faculty 
was improving rapidly, as evidenced 
by both the quality of our junior faculty 
and the growing number of outstanding 
hires we were making at the senior 
level. The College was moving into 
exciting new areas and beginning to 
compete more effectively for major 
national centers and projects.
 Yet we were still uneasy. During 
the first year we had been worried 
about throwing too many balls in 
the air at one time. However as the 
College regained its strength and 
capacity, we began to worry about 
our ability to generate initiatives and 
pursue opportunities. We sensed a 
notable absence of vision, creativity, 
and innovation throughout much of 
the college. Much of this was probably 
due to the “impacted wisdom group” 
among our senior faculty, worn 
down and apathetic after years of 
inadequate support. There was also 
considerable resistance, particularly 
within some of the large departments, 
to building the teams necessary to go 
after major interdisciplinary projects. 
Our earlier experiences with the ERC, 
supercomputer, and CER proposals 
revealed the limited bench strength in 
the College. 
 I was also worried about putting 
too many of our eggs in one basket. 
We had made major commitments to 
the Center for Research on Integrated 
Manufacturing and were about to 
make even larger bets on the solid 
state electronics laboratory. Yet, if 
these failed, we could do considerable 
damage to the College’s credibility in 
future years (particularly since we had 
gone after a major state initiative in the 
Research Excellence Fund to support 
these efforts). We needed to diversify 
our initiatives and investments, but 
to do that we needed more leadership 
horsepower among the faculty.
 Finally, although we had been 
extremely successful in making the 
case for the College and keeping the 
pressure on the University’s Executive 
Officers to support our initiatives, I 
began to worry about our very success. 
My paranoia suggested a theorem that 
states, “When you always get what you 
ask for, you should always be asking 
for more!”
 
Being sworn in as a member of the National 
Science Board by Roland Schmitt
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Chapter 7
Moving into High Gear
Although the rapid pace we had set 
during the first two years in the deans’ 
office did not slow, we became more 
adept at managing the unusual number 
of opportunities that arose from our 
earlier success. The “To Do” lists 
continued to grow in length (typically 
numbering 100 or more items), but 
then so too did the completion lists 
of goals we had achieved. There were 
some changes. Scott Fogler left to 
return to the position of chairman 
of his Department of Chemical 
Engineering. Lynn Conway arrived 
from California as a new associate 
dean in charge of new initiatives, with 
a particular emphasis on areas such 
as artificial intelligence and advanced 
microelectronics design. Walt Hancock 
joined us to help guide our rapidly 
growing activities in manufacturing 
science and engineering.
 My own activities became even 
more complex because of my new 
responsibilities on the National 
Science Board (NSB). This body met in 
Washington for two to three days every 
two months. In addition, there were 
numerous committees of the NSB that 
met more frequently. I was assigned 
the role as chair of one of the major 
standing committees concerned with 
NSF’s Education and Human Resources 
programs and served on several 
others concerning issues ranging from 
undergraduate education to technology 
export controls to the future of the NSF 
supercomputer program. Although the 
time commitments were considerable, 
the opportunities to learn more about 
the federal research environment 
and meet the key players proved 
invaluable.
 We had made considerable progress 
on our original plan, but we were 
determined to remain focused on our 
key goals of rebuilding the faculty, 
restoring adequate support for the 
College, and completing the North 
Campus move. As I have discussed in 
the previous chapter, these efforts were 
well underway by mid-way through 
my term as dean and would soon be 
completed. But there were many other 
projects, including building a modern 
computing environment for the 
College, stimulating new intellectual 
thrusts capable of attracting significant 
external funding, putting into place 
new policies for intellectual property 
development and technology transfer, 
developing important partnerships 
with other programs in the University, 
and, of course, fighting the inevitable 
battles against the political forces that 
thwart change in large organizations 
such as universities.
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The Computer Aided 
Engineering Network
The College faced a very major 
challenge in building a modern 
computing environment for its 
students, faculty, and programs. Part 
of the problem was developing an 
appropriate vision for a state-of-the-art 
system and then financing it. But we 
also faced a challenge because of the 
very success of the University-wide 
Michigan Terminal System (MTS). 
Developed with IBM in the 1960s, 
this had long been one of the nation’s 
leading time-sharing systems. Yet it 
was an inhouse system, adopted by 
few other universities, and during the 
1970s it rapidly lost ground to the new 
generation of minicomputers such as 
DEC’s VAX systems for science and 
engineering applications. By the end 
of the 1970s, most engineering and 
science departments at top research 
universities had acquired their own 
VAX systems. Yet, Michigan remained 
not only moored to the increasingly 
aging mainframe-based MTS system, 
but also to centrally administrated 
computer policies that prevented 
academic programs from breaking 
away and acquiring more advanced 
computing environments. In fact, every 
purchase of a computer had to be 
approved by a central committee at the 
University.
 This was a topic of personal interest, 
since my own career had largely 
paralleled that of the digital computer. 
My particular area of research, nuclear 
energy systems (nuclear reactors, 
nuclear rockets, thermonuclear fusion), 
was not only heavily dependent upon 
state-of-the-art computing, but it had 
actually driven much of computer 
development. During the 1960s and 
1970s I had done much of my work 
using Atomic Energy Commission 
supercomputers at AEC laboratories 
such as Los Alamos and Livermore. 
Although my research made use of 
the very fastest computers in the 
world, several of our faculty members 
(including Dick Phillips and Bill 
Powers of Aerospace Engineering) got 
me interested in the use of the first 
microcomputers such as the TRS-80 
and Apple II for instructional purposes. 
In fact, I taught one of the very first 
introductory computer courses on 
these systems in the late 1970s. From 
these experiences, I was convinced 
that the College simply had to break 
away from the University’s MTS 
system and build its own computing 
environment, more suited to its needs. 
I was convinced that the digital 
computer would rapidly evolve from 
simply a tool for scientific computation 
and information processing into an 
information technology infrastructure 
absolutely essential to all of our 
activities, from research to instruction 
to administration. Hence, to build a 
leading engineering college, we would 
have to become a leader in information 
technology. This view was shared by 
many members of the College.
 Dan Atkins assumed the leadership 
for this effort, assisted by Dick Phillips, 
Lynn Conway and other members of 
the faculty. We set a rather ambitious 
goal: To build the most sophisticated 
information technology environment 
of any engineering college in the 
nation, an environment that would 
continually push the limits of what 
could be delivered in terms of power, 
ease of use, and reliability to our 
students, faculty, and staff. The system 
was called CAEN, the Computer Aided 
Engineering Network, a name that 
reflected its functional architecture 
as a sophisticated information 
technology network integrating the 
Colleges’ instruction, research, and 
administrative activities together 
with both oncampus users (students, 
faculty, staff) and off-campus 
participants (industry, government, 
alumni). More technically, CAEN was 
envisioned as a distributed intelligence, 
The Michigan Terminal System (MTS) 
Computer System
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hierarchical computing system linking 
personal computer workstations, 
superminicomputers, mainframe 
computers, function-specific machines 
(CAD/CAM, simulation) and gateway 
machines to national networks and 
facilities such as supercomputer 
centers. The network was designed 
to support not only general 
scientific computing, but computer-
aided instruction, administrative 
services, and access to technical and 
bibliographic databases. 
 We first had to fight a battle on 
State Street to allow us to break away 
from the University MTS system. Not 
surprisingly, this involved many of 
our old foes in the kingdom of the 
vice president for research, since they 
ran campus computing at that time. 
Fortunately it was easy to convince 
Harold Shapiro and Bill Frye that they 
needed to encourage more diversity 
in computing, and in particular, 
allow some units to move far out on 
the curve of advanced computing 
as pathfinders for the rest of the 
University. Engineering and Business 
Administration were given the go-
ahead to build their own environments 
(which would eventually lead to the 
disappearance of MTS, although it 
would take almost a decade).
 I have already mentioned some of 
our early steps to build CAEN. We 
first provided every member of the 
faculty with a personal computer 
(a choice of either an IBM PC or an 
Apple II computer). We next began to 
acquire several networked clusters of 
state-of-the-art computer workstations 
for research (Apollo, Sun, HP, Apple 
Lisas, Silicon Graphics). We faced a 
very major challenge in providing 
adequate computing resources for our 
students, since our large enrollments 
(6,000) would require a massive 
investment. To address this, we took 
two very important steps: First, as I 
mentioned in the previous chapter, we 
persuaded the University to allow us 
to charge students a special $100 per 
term computer user fee to help support 
their computing environment.  
 This generated $1.5 million each 
year that we then could use to buy 
(or even debt-finance) computer 
equipment. We made absolutely 
certain that every penny of these fees 
(along with significant contributions 
from the College) went entirely to 
equip numerous student computing 
clusters around the College that 
would be restricted solely for the use 
of engineering students. To provide 
a vivid demonstration of just what 
the students were getting for their 
fees, we converted two large lecture 
rooms on the first floor of the Chrysler 
Center into a gigantic computer cluster, 
equipped with over 100 of the new 
Apple Lisa workstations. This was 
quite a sight—probably the largest 
collection of Apple Lisas that ever 
existed—and it really impressed the 
students.1 We adopted the philosophy 
that these were the students’ 
computers, without any constraints 
on how they could use them. Similar 
computer clusters were built around 
the College.2
 The second element of our plan 
for students involved developing a 
mechanism to help them purchase 
their own personal computers, since 
we realized that the College would 
never have sufficient assets to equip 
all 6,000 students. We explored the 
possibility of negotiating very deep 
discounts (60% or more off list price) 
with key vendors such as Apple and 
IBM. They were quite willing to do 
this, but the principal hangup was 
with the University, nervous that the 
local computer stores might complain 
to the state legislature that we were 
undercutting their business. After 
considerable effort, we finally managed 
to convince Shapiro and Brinkerhoff 
that the leading universities would 
be achieving massive deployment 
of personal computers to students 
through such bulk discounts, and that 
Michigan would rapidly fall behind 
if we did not do the same. Since I 
suspected that the impact on local 
retailers would be very positive from 
the secondary hardware and software 
sales stimulated by the student 
COMPUTER AIDED ENGINEERING NETWORK
The Apple Lisa Lab in the Chrysler Center 
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program, we negotiated a separate 
agreement with them to sell their wares 
when the students picked up their 
computers through the University. 
Since the first major deliveries occurred 
early in the fall, we began to call these 
events the Fall Computer Kickoff Sale. 
It was quite a hit with the students, 
particularly when new systems such as 
the Macintosh appeared. The number 
of University students acquiring their 
own computers began to rise rapidly, 
stimulating both the College and 
the University to install appropriate 
networking capability in the residence 
halls and University buildings. (The 
Fall Computer Kickoff Sales continue to 
this day.)
 The final step in bringing CAEN 
to the level of sophistication we had 
envisioned was made possible by a $2 
million gift from General Motors that 
allowed us to acquire over 350 high-
end computer workstations, connected 
with high speed networks, to serve 
the advanced needs of students and 
faculty. Our philosophy was simple: 
We were determined to stay always at 
the cutting edge, but with a very strong 
service focus. We sought to remove all 
constraints on computing, with no limit 
whatsoever on student and faculty 
use. We went with a multivendor 
environment, moving with whatever 
technology was most powerful. 
 Needless to say, these were highly 
controversial issues in the early 
1980s, particularly at the University 
of Michigan. But as a result, by the 
mid-1980s the College could boast one 
of the most sophisticated computing 
environments of any University in 
the world, a fact of major importance 
to recruiting outstanding faculty and 
students.
Completion of the North 
Campus Move
As we discussed in the previous 
chapter, all of the key steps necessary 
to complete the long-sought (and 
endured) move of the College to 
the North Campus were in place by 
mid-1983. We needed only to finish 
the construction of the massive 
Engineering Building I (now the 
Electrical Engineering and Computer 
Science Building), and this would occur 
in spring of 1996.3
 Of course, although the move 
of all of our faculty, students, and 
programs was complete, there was 
still more to do to improve the quality 
of the North Campus environment. 
We invested heavily in building an 
instructional center (library, computer 
center, instructional television) in 
the unfinished basement of the Dow 
Building (with only a minor setback 
when the underground facility for 
the HVAC equipment collapsed from 
faulty materials and design midway 
through the project). Chuck Vest 
pushed for more student facilities, 
including a small vending/study area 
next to the EECS Building (we all called 
it Chuck’s Bar and Grill although it 
was later named as a memorial to one 
of our young faculty, Jonathan Laitone, 
who was lost in a climbing accident 
on Mt. Ranier my first year as dean). A 
connector laboratory was built between 
the Dow and G.G. Brown Laboratories 
for bioengineering, a major addition 
was built for the North Campus 
Commons (later named the Pierpont 
Commons), and the Space Physics 
Research Laboratory was doubled and 
then tripled in size.
The launch of the Computer Aided Engineering 
Network (with Bill Poduska of Apollo Computers 
and Steve Jobs of Apple Computer) 
The Dow-GGBL Connector
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 There were several major additions 
to the North Campus in the years 
after I left as dean, including the FXB 
Building for Aerospace Engineering,
the Lurie Engineering Building and Bell 
Tower, and the Media Union. 
Since I had a hand in all of these 
projects (rather, an invisible hand, since 
I was provost and then president at the 
time), I’ll return to discuss these in a 
later chapter. Finally, in my last years 
as president, I commissioned a major 
new master plan for the North Campus 
(the so-called “North Woods” project), 
designed to add much of the human 
experience of the Central Campus. 
Unfortunately my successor in the 
presidency, Lee Bollinger, decided to 
halt these projects and largely ignored 
the further needs of the North Campus, 
but that is a story for Chapter 8.
The new EECS building
COMPLETION OF THE NORTH CAMPUS MOVE
Françios-Xavier Bagnoud Aerospace Building
Chuck Vest (as Dean) dedicating the new Space 
Physics Research Laboratory addition
Lurie Engineering Center
The Media Union
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Intellectual Thrusts
With much of the effort to restore the 
support, environment, and morale of 
the College now underway, we had the 
luxury to begin to think more deeply 
about its intellectual thrusts in teaching 
and research. My own thinking had 
been heavily influenced both by 
discussions with thought leaders like 
Carver Mead of Caltech and Lynn 
Conway of Xerox PARC (later to join 
Michigan as an associate dean) and 
writings of science philosophers such 
as Thomas Kuhn. Some background on 
these evolving ideas is useful here.
 It is important to recognize the 
dynamic nature of that intellectual 
character of scholarship.  What we 
regard as entrenched disciplines have 
changed considerably in the past and 
continue to do so today. During our 
lives we have experienced a period 
of great intellectual change and 
ferment.  New ideas and concepts are 
exploding forth at ever-increasing 
rates.  We have ceased to accept that 
there is any coherent or unique form 
of wisdom that serves as the basis for 
new knowledge.  We have simply seen 
too many instances in which a new 
concept has blown apart our traditional 
views of the field.  For example, in my 
own area of physics, Einstein’s theory 
of relativity and the introduction 
of quantum mechanics totally 
revolutionized the way that we thought 
of the physical world.  The molecular 
foundations of life have done the same 
to the biomedical sciences.  We are 
increasingly surrounded by radical 
critiques of fundamental premises 
and scholarship, collisions between 
different cultures and perspectives.
 Hence the capacity for intellectual 
change and renewal has become 
increasingly important to us as 
individuals and to our institutions.  As 
the pace of new knowledge accelerates, 
it seems apparent that we are entering 
a period in which permanence and 
stability have become less valued than 
flexibility and creativity, in which the 
only certainty will be the presence 
of continual change. The capacity to 
relish, stimulate, and manage change 
will be one of the most important 
abilities of all.
 But here we face a major challenge 
because most of us have been trained 
The completed North Campus (circa 1986)
The “new” West Hall (no longer the home of 
Engineering)
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to think in terms of change as a linear, 
causal, and rational process.  We have 
been taught that by looking at the past, 
we can extrapolate into the future.  
Yet, because of my background as a 
physicist, I have become increasingly 
convinced that the change in most 
complex systems, organizations, or 
indeed, even fields of knowledge, 
is:  i) highly non-linear, ii) frequently 
discontinuous, and iii) usually 
stochastic or random in nature.  Let me 
expand on this theme for a moment.
Intellectual Change
 Most of us have been trained to think 
in terms of the change process as linear. 
In a sense, we have been taught that by 
looking back to the past, we can simply 





 Of course, the scientist has a much 
different view of change, a view 
that in many ways in much more 
disturbing.  The scientist notes that 
most change in our natural world does 
not occur linearly with time but rather 
exponentially at ever-increasing rates.  
 The bacterial colony on the petri 
dish runs out of nutrient.  The world 
population will run out of land surface—
although perhaps this will not occur 
until the year 2500 when there are forty 
trillion people on the face of the earth 
with only one square yard per person!
 Ah, but we have learned in recent 
years that the world really doesn’t 
work like this either!  Instead, we 
have learned that even the simplest 
systems in nature tend to behave in a 
far more complex and unpredictable 
fashion.  They follow a change process 
known in today’s popular lexicon 
as “chaos.”  While the early stages 
of change are linear, exponential, or 
perhaps even saturating, at later stages 
change frequently occurs in a far more 
dramatic and unpredictable way.  
 In this view of the world, systems 
become unstable and undergo dramatic 
and often chaotic change to create new 
 From this view, the challenges 
that face us, challenges such as the 
growth in the world’s population, 
or the consumption of our natural 
resources, or the pollution of our 
planet, are growing ever more serious 
at exponential rates.  Fortunately, 
the same is true of the growth in 
knowledge, since the rate of change 
in our reservoir of understanding and 
insight is proportional to the amount of 
understanding and insight we already 
have, the basic exponential condition.  
However, since we are attempting 
to apply an exponentially growing 
knowledge base to exponentially 
growing problems, any imbalance 
could lead to catastrophe, since we 
would be overtaken before we could 
learn how to cope with the problem.
 Enter the economist who says 
not to worry.  Sooner or later every 
exponential phenomenon eventually 
reaches a limit, a saturation, as the 
law of diminishing returns sets in.  
Sooner or later we run out of necessary 
resources to sustain exponential 
growth, and the process of change 
slows to a halt.  
INTELLECTUAL THRUSTS
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levels of order and complexity.  Here 
we need only witness the complex 
evolution of clouds in the sky or the 
complexity of flowing water or the 
extraordinary complexity and diversity 
of living creatures.  
 To put it in a somewhat different 
perspective, we now know that most 
complex systems that may at first 
appear to be stable and unchanging are, 
in reality, comprised of components 
that are continually fluctuating or 
changing.  In these systems a situation 
sometimes occurs in which a single 
fluctuation becomes so large, as a result 
of feedback and non-linearities, that 
it shatters the stability of the system.  
At this singular point, called in the 
language of physics a bifurcation point, 
it becomes quite impossible to predict 
in advance which direction change 
will take—whether the system will 
disintegrate into a highly disordered 
or chaotic state or leap to a new higher 
level of order or organization.
 Of course, such bifurcation 
instabilities cannot be triggered by just 
any old fluctuation, but only by
 those that are particularly “dangerous”
— those that can exploit to their 
advantage the nonlinear relations 
that can trigger the instability of the 
existing state.  The more complex the 
system is, the more numerous are the 
types of fluctuations that can threaten 
instability.
 There are several particular features 
of this modern view of change that 
have major implications for the world 
in which we live.  First, from this 
modern view, change is not simple 
and gradual.  It is not linear.  Rather, it 
is characterized by nonlinearities that 
lead to complex behavior, frequently to 
dramatic rather than gradual change, to 
revolution rather than evolution.
 But that’s not all.  Change is also not 
predictable and deterministic, but rather 
random and stochastic in nature.  The 
real world works in sharp contrast to the 
deterministic views of classical science 
of Newton or such modern determinists 
as Freud or Marx or Skinner.  That is the 
bad news.  
 Now for the good news!  Chaotic 
change depends far more sensitively 
on small disturbances than we had 
ever thought possible.  This is in sharp 
contrast to the basic idea in western 
science that you don’t have to take into 
account the falling of a leaf on some 
planet in another galaxy when you 
are trying to account for the motion 
of a billiard ball on a pool table on 
earth.  Usually, we neglect very small 
influences.  There is a convergence in 
the way things work, and arbitrarily 
small influences don’t blow up to have 
arbitrarily large effects.  The situation 
is quite the opposite in chaotic systems.  
These behave in what mathematicians 
would refer to as an “ill-posed” 
manner.  But the popular press has a far 
more picturesque term, known as the 
“butterfly effect,” which arises from the 
suggestion that even the disturbance 
in the air caused by a butterfly’s wings 
could cause major changes in weather 
half-way around the globe because of 
the chaotic nature of weather patterns.  
 Translated into more human terms, 
dramatic change is frequently triggered 
by a few extraordinary people with 
extraordinary ideas—or by the young 
or newly initiated—people who haven’t 
had the time yet to become trapped in the 
same ruts as the more experienced of us. 
 If we take the viewpoint that most 
organizations—or even most fields 
of knowledge—are examples of such 
complex systems, then this view of 
change is remarkably similar to that 
in the philosopher Thomas Kuhn’s 
thesis concerning the way that scientific 
knowledge evolves4.  In essence, it says 
that a single individual, or idea, can 
create dramatic change, a revolution, 
if you will, in the traditional way that 
we look at a field.  Kuhn uses the term 
“paradigm” to refer to the body of 
knowledge, in essence the way that 
one is accustomed to look at a field, the 
accepted practices or perspectives.  In 
a sense then, a paradigm is what the 
members of a community of scholars 
share; and conversely, a scholarly 
community consists of people who share 
the same paradigm.  One must take 
care here, however, because in contrast 
with the standard usage, a knowledge 
paradigm is not really a model for 
application; rather it is a subject for 
further study and articulation.  In this 
sense, then, most research consists not 
of seeking major novelties, but rather 
polishing up existing paradigms, 
essentially mopping up, or “sweating 
the details.”  
 In Kuhn’s view, major progress 
does not occur through the gradual 
evolution of an existing paradigm, but 
rather through a revolutionary process 
in which an existing paradigm is 
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replaced by an entirely new paradigm.  
The transformations of paradigms 
are revolutionary in nature, and the 
successive transition from one paradigm 
to another via revolution is the usual 
developmental pattern of a mature field 
of knowledge.
 Kuhn also observes that those who 
achieve the fundamental invention of a 
new paradigm are usually either very 
young or very new to the field whose 
paradigm they change.  These are the 
individuals, who, being little committed 
by prior practice to the traditional rules 
of the discipline, are particularly likely 
to see that those rules no longer define a 
playable game and conceive another set 
that can replace them.  They can make 
contributions of unusual importance 
since they haven’t had the time yet to 
fall into the same old ruts that have 
trapped more experienced scholars.  
 In summary then, the Kuhnian 
view of intellectual change, in which 
one knowledge paradigm is replaced 
through revolution by another 
knowledge paradigm, is remarkably 
similar to the nonlinear evolution of 
complex systems that we discussed 
earlier.  So far, so good.  What is the 
implication of this modern view of 
change for our institutions and our 
scholars?
 If our future is indeed one in which 
the capacity to stimulate and manage 
intellectual change becomes important 
and in which change is also viewed as a 
highly nonlinear, occasionally dramatic, 
and usually unpredictable process 
triggered by extraordinary people 
and their ideas, then this suggests that 
academic institutions may well wish 
to reconsider carefully how they go 
about their business of teaching and 
research.  In this future, renewal and 
change will become essential for both 
the achievement and the sustaining of 
excellence.
 It seems critical that academic 
institutions respond not just grudgingly 
to change.  Rather, they must relish and 
stimulate and manage the process of 
continual change and renewal if they 
are to achieve excellence in leadership.  
Further, we must encourage faculty 
members, on occasion, to take the risks 
necessary for major impact.  As Lynn 
Conway puts it, after faculty have 
progressed through the traditional 
promotional ranks, demonstrating 
their potential for tenure and then the 
achievement to become full professors, 
there is still something more:  the goal 
of doing work that will shape or even 
create a field.
 All too often academic institution—
and academicians—tend to regard their 
role more as keepers and transmitters of 
existing knowledge than as the creators 
of new knowledge.  Here it is useful 
to think of the growth of knowledge 
in the field as an S-shaped or sigmoid 
curve.  In the early stages, the growth of 
knowledge in a field is exponential with 
time, since the more you learn, the more 
rapidly the rate of knowledge increases.
    At this early stage, a few individuals 
of exceptional ability and great 
intellectual span can have a truly 
extraordinary impact, essentially 
stimulating and defining entirely new 
fields of knowledge.  This is the “high 
risk” area, since it can frequently take 
years (in addition to great talent) to 
achieve something.
 As the field matures, the growth in 
knowledge becomes linear with time.  
In this stage, the more resources you 
throw at an area, the more people or 
dollars, the more you learn.  This is 
where it is “safest” to work, easiest to 
get grants, and to achieve tenure.
 As the field matures still further, the 
growth and knowledge trails off, it 
saturates, a law of diminishing return 
sets in as one mines most of the new 
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this effort, we recruited Lynn Conway, 
who was then head of the artificial 
intelligence program at Xerox PARC, 
to join the College. Her role was to 
“launch rockets,” which she did almost 
immediately in a spectacular fashion 
by forming a partnership with EDS and 
the College to build the “capture lab,” 
a multimedia brainstorming laboratory 
that functioned as part of the Center for 
Machine Intelligence.
Technology Transfer and 
Intellectual Property
One of our key goals was to provide 
strong incentives and support for 
technology transfer. Key in this was 
modifying the existing University 
policies on intellectual property. At 
the time, the University not only held 
ownership of all intellectual property 
 
 All too often, much of our work 
drifts into this saturation regime and 
becomes essentially trapped in a rut.
 Some of my colleagues suggest there 
may be a fourth phase—they have 
referred to it as intellectual senility—
where continuing to work in a field is 
counterproductive and actually reduces 
its knowledge content.  
(Actually, there have been times 
recently when I have begun to 
wonder if my old field, nuclear fusion, 
hasn’t entered this final phase of 
intellectual evolution as of late with the 
controversy over “cold” fusion.)
 One of the great challenges of 
research universities is how to 
encourage more people to work down 
in the high-risk, exponential part of 
the knowledge curve without unduly 
jeopardizing their academic careers.  
We must stimulate more of a risk-
taking intellectual culture in which 
people are encouraged to take bold 
initiatives.  From this perspective, it 
is important to jar as many people 
as possible out of “conventional 
wisdom” by fostering experiments, 
recruiting restive people from outside 
of the university and turning them 
loose, “causing trouble” by making 
conventional paths more trouble than 
unconventional ones.
 And, here once again, we must 
consider carefully the degree to which 
the disciplines should be allowed to 
constrain truly innovative scholarship 
and teaching.  While we always take 
care to understand and appreciate the 
tradition of the disciplines, we must 
also recognize the degree to which they 
can exclude or punish those who take 
risks.
 To this end, we launched a series of 
major research projects and centers that 
would draw faculty members together 
from across the departments of the 
College and beyond and encourage 
high risk research ”on the exponential 
part of the knowledge curve.” 
Examples of such efforts included the 
following.
• Center for Research on Integrated 
Manufacturing
• AFOSR Center for Excellence in 
Robotics
• Computer Aided Engineering 
Network
• SRC Center for Excellence in 
Microelectronics
• Center for Ultrafast Optics
• Computer Enhanced Productivity 
Project (EPIC)
• Center for Advanced Electronics 
and Optics Technology
• Center for Scientific Computation
• Center for Machine Intelligence
There were many other such efforts 
launched and supported during my last 
years in the deans’ office. To help us in 
Time
Knowledge
Associate Dean Lynn Conway
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produced by faculty and staff in 
research activities, but retained as well 
essentially most of the royalties under 
the control of the vice president for 
research. There was very little incentive 
for intellectual property disclosure 
or patent development, and even 
less support for these activities from 
the University, whose activities were 
largely staffed by lawyers with the 
primary mission of keeping the cork in 
the bottle so that the “big one” would 
not get away.
 It was our belief that income 
from technology transfer should be 
determined on the basis of who earned 
it and not under the control of the vice 
president for research. The key issue 
in royalty distribution should involve 
effort, risk sharing, and equity, with 
the goal of providing strong incentives 
to faculty and staff to become engaged 
in these activities. To respond to these 
pressures from the College and others, 
the University established an external 
organization, the Michigan Research 
Corporation, with the mission of 
intellectual property development from 
University research. Unfortunately, 
however, MRC could only work with 
those technologies that were released 
to it by the Intellectual Property Office 
of the vice president for research, and 
the lawyers running that office were 
determined not to let MRC have any 
intellectual property with potential 
value. (In fact, there were strong signs 
that the IPO felt threatened by MRC 
and wanted it to fail.)
 Despite our best efforts, the 
University was just not ready to 
move on any significant modification 
of intellectual property policies for 
much the same reason that they were 
unwilling to address the University-
wide issue of indirect cost recovery 
and research incentives. These matters 
would have to wait until I moved into 
the provost office.
Changing the Culture
Throughout these chapters we have 
stressed the importance of the goal of 
changing the culture of the College, 
creating an environment in which 
excellence and innovation were not 
only encouraged and supported but, 
indeed, expected. We have discussed 
the many steps we took not simply 
to put into place strong incentives 
for achievement, but also to raise the 
morale and confidence of the faculty.
 But changing the culture involved 
many other elements. For example, we 
believed it very important to put into 
place rational, transparent, and need- 
and performance-based mechanisms 
for allocating resources. We worked 
closely with the department chairs 
and Executive Committee to develop 
these budget allocation processes. 
We have already discussed several 
aspects in earlier chapters, for example, 
how funding for flexible instructional 
or support staff or permanent 
faculty positions were allocated to 
the departments. We believed it 
very important to share with all of 
the departments the total resource 
allocations of the College, so that each 
could assess whether they were getting 
their fair share relative to other units. 
We believed the deans should be held 
accountable for these decisions.
 Beyond the faculty and the 
administration, we also faced a 
challenge in changing the student 
culture. Not that the students lacked 
talent, energy, and commitment, 
since even during the early 1980s, we 
were attracting the best students in 
the University, as measured by their 
entering qualifications. But the rapid 
growth in University enrollments 
during the decades following WWII 
had largely lost the identification of 
students with graduating classes or 
academic programs. 
 We attempted to restore this esprit 
de corps by assisting students in 
creating once more a graduating 
class identity, complete with elected 
Addressing the Engineering Class of 1983
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class officers, and then organizing a 
separate Engineering Commencement 
Exercise each spring. (This Engineering 
Commencement was held in addition 
to the University-wide commencement 
exercises, so that engineering students 
could participate in both.) The first 
Engineering Commencement was held 
in Chrisler Arena in spring of 1983, 
and it was a rousing success, giving 
students, parents, and the faculty both 
ownership of and identification with 
their own graduation celebration. It 
created an important tradition that 
continues today.
Strengthening the Bonds 
with LS&A
One of the themes of our leadership 
was to rebuild the bonds between the 
College of Engineering and the rest of 
the University, particularly the College 
of Literature, Science, and the Arts. In 
earlier chapters we discussed how the 
College had increasingly isolated itself 
from the University during the 1960s 
and 1970s, requiring its students to 
take courses in humanities and social 
sciences from its own faculty. With 
the move to North Campus, there 
was a risk that the College would 
become even more isolated. I was 
determined not to let this happen, 
both because of my commitment to 
the goal of a liberal education for 
our students, and moreover because 
I believed the College would draw 
much of its strength from the science 
and mathematics programs in LS&A. I 
was convinced that in the long run, the 
College could never rise to a position 
of true national leadership without 
strong University programs in areas 
such as physics, chemistry, biology, and 
mathematics.
 But here we faced a major challenge, 
since although the University of 
Michigan had been a leader in science 
and mathematics during the 1930s and 
1940s, these programs had lost much 
of the leadership during the post-war 
decades. This was a period in which 
the LS&A leadership was dominated 
by the social sciences, and laboratory-
intensive programs such as physics, 
chemistry, and biology suffered greatly. 
Although the decline in the quality of 
these programs had become a concern 
to the University, with the release of 
the rankings of graduate program 
quality in the early 1980s, it would take 
a significant commitment to rebuild 
them, which was unlikely during a 
period of financial retrenchment. 
 Hence we made a conscious decision 
to do what we could to help build the 
quality of the sciences through the 
creation of a series of joint programs. 
The first of these efforts involved 
building new interdisciplinary 
programs in applied physics and 
applied mathematics, managed jointly 
by Engineering and LS&A. In each 
case, we worked closely with our 
colleagues in the LS&A departments 
of physics and mathematics to design 
these new programs. The College 
compensated for LS&A’s reluctance 
to invest substantial new resources in 
these programs by taking the lead in 
allocating new faculty positions and 
facilities to these joint efforts, even 
in those instances in which LS&A 
was unable (or unwilling) to make a 
matching contribution. In some cases 
the College took the lead in obtaining 
additional funds to support LS&A’s 
participation, such as when we built 
into the Research Excellence Fund an 
additional $500,000 per year in base 
support for Applied Physics. In other 
cases we made massive commitments 
in funding and facilities to recruit new 
superstar faculty to build the programs, 
as we did when we lured Gerard 
Mourou’s group in ultrafast lasers 
from the University of Rochester to 
Michigan. We also worked closely with 
the science faculty in LS&A to build 
and operate special-purpose facilities 
such as a materials characterization 
laboratory (e.g., electron microscropy, 
electron beam epitaxy).
 There was also an effort to build 
bridges between Engineering and 
LS&A that reflected the changing 
nature of scientific programs. For 
example, Dan Atkins led the effort 
to merge computer science and 
engineering on the campus, by guiding 
a faculty process that eventually led 
to the merger of the Computer and 
Communications Science Department 
in LS&A into the Electrical and 
Computer Engineering Department 
in Engineering. This new super 
department became the primary tenant 
of the new Electrical Engineering and 
Computer Science Building (formerly 
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Engineering Building I). A parallel 
process in the reverse direction 
occurred when the oceanographers in 
our Department of Atmospheric and 
Oceanic Sciences were transferred into 
the Geology Department of LS&A, 
leaving the College with a Department 
of Atmospheric and Space Sciences.
 Although most of these efforts 
demonstrated a growing spirit of 
cooperation between Engineering 
and LS&A, there were a few bumps 
on the road. The LS&A deans 
occasionally exhibited a touch of 
paranoia, suspecting that Engineering’s 
increasingly strong engagement with 
the sciences might be part of a power 
play to eventually take them over. Not 
that this was a new idea. Frequently, 
we would be approached quietly 
by faculty members in departments 
such as physics, chemistry, and 
mathematics, frustrated by years of 
neglect within LS&A, and pleading 
with us to bring these departments 
into Engineering. Actually, this was not 
so far-fetched, since several of the top 
universities in the nation did merge 
their sciences into engineering, notably 
the Universities of Illinois, Minnesota, 
and Caltech. Although I had great 
sympathy for the plight of the sciences, 
the geographical separation of the 
sciences on the Central Campus and 
Engineering on the North Campus 
would have been just to difficult to 
overcome. The thought of raising 
the $100 million or more it would 
have taken to move the sciences to 
the North Campus was simply too 
formidable at the time (although had 
I remained as dean another five years, 
it would almost have certainly come 
on the radar scope). As it was, I would 
turn my attention to rebuilding the 




In my later years as dean, more and 
more of my time would be spent in 
fundraising, traveling to visit donor 
prospects, whether individuals, 
companies, or foundations. We rebuilt 
the old Industry Committee of the 
College as a new National Advisory 
Committee, comprised of leaders 
from both our alumni and industry. 
This served not only as an advisory 
group to the College, but also as one 
of our primary fund-raising groups. I 
challenged the NAC at one of its early 
meetings by observing:
As an increasingly privately financed 
institution, the College firmly believes 
that its future will depend not on the 
capacity nor breadth but rather the quality 
of its academic programs. The breadth of 
academic programs in the College was 
achieved during a period of exceptionally 
strong public support. In the absence of 
that support, the College must achieve 
the capacity to focus its resources to 
stress those areas in which it has the 
capacity, potential, or mission to be a 
national leaders. To this end, the College 
has developed administrative structures 
and policies to facilitate reviews and tests 
of centrality to its mission, quality, and 
cost-effectiveness. It must approach its 
future as if it were a player in a very 
high-stakes poker game. It must choose 
its bets carefully and courageously.
 More and more effort was spent 
identifying and cultivating major donor 
prospects. During the early stages this 
was more like a scavenger hunt, in the 
sense that our development staff would 
set up a series of appointments in a 
given region, say Florida or southern 
California, and off I would go by 
myself, map in hand, trying to find 
my next meeting with a prospect. In 
retrospect, it was a bit crazy, since I was 
usually in a panic to find the prospect’s 
house or office in a strange city in time 
for a scheduled meeting. But the effort 
did pay off, since many of our most 
generous donors came from these early 
meetings (including Reid Anderson, 
Ralph Colton, Carl Gerstacker, Earl 
Hoover, Goff Smith, Ame Vennema, 
Milo Oliphant, and Bob and Anne 
Lurie). And over time we built very 
significant private support.
 But, as most deans soon find, 
the fund-raising activities of their 
school or college occasionally run 
into complications with the central 
University development function. In 
our case, it was made more difficult 
because the University had launched 
a major fund-raising campaign during 
the 1980s without including the College 
in the planning process (both because 
Ragone had completed a College-
specific campaign in the 1970s and 
because we had had interim leadership 
until I came on board). The key 
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priorities of this campaign had already 
been set, including several real dogs 
like the chemical sciences complex (for 
which they never were able to raise any 
money, and which I would eventually 
build as provost and president with 
state money). Not surprisingly, Chuck 
Vest and I would occasionally have 
to fall into our “good cop/bad cop” 
routine in which I would pound the 
table when central development 
screwed up (for example, in allowing 
Ford’s gift to the University to go to 
UM-Dearborn Engineering rather than 
us). Then Chuck would come in with 
a calm, relaxed proposal designed to 
address the concern. In the end, we 
found that we were best off when we 
kept the central development operation 
out of our hair, since it was usually the 
case that they were more of a hindrance 
than a help.
The Forces of Darkness
Although we tried to eliminate the 
defensiveness and insularity that had 
built up in the College over the years 
of budget deprivation during the 1960s 
and 1970s, we recognized that amidst 
all of the good will, encouragement, 
and support we had been receiving 
from State Street, there were, in 
fact, some serious threats buried in 
the central administration. Most of 
these related to the empire that had 
evolved under the vice president for 
research. As we noted earlier, during 
the 1960s, this office was frequently 
in direct competition with the College 
for resources, both from within and 
without the University. Perhaps 
the most striking example was the 
building of the Institute of Science and 
Technology, which not only diverted 
state capital funding from the College’s 
North Campus moving needs, but 
created programs in engineering and 
applied science that competed directly 
with those in the College for University 
and federal funding. 
 But there were other examples. 
Van Wylen had strongly opposed 
the creation of the Highway Safety 
Research Institute, believing that 
those activities should be conducted 
within the College of Engineering. 
One could well have made the case 
that the reporting line for the Phoenix 
Laboratory should also have been in 
the College, since it was most closely 
related to the Department of Nuclear 
Engineering. Beyond this, there was 
an ongoing effort by the vice president 
for research to take over other 
activities in direct competition with 
the College that were only thwarted 
by our direct approach to Harold 
Shapiro and Bill Frye. A good example 
was the aggressive effort to wrest the 
robotics institute (later the Industrial 
Technology Institute) away from 
Engineering.
 Perhaps our greatest frustration with 
the vice president involved a series 
of policy issues. During my tenure as 
chair of the Academic Affairs Advisory 
Committee we had already identified 
faculty concerns ranging from the 
highly centralized and unresponsive 
nature of the vp-research units to 
inadequate support and incentives 
for sponsored research development. 
To this list, the College added other 
concerns such as the policies governing 
intellectual property and indirect cost 
recovery. We had learned that within 
the Executive Officer discussions, 
Overberger would generally be the 
one to argue against supporting the 
College. Yet our concerns did not 
rest alone with a single individual, 
but rather with the office itself and 
the empire it had spawned. And, 
sure enough, when Overberger was 
eventually succeeded by a new vice 
president for research, Linda Wilson, 
from the University of Illinois, we 
continued to have problems—although, 
in fairness, I always felt these arose 
primarily from the bureaucracy that 
had built up over the years rather than 
Wilson herself, who seemed basically 
supportive of Engineering.
And, for Our Next Act...
As I entered my fifth year in the dean’s 
office, most of the initial planning 
objectives had been achieved. With the 
construction of Engineering Building I, 
the North Campus move was assured. 
The Research Excellence Fund erased 
the Engineering Gap and put the 
College on a secure financial footing 
for the foreseeable future. We were 
attracting outstanding new faculty 
members at all levels, and as a result, 
our success in winning major national 
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research competitions was improving 
rapidly. All of the indicators such as 
the national ranking of our academic 
programs, our sponsored research 
volume, and Ph.D. production were 
headed up toward national leadership.
 Of course, my notebook continued 
to have long “To Do” lists, since no 
matter how far we had come, there 
were always roads ahead yet to travel. 
The North Campus still needed a major 
library facility which we envisioned 
as supporting all of its academic 
units (including Music, Art, and 
Architecture). We were in the process 
of negotiating with the state legislature 
a statewide instructional television 
network (MITN: the Michigan 
Instructional Television Network). And 
the North Campus still fell short of the 
quality of life for faculty and students 
that characterized the Central Campus 
(although Chuck Vest’s addition to the 
North Campus (Pierpont) Commons 
would help).
 As was customary at the time, 
Bill Frye had touched bases with 
the College Executive Committee 
concerning my reappointment for 
another five-year term, and they had 
enthusiastically supported it. But, as 
usual, I was beginning to have my 
own doubts. Although I was confident 
that we had moved far enough along 
our agenda to rebuild the College that 
backsliding was unlikely, even in the 
event of shifting University priorities or 
eroding state support, I was less certain 
that I was the appropriate leader for the 
College’s future. After all, I had been 
brought in as a change agent, to rebuild 
and reshape the College, restoring its 
quality and its reputation. Now that 
the College had rocketed to cruising 
altitude, perhaps it needed another 
style of leadership.
 Of course, during the years I served 
as dean, I had been probed about other 
opportunities. My alma mater, Caltech, 
had tried to talk me into becoming 
the Executive of their Division of 
Engineering and Applied Science, with 
the understanding that I would be a 
lead candidate to succeed its president, 
Murph Goldberger in two years when 
he was intending to step down. The 
University of Virginia had approached 
me about their provost position. Ford 
Motor Company had probed about 
the possibility of becoming their chief 
technical officer. And, as I was to learn 
later, I was even on the Yale presidency 
list (although, I suspect, only at a very 
early stage). But Anne and I were not 
ready to leave Ann Arbor and the 
University just yet.
 As fate would have it, we really did 
not have to leave, since the provost 
position at Michigan opened up. 
Bill Frye decided in fall of 1985 to 
return the following spring to his 
native Georgia as provost at Emory 
University. Harold Shapiro launched 
a long and quite involved search for 
Bill’s replacement, in which it was clear 
that the leading internal candidates 
were three deans: John D’Arms, dean 
of the graduate school, Gil Whitaker, 
dean of the business school, and me. 
On the positive side, Michigan had 
never selected a provost from outside 
the University (in part because of the 
concern that the learning curve was 
simply too steep and unforgiving in a 
university of its size and complexity). 
However, it was also the case that in 
over 175 years of Michigan history, 
the University had never selected 
anybody from Engineering for a senior 
University position.5 
 Yet, sometimes the impossible 
happens, and in March, while I was in 
Washington at a National Science Board 
meeting, I received a call from Susan 
Lipschutz, assistant to the president, 
asking me to come back to Ann Arbor 
to discuss the provost position with 
Harold Shapiro. (Actually, I had been 
intending to fly on to Walt Disney 
World to meet Anne and our daughters 
for our spring break week, but I called 
and told them I would catch up with 
them the next day.)
 In a brief meeting at the President’s 
House, Harold Shapiro offered me the 
position, with the hope I would stay 
in it for at least five years. After all, 
Michigan provosts frequently have 
been lured into university presidencies 
(e.g., Roger Heyns to UC-Berkeley, 
Frank Rhodes to Cornell, Harold 
Shapiro to Michigan and Princeton, 
Chuck Vest to MIT, Bernie Machen to 
Utah, and Nancy Cantor to Illinois).  I 
agreed, but with the understanding 
that Shapiro would also stay for that 
period. (Unfortunately, Harold would 
leave for the presidency at Princeton 
the following year, and soon after I 
would be sucked into the vortex of a 
presidential search.) As in my earlier 
“negotiations,” I said that since our 
relationship would depend on a very 
110 A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE UM COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING
high level of trust and confidence, I 
would be comfortable with whatever 
arrangement he decided on. My 
only request was that I continue my 
service on the National Science Board, 
since I believed this to be of major 
importance to the University (and the 
nation, of course). We also agreed that 
Chuck Vest would not only succeed 
me as acting dean, but that we both 
would develop a process that would 
quickly result in his appointment as 
my permanent successor as dean of 
engineering. (As usual in a University, 
process was everything, so we could 
not immediately just announce him as 
the next dean.) It is worth noting that I 
have scribbled in my notes on this brief 
meeting with Shapiro the concluding 
phrase:
 “And Faust signed on the dotted line...”
 
 With this midcourse maneuver 
completed, I then caught the next plane 
for Florida to join my family. On the 
way I made quick phone calls to Chuck 
and Dan to let them know, and then 
while in Disney World, I made calls to 
Bill Frye and several of the key staff 
and deans to let them know before it 
hit the wires. Since I would not be back 
in Ann Arbor for a week, I also sent the 
following electronic mail message to 
the department chairmen and senior 
staff:
The time has come, the walrus said, to 
speak of many things...
Of sailing ships and sealing wax, of 
cabbages and deans...
 ...and provosts too...
Last Friday President Shapiro called me 
back from Washington to ask if I would 
take on the provost assignment. Since 
the search/decision process to select 
Bill Frye’s successor had been a rather 
lengthy and extensive affair, I had had 
plenty of time to consider carefully the 
pros and cons of leaping from the frying 
pan into the fire.
During the past five years I have enjoyed 
immensely the opportunity to work with 
you and your faculty colleagues in our 
efforts to rebuild the College into one of 
the leading engineering schools in the 
nation. However in recent months I have 
become more and more convinced that 
the first phase of this work was nearing 
an end, and perhaps it was time for a 
change in College leadership. While my 
“damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead” 
style was probably necessary to get us 
moving once again after the doldrums 
of the 1970s, I believe that the College 
might now benefit more from a dean 
who can provide the vision, wisdom, and 
considered reflection to lead the College 
to new levels of excellence.
I am also convinced that, at this point in 
the University’s history, it desperately 
needs a scientist/engineer in a top 
leadership position—not simply to 
maintain and enhance the momentum 
the College has achieved over the past 
several years, but to rebuild the quality 
of the basic and applied sciences at 
Michigan to a level befitting a great 
university.
To maintain the momentum of the 
College, I believe it essential that the 
torch of leadership be passed as rapidly as 
possible. When I return next week, I will 
meet both with the Chairman’s Advisory 
Council and the Executive Committee 
to discuss this process. While there will 
certainly be a short period of time during 
which an Acting Dean will be necessary, 
I am confident that the selection of my 
permanent successor can be completed by 
this summer (i.e., before the key budget 
decisions for FY86-87 are made).
Let me apologize for this rather cold 
style of communicating my decision 
(via e-mail). (Although I am sure that 
many would characterize an e-mail 
message from Walt Disney World as 
perfectly consistent with the Duderstadt 
style...high tech, with a dash of Mickey 
Mouse).
Because of your support and effort, the 
College has been a very exciting place 
during the past several years. I can 
assure you that I will continue to do 
everything possible to provide you with 
the support you need on your continued 
climb to the top of engineering education.
See you next week!
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 The transition from dean to provost 
was about as rapid as that from faculty 
member to dean. My meeting with 
Shapiro was on March 22, and I moved 
into the provost office on May 1. As with 
my transition into the dean’s role, I spent 
most of that six-week period meeting 
with people (particularly the deans) while 
working with Chuck and Dan to ensure a 
smooth transition in Engineering. Dan and 
Chuck arranged a going-away party-most 
fittingly, a German picnic complete with 
a German band, bratwurst, sauerkraut, 
and lots of beer. They presented us with 
“Provost” and “Provostess” T-shirts and a 
brass plaque containing the famous charts 
documenting the progress to erase the 
Engineering Gap.
 We had fun at the farewell, but both 
Anne and I would miss Engineering 
a great deal. We would look back on 
those five years as perhaps our most 
enjoyable at the University. While Anne 
and I were able to accomplish more of 
lasting value to the University in the 
roles of provost (and provostess) and 
president (and first lady), the “go for it” 
spirit of our deans, chairs, and faculty 
team as we rebuilt the College was 
an experience we would never forget. 
Besides, being dean is probably the 
best job at the University of Michigan. 
(It certainly beats being provost or 
president, as we were to learn!)
The New Provost
A “moving on” picnic for the dean
A farewell address to the College 
The new provost and provostess




The story of my involvement with 
the College of Engineering does 
not end in 1986, however. As both 
provost and president, I had many 
opportunities to help sustain the 
momentum established during the 
early 1980s. To be sure, the provost of 
the University, as both chief academic 
officer and chief budget officer, 
must take great care not to play 
favorites among the academic units. 
Furthermore, it is important to stay 
out of the way of one’s successors 
so that they can set their own goals 
and style of academic leadership. 
But loyalty lingers. After spending 
almost two decades in the College of 
Engineering, including five intense 
years in rebuilding it, I was not about 
to tolerate any backsliding in   
University priority or support. 
 But, before continuing on with my 
personal history of the College of 
Engineering, it is useful to first take 
another detour to describe a few of 
our adventures in the roles of provost 
and president of the University. This 
book is not the place for a detailed 
narrative of my presidency. But it 
is probably appropriate to convey a 
brief summary of that period before 
returning to discuss the progress of 
the College of Engineering during 
that period.
 As I have stressed, the fate of the 
College has depended as much upon 
the leadership of the University as 
that in the engineering dean’s office. 
Since I was the first engineering faculty 
member ever elevated to the rarefied 
heights of the central administration 
of the University, it is useful—or at 
least amusing—to understand how 
an engineer approached the roles of 
provosting and presiding. 
 Both Anne and I tried to bring 
the same energy, excitement, and 
confidence about the future to our new 
roles in the provost’s role that we had 
brought to leadership in the College of 
Engineering. 
 Within a few months I had not only 
launched a major set of planning 
activities involving every school and 
college of the University, but I had 
also launched many of the initiatives 
that would later define my presidency:  
a major effort to increase the racial 
diversity of the campus community 
(the Michigan Mandate), a series 
of initiatives designed to improve 
the undergraduate experience, an 
aggressive plan to improve the capital 
facilities of the University, a far-
reaching effort to achieve leadership 
in the use of information technology, 
efforts to rebuild the natural sciences, 
and the restructuring of several The New Provost Team
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with statements like, “He was my 
choice!”)
 In general, there was a very positive 
reception to the selection, both on the 
campus and in the media.  Our family 
was well known to the University 
community, and there seemed to be a 
sense of confidence in the direction that 
we would lead.
 Since my old dean’s office in the 
Chrysler Center—consisting of two 
small rooms and access to a conference 
room—was now vacant with the 
opening of the new dean’s office in 
EBI, I persuaded Chuck Vest to let 
me continue to use this space as my 
candidate to succeed Shapiro at 
Michigan.
 The presidential search was long 
and wearing—as Anne put it, like 
a 14-month pregnancy. During the 
latter stages of the search, Chuck Vest, 
then serving as Dean of Engineering, 
dropped off two bottles of wine with 
the accompanying note:
   
   
   
   
   
        
 
Others can debate whether the Regents 
made the correct decision or not, but 
as fate would have it, in June of 1988 
I was elected the 11th president of the 
University at a public meeting of the 
Board of Regents. Since the Regents’ 
meeting was public, there were enough 
folks in attendance to require the use 
of the anteroom.  In addition to our 
daughters, Susan and Kathy, there were 
a number of our friends on the faculty.  
There were also a number of University 
personalities, such as Bo Schembechler.  
(Needless to say, Bo stole the headlines 
key professional schools (including 
Dentistry, Library Science, and 
Education).  
 As the activities of the Provost Office 
accelerated, we were also asked to take 
on additional responsibilities.  Even 
during normal times, the provost 
position at Michigan was a particularly 
challenging one because of its broad 
range of responsibilities since the 
provost not only serves as the chief 
academic officer of the University but 
also as the University’s chief budget 
officer.  The provost was also second-
in-command and thereby empowered 
to serve as acting president in the 
event of the president’s absence.  Such 
a situation arose late in 1986 when 
Harold Shapiro took a brief sabbatical 
leave, spent partly in England and 
partly in New York, working at the 
Ford Foundation.  During this period, I 
served as Acting President in addition 
to my role as Provost.
 While on sabbatical leave, Harold 
Shapiro was approached by Princeton 
University concerning its presidency. 
Although he declined the initial 
approach, the wear and tear of 
returning to winter in Ann Arbor took 
its toll, and he eventually agreed and 
announced his intention to accept the 
Princeton offer in early May. Needless 
to say, Anne and I found our roles in 
the Provost’s Office even more difficult, 
since not only did we have to assume 
the responsibility of guiding the 
University through a difficult period of 
transition in leadership, but as second-
in-command, I was immediately 
identified as the most visible internal 
Chuck Vest’s Advice
My public interview with the Regents
Introducing the new first family
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life, isolation, intolerance, and 
separation had to give way to pluralism 
and diversity.  A new, dynamic, and 
interconnected world was emerging.  
If the University wanted to maintain 
the leadership position it had enjoyed 
for close to two centuries, it had to not 
only adapt to life in that world, but to 
lead the effort to define the very nature 
of the university for the century ahead.
 I was aware of the long-held belief 
that each of the earlier presidents of the 
University seemed to have been 
chosen—or perhaps was molded—by 
the challenges of the times.  The 1950s 
and 1960s had been a time of dramatic 
growth, and Harlan Hatcher had led 
the great expansion of the University 
as it doubled in size and added two 
regional campuses.  The late 1960s 
and 1970s were a time of great unrest 
in America, and Robben Fleming’s 
wise and experienced leadership 
had protected the University and 
its fundamental values during these 
difficult times.  While Harold Shapiro 
had positioned the University to adapt 
to a future of declining state support, 
with faculty, students, and staff on 
campus, augmented by numerous 
discussions with external constituents, 
I began to focus on three themes for 
the future:  knowledge, globalization, 
and diversity.  Knowledge was 
becoming increasingly important 
as the key to growth and change.  
Information and communications 
technologies were quickly breaking 
down barriers between nations and 
economies, producing an increasingly 
interdependent global community.  As 
barriers disappeared and new groups 
entered the main stream of American 
THE INVISIBLE HAND
The announcement of a new president in the University Record
Anne and the Inauguration Committee, Shirley 
Clarkson, Anita Miller, John D’Arms
“faculty office” in Engineering.  Since 
the office was adjacent to the College of 
Engineering computing center (CAEN), 
it had very strong computer support 
and network connectivity.  This office 
was to prove invaluable as backup 
command center when the Fleming 
Building was under siege, e.g., from 
student protests or media attention.  
It provided the perfect retreat for 
my effort to plan the early stages 
of my presidency. During August, I 
disappeared back to my old North 
Campus office to begin to put together 
my strategy for the University. 
 There I wrote the key speeches I 
would be making during the year 
ahead to introduce my agenda, 
including my inauguration address.  
The walls of my old office were covered 
with ideas and outlines for the themes 
for the years ahead and my proposed 
vision for the future of the University.
 Fortunately, much of my activity 
as provost had involved leading an 
extensive planning effort within the 
University.  In countless meetings Jim working on his speeches in the dean’s office
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the same when he later succeeded me 
as provost. In subsequent years this 
$8.5 million, increased each year at the 
same rate as the state appropriation, 
would lose its identification as a 
specific fund for research and instead 
become a part of the College’s base 
budget, under the control of the dean 
and available for any purpose. 
 As I will explain later, as President I 
was also able to use my influence over 
state appropriations and private fund-
raising to quietly acquire several major 
new facilities for the North Campus, 
including the Media Union, the Lurie 
Engineering Building (which, despite 
portrayals to the contrary, was actually 
a state-funded building), and an array 
his most important impact was in a 
different area.  As both Vice President 
for Academic Affairs and then as 
President, Shapiro’s commitment to 
academic excellence was intense and 
unrelenting.
 But I sought something beyond 
excellence.  Instead I embraced the 
University’s heritage of leadership, first 
as it defined the nature of public higher 
education in the late 19th century, 
and then again as it evolved into a 
comprehensive research university to 
serve the latter 20th century.  I became 
convinced that to pursue a destiny 
of leadership for the 21st century, 
academic excellence in traditional 
terms, while necessary, was not 
sufficient.  Beyond this, true leadership 
would demand that the University 
would have to transform itself once 
again, to serve a rapidly changing 
society and a dramatically changed 
world.  And it was this combination 
of leadership and excellence that I 
placed as a vision and challenge to the 
University.
 I wasted little time in setting out my 
vision for the University during the 
week of inauguration activities. My 
inauguration address set this out as a 
challenge:
The triad mission of the university as 
we know it today--teaching, research, 
and service--was shaped by the needs 
of an America of the past.  Since our 
nation today is changing at an ever-
accelerating pace, is it not appropriate 
to question whether our present concept 
of the research university, developed 
largely to serve a homogeneous, 
domestic, industrial society, must not 
also evolve rapidly if we are to serve the 
highly pluralistic, knowledge-intensive 
world-nation that will be America of the 
twenty-first century?
Of course, there have been many in 
recent years who have suggested that 
the traditional paradigm of the public 
university must evolve to respond to the 
challenges that will confront our society 
in the years ahead.  But will a gradual 
evolution of our traditional paradigm 
be sufficient?  Or, will the changes 
ahead force a more dramatic, indeed 
revolutionary, shift in the paradigm of 
the contemporary research university?
Just as with other institutions in our 
society, those universities that will thrive 
will be those that are capable not only 
of responding to this future of change, 
but that have the capacity to relish, 
stimulate, and manage change.  In 
this perspective it may well be that the 
continual renewal of the role, mission, 
values, and goals of our institutions will 
become the greatest challenge of all!
 Although I had to be discreet in my 
efforts, I was able to watch out for the 
College in my roles as provost and 
president, using an invisible hand to 
sustain its progress and prevent any 
backsliding. For example, in an earlier 
chapter I have already mentioned 
how I quickly used my position as 
chief budget officer to quietly lock the 
Research Excellence Fund into the base 
budget of the College. Chuck Vest did 
The New Prez
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Chemical Engineering, as his own 
successor as associate dean of academic 
affairs.  
 Chuck’s first assignment was to 
preside over the formal completion 
of the move of the College to the 
North Campus by dedicating the new 
Electrical Engineering and Computer 
Science Building. This was planned as 
a champagne gala, complete with laser 
light show and fireworks and a visit by 
Governor Blanchard. Unfortunately, 
a tornado alert kept the Governor 
in Lansing (although he called both 
Chuck and me to congratulate us). 
And, as noted earlier, both Anne and 
I assumed what would become our 
increasingly frequent roles as invisible 
guests at the back of the audience.
 Unfortunately, Chuck’s tenure as 
dean of engineering was brief. Shortly 
after becoming president, I convened a 
provost search committee dominated 
by faculty from the humanities, with 
the assumption that the faculty would 
be most comfortable with someone 
from the liberal arts as provost to pair 
TRANSITIONS IN THE DEAN’S OFFICE
of other facilities and infrastructure. I 
was also able to help out the College 
in other ways, through influence in 
Washington, Lansing, and with key 
donors. But my most important role 
as provost and then president was to 
make certain that the College continued 
to benefit from strong leadership.
Transitions in the Dean’s 
Office
My first task as provost was to select 
a new dean for the College. It was 
obvious to all that Chuck Vest was the 
clear choice for this post. Nevertheless, 
University tradition and process 
required that we conduct a sufficient 
search to at least give the faculty a 
sense that they had had input to the 
decision. We felt this was important 
both to the University and to Chuck’s 
credibility as dean. To this end, we 
appointed a small search committee, 
and then we retained a search 
consultant to do a scanning exercise, 
just to see what other candidates 
were out there (particularly at other 
universities) and how they compared 
with Chuck. The consultant quickly 
confirmed our belief that Chuck would 
clearly be the best candidate for the 
position, and by early summer we were 
able to name him Dean of Engineering. 
Dan Atkins and Lynn Conway stayed 
on as associate deans, along with Hal 
Harger as business manager. Chuck 
soon named Erdogan Gulari, one of 
our strongest younger professors from 
with a president from Engineering. 
Imagine my surprise when the search 
committee concluded, unanimously, 
that Chuck was the most outstanding 
candidate. Although the idea of two 
engineers at the helm of the University 
was a bit unnerving at first, after 
consultation with a great many faculty 
members, the belief was that Chuck’s 
exceptional breadth, and the strong 
difference in our styles, would quickly 
overcome any concerns.1
 Just as during my own days in 
the provost’s office, Chuck’s first job 
was to find his successor as dean 
of engineering. Since this would be 
his first search as provost, I felt it 
important to let him take the lead. 
Dan Atkins agreed to be Interim Dean 
during the search process.  After a 
national search, which considered top 
candidates from Caltech, Berkeley, 
Dean Chuck Vest dedicating the expansion of the 
Space Physics Research Laboratory
Daniel Atkins (Interim Dean 1988-89)
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 We were able to convince an old 
friend and colleague, Glenn Knoll, to 
take the role as Interim Dean in 1994. 
Knoll had served as chairman of the 
Department of Nuclear Engineering 
and was widely regarded as one of our 
most outstanding faculty members in 
both teaching and research. Hence his 
appointment was a popular one to the 
faculty. The search for his successor, 
however, took somewhat longer than 
we had originally planned, in part 
because of a change in the provost’s 
office followed by my own decision 
to step down from the presidency and 
return to the faculty.
 I had been playing a personal role 
in this search in an effort to lure Steve 
Director, then dean of engineering 
at Carnegie Mellon and a leading 
engineering educator, to Michigan. 
When I announced my decision to 
return to the faculty, it set the search 
back several months. There was a 
brief period when a number of faculty 
members approached me to see if I 
and MIT, Chuck finally offered the 
position to Peter Banks, a professor 
of electrical engineering from 
Stanford. Banks was both visionary 
and charismatic, with extensive 
experience in entrepreneurial activities 
and federally sponsored research. 
However, his inexperience in leading 
a large academic unit, along with his 
considerable off-campus activities in 
fund-raising and federal relations, 
led to a growing gap between his 
visions for the College and where the 
faculty wanted to head. Furthermore, 
the College Executive Committee 
attempted to fill the growing leadership 
vacuum and became overly involved in 
micromanaging the College. 
 Unfortunately, Chuck remained in 
the provost role for only a year before 
he was approached by MIT about their 
presidency. Although he was very 
concerned about leaving after such a 
brief stint, I portrayed the MIT offer as 
a “call to national service” that left him 
little choice but to accept. 
 Peter Banks was successful in 
continuing to build the reputation 
of the College, and his fund-raising 
skills were key in pulling in major 
gifts to build several important North 
Campus facilities (including the FXB 
Building for Aerospace Engineering 
and the Lurie Engineering Center and 
Lurie Tower). However after several 
years, he opted for a new position as 
the president of the Environmental 
Research Institute of Michigan. Hence 
we were back to the search for a new 
dean.
The prez and provost cooking burgers for the 
Regents
Two university presidents:  MIT and Michigan
Peter and Paulette Banks with John and Susan 
Ulrich, fund-raising chair
Glenn Knoll (Interim) (1994-1996)
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already recognized that additional 
facilities would be necessary, as 
indicated by this planning map for the 
North Campus.
 In particular, there was a need for 
a major North Campus library that 
would serve all academic units, as well 
as an expansion of the North Campus 
Commons (later renamed the Pierpont 
Commons, after Wilbur Pierpont, the 
former vice president for finance of the 
University who was the real visionary 
behind the development of the North 
Campus site.)
 The College of Engineering also 
had particular needs. As I pointed out 
in an earlier chapter, the Department 
of Aerospace Engineering had been 
housed in an inadequate, concrete 
block building constructed during 
the 1970s. Through the efforts of Tom 
Adamson, chair of the Department 
of Aerospace Engineering, we were 
fortunate to receive a major gift from 
THE FURTHER EVOLUTION OF THE NORTH CAMPUS
The North Campus master plan, circa 1986
would be willing to return to the dean’s 
role myself.2 Anne and I had long felt 
that it was a more enjoyable role than 
serving as provost and president. In 
the end, however, I decided that after 
leading the University for 10 years, it 
would be difficult to return to the role 
of dean. Been there, done that.
 Hence, I resumed negotiations 
with Steve Director, and he finally 
agreed to become the next dean of the 
College. Director brought with him 
not only a reputation as a national 
leader in engineering education, but 
moreover a reputation as a leading 
computer engineer. He was quickly 
able to reestablish the linkages between 
the dean’s office and the faculty and 
continue the momentum of the College. 
Furthermore, Director provided the 
strong leadership necessary to protect 
the College from the dangers posed 
by a new administration that largely 
viewed the North Campus as having 
benefited to an unusual extent during 
my years of leadership and was 
determined to push Engineering down 
the list in priorities once again.
Further Evolution of the 
North Campus
The North Campus site of the College 
of Engineering continued to evolve 
during the years following my tenure 
as dean. When the College completed 
its move in 1986, following the opening 
of the Electrical Engineering and 
Computer Science Building, it was The Wilbur & Maxine Pierpont Commons
The François-Xavier Bagnoud (FXB) Building
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Campus, commissioning the noted 
American architect, Charles Moore, 
for the design.3  In addition, Ann Lurie 
provided another gift for a bell tower 
and carillon on the North Campus, also 
designed by Charles Moore.
 At roughly the same time, I was 
guiding through the state capital outlay 
process for a major appropriation for 
a North Campus “library.” We had 
long had this project on the drawing 
boards, including it without success 
in the Campaign for Michigan of the 
1980s, with a vision for building a 
“library of the future”. Two events 
occurred that provided the University 
the opportunity to move forward 
immediately not only with this project, 
but also the Lurie projects.
 In 1992, when a new governor, John 
Engler, was elected, he learned that 
he had inherited a $1 billion deficit in 
the state budget from his predecessor. 
By taking advantage of an interesting 
loophole in Medicare reimbursement, 
we were able to execute an electronic 
transfer of funds through our medical 
center that allowed the governor to 
Bob Lurie, a former graduate of the 
College who had built a major financial 
empire in Chicago with Sam Zell, a 
graduate of the Business School. Bob 
was a wonderfully creative person 
who had long expressed an interest 
in helping the College. When he died 
at an early age, his wife Ann picked 
up the commitment and agreed to 
fund a major building on the North 
the Countess Albina DuBuousvouvray 
to build a new building in memory of 
her son, François-Xavier Bagnoud, a 
former student in aerospace who was 
killed in a helicopter accident in Africa. 
The FXB Building provided superb 
facilities for this important department.
Furthermore, the Countess provided 
additional funding to commission a 
major sculpture, “The Wave Field,” by 
Maya Lin.
This blending of major art with the 
evolution of the North Campus was 
due in part to the particular interests of 
Brad Canale, who continued to direct 
the College’s development efforts. 
 Chuck Vest was instrumental in 
building a major addition to the North 
Campus Commons that housed an 
array of student services activities.
 Perhaps the most dramatic new 
buildings constructed on the North 
Campus resulted from a unique 
combination of public and private 
support: the Media Union, the Lurie 
Engineering Center, and the Robert 
and Ann Lurie Tower. During my days 
as dean, I had become friends with 
Maya Lin’s “Wave Field”
A sculpture at the Dow Building
The expansion of the North Campus Commons
The Lurie Engineering Center
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The Robert and Ann Lurie Bell Tower The North Campus, circa 1996
plug the hole in his budget. This not 
only enabled him to move ahead with 
a capital outlay program, but in his 
gratitude, he agreed to let us use our 
share of these funds (roughly $125 
million) in a highly flexible manner. 
We had included in our package $50 
million for a North Campus library, but 
when we learned that Michigan State 
University was proposing a $70 million 
Soil Sciences Laboratory, we decided to 
jump-start the Lurie projects and add 
them in the budget request to match 
Michigan State.
 To enable this, we needed a 
somewhat different concept for the 
three buildings. Driving to our first 
hearing before the legislative capital 
outlay committees, I suggested 
that we combine the magic words 
“instruction,” “technology,” and 
“center” into a term that sounded high-
tech but really meant nothing: “The 
Integrated Instructional Technology 
Center” or ITIC. And this is precisely 
what the state funded: a $70 million 
complex that included the Lurie 
Building, Bell Tower, and the library 
(later to be called the Media Union). 
Ann Lurie was comfortable with using 
state funding to start the projects, with 
the understanding that her gifts, to be 
paid out over a longer period, would 
eventually go to help support a new 
building for the School of Social Work 
(“all money is green,” as they say).
 The Lurie Engineering Building and 
Lurie Tower would turn out to be the 
very last buildings designed by Charles 
Moore. Because of the architectural 
importance of these structures, when 
cost overruns on the Lurie Tower 
threatened to cut the original design, 
I put in $2 million of additional 
University funding to build it exactly as 
Moore had designed it.
The Industrial Technology Institute
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 And what a project it was. When the 
Media Union finally opened its doors 
in 1996, there were probably fewer 
than a dozen people on the campus 
who understood what it was. But the 
students rapidly learned, and within 
a month it became the most popular 
facility in the University, operating 
around the clock, seven days a week, 
populated by thousands of students.
 The Media Union was designed to 
be a testbed for developing, studying, 
and perhaps implementing the new 
paradigms of the university enabled 
by information technology.  It would 
give us the chance to try out different 
The Media Union
The main structure of the ITIC complex 
was a $50 million building, originally 
portrayed as a North Campus library. 
However, since the governor had given 
us unusual flexibility in the design of 
this facility, we assembled a usually 
creative team of faculty and deans and 
said: “Here is $50 million. Build us a 
building for a 21st Century university!” 
The team included visionaries such 
as Lynn Conway, Maurita Holland, 
Dan Atkins, and Randy Frank from 
the faculty and Deans Peter Banks 
(Engineering), Paul Boylan (Music), 
Bob Beckley (Architecture), and Allen 
Samuels (Art). Together, they came up 
with a fascinating new concept, best 
captured by the new name “Media 
Union,” which was a play on the 
“Michigan Union” of the Central 
Campus, but suggested the merging of 
various media (art, music, architecture, 
engineering) and senses (sight, 
hearing, touch, etc.) Randy Frank, 
then the director of the Computer 
Aided Engineering Network, took 
lead responsibility for directing the 
evolution of the project.
 There were several other North 
Campus building projects during 
this period, including the Industrial 
Technology Institute and an expansion 
of the Space Physics Research 
Laboratory. Furthermore, the Lurie 
Engineering Center also provided a 
significant expansion of the facilities 
occupied by the Department of 
Industrial and Operations Engineering.
The Department of Industrial and Operations 
Engineering
The Media Union (Bonisteel Boulevard side)
The Media Union (campus side)
Cutting the ribbon for the Media Union with 
Governor John Engler
The Space Physics Research Laboratory
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possibilities before they become 
widespread realities, helping us 
avoid potentially expensive or even 
dangerous mistakes while maximizing 
the extraordinary capacities of our new 
tools.
 The Media Union created an 
environment where students and 
faculty could join with colleagues 
beyond the campus, developing and 
testing new visions of the university, 
exploring teaching, research, service, 
extension, and other areas.  Even 
more importantly, the Media Union 
fostered a new spirit of excitement and 
adventure.  It provided the foundation 
for a risk-tolerant culture, where 
students and faculty were strongly 
encouraged to “go for it,” accepting 
failure as a part of the learning process 
as they reach for ambitious goals.  
Organized around dynamic, integrative 
themes, the Media Union worked to 
break down the compartmentalized 
nature of the larger university.
 Originally we envisioned the Media 
Union as a common connecting 
point among the four schools on 
the University’s North Campus:  
Engineering, Architecture and Urban 
Planning, Music, and Art, all of which 
are intimately concerned with the act 
of creation.  Although all four facilities 
operated within close proximity of 
each other, in the past there had been 
few collaborations between them.  
This made little sense.  Increasingly 
society demands designs that combine 
aesthetics, efficiency, and durability.  
As engineers become more like artists, 
artists and musicians have become 
more interested in new environments 
for their creations; and architects 
are increasingly concerned with the 
structural integrity and beauty of their 
designs.
 We soon realized, however, that the 
Media Union must be a resource for 
the entire University.  The need for 
interdisciplinary collaboration extends 
beyond the North Campus schools, and 
as a facility designed in part to bridge 
the limitations of time and distance, 
what better place to bring the North 
and Central Campuses together?  The 
Media Union could act as a catalyst, 
helping faculty and students from 
different fields realize their similarities 
while capitalizing on their differences.
 More specifically, this 250,000 square 
foot facility, looking like a modern 
version of the Temple of Karnak, 
contains almost 1,000 workstations for 
student use-including Pentiums and 
Macs and Unix machines such as Suns 
and Hewlett Packard workstations.  
 It has thousands of network jacks 
where students can plug in their 
laptops, and wireless modems if they 
wish to work in its surrounding plazas 
and gardens during the summer.  The 
facility contains a 1.5-million volume 
library for art, science, and engineering, 
but perhaps more significantly, it is 
the site of our major digital library 
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Architecture at Yale University.) While 
groups could meet physically from 
time to time, many of the members 
of these project teams participated 
through interactive technology.  
Members did not need to leave their 
home institution or even their homes 
to join in close collaboration with other 
scholars who were thousands of miles 
away.
 Libraries will always have books, 
but the Media Union’s library will not 
be judged by its number of volumes.  
Increasingly, information will be 
stored electronically, and its data will 
be dispersed across the globe.  We are 
talking about more than just text; the 
Internet already contains archives of 
images and sounds, audio and visual 
information that scholars can retrieve 
at the touch of a button.  Eventually 
a researcher will not have to find a 
DVD to view movies or locate a tape 
recorder to listen to the score of a 
symphony.  And published “papers” 
will increasingly include images and 
sounds as an integral part of their 
project.  There is a sophisticated 
teleconferencing facility, design studios, 
visualization laboratories, and a major 
virtual reality complex.  Since art, 
architecture, and music students work 
side-by-side with engineering students, 
the Media Union contains sophisticated 
recording studios and electronic 
music studios.  It also has a state-of-
the-art sound stage for “digitizing” 
performances, as well as numerous 
galleries for displaying the results of 
student creative efforts.  The Media 
Union is open 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week, so that students have 
round-the-clock access to its facilities.
 The “virtual” nature of the 
research teams in the Media Union 
entice not only campus scholars, but 
exciting thinkers around the world to 
participate.  (For example, we built a 
relationship with the Schools of Art and 
presentation.
 The Media Union libraries eliminate 
much of the drudgery usually 
associated with information retrieval.  
Quasi-intelligent software programs 
search out data for even the most 
unique topics, tracing connections 
within a broad spectrum of research 
that scholars might have missed 
using manual techniques.  While this 
will never replace human insight, 
the wide-ranging character of these 
searches helps break down the invisible 
barriers that often separate disciplines 
today.  The most useful resources for 
a psychologist working on an aspect 
The atrium of the Media Union
The design studios in the Media Union The library area in the Media Union
The gallery areas of the Media Union
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centers find themselves infected by the 
stolid, incremental “disease” of large 
institutions.  Creating a fluid structure 
that continually embraces new ideas 
would be a great struggle.  A related 
challenge would be learning to sustain 
spaces that are truly neutral in their 
academic orientation. 
 Another difficulty we grappled with 
was finding ways to let the energy and 
enthusiasm from the Center’s cutting-
edge research projects trickle out into 
the common areas of the building, and 
ultimately to the entire University.  The 
new interactive library was open to all 
members of the Michigan community, 
but much of the rest of the building 
would be reserved for a wide spectrum 
of research projects and groups.  
Researchers and scholars needed space 
of their own to work together, but we 
worried that if they remain isolated 
behind closed doors (even glass doors), 
we could lose the opportunity for our 
students and colleagues to experience 
their excitement.  Even allowing the 
outside world “virtual” access to the 
Union’s projects would not be enough.   
 As Architecture Dean Robert Beckley 
noted, “there are ways in which we 
would like the building to have the 
messy, intriguing look of a house 
for mad scientists.”  If we expected 
the Media Union to be a catalyst, 
changing the common practices of our 
community, we had to find ways for 
these new practices to move beyond 
the building’s studios.
of “panic” might well turn out to have 
been written by an anthropologist or an 
English professor or even an engineer.
 Libraries will also increasingly 
become places where the differences 
between “researching” and “doing” 
blur.  The new information technology 
not only supports information retrieval, 
but also facilitates manipulation of 
that information.  A student could not 
only read about architecture, but use a 
computer tool at the same time to try 
out a design.
 For the Media Union to succeed, 
we realized we had to take risks, 
accepting that we might stumble before 
we could walk.  When we began the 
early planning for the project in the 
1980s, our challenge was to envision a 
building that could become a campus 
“commons,” both physically and 
virtually.  We struggled with designing 
a place that would allow colleagues 
from very different disciplines and 
across great distances to collaborate 
with each other.  Ultimately, we had no 
final answers—just ideas.  We realized 
we probably would not get it all right 
from the beginning.  In fact, it was clear 
that stagnation will have arrived if the 
Media Union ever settles comfortably 
into any single form.
 One of the problems in centers like 
the Media Union at other universities 
has been that projects often move in 
when the facility is built—and then 
never leave.  Limited paradigms take 
hold and then can’t be shaken loose.  
Instead of propagating flexibility 
within the larger university, the 
reverse often happens, and these 
THE NORTH WOODS  PROJECT
The Media Union
The “Comet and Quantum Mechanics” fresco in 
the Media Union
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The North Campus, circa 1996
The North Woods master plan
The North Woods Project
With the completion of the Media 
Union, Lurie Engineering Building, 
and Lurie Tower in the mid-1990s, 
the North Campus had taken on a 
decidedly different look. It was now 
home to four major schools and over 
14,000 students. It made important 
architectural statements. Its rare blend 
of creative disciplines began to suggest 
a new name adopted by several of the 
deans: “The Renaissance Campus.” 
In many ways, the North Campus 
had become the laboratory for the 
University of the 21st Century.
 To recognize this broader mission, 
we launched a major effort to develop 
a new master plan for the campus. To 
stimulate creativity, we approached 
this as a blind competition, inviting the 
very top architectural planning firms 
to prepare proposals, with the deans of 
the North Campus schools forming a 
committee of judges to select the final 
design.
 The competition was intense, and 
the judges were rigorous. In the end, 
the competition was won by Johnson, 
Johnson, and Roy, ironically the 
creators of earlier master plans for 
the University, who developed an 
extraordinary new master plan with 
the code name “North Woods.” This 
plan created a new North-South axis 
running through the campus, from the 
forests to the north down to the Huron 
River to the south. It made extensive 
use of the evergreen plantings that 
had long provided a distinctive 
character to the North Campus. The 
deans forming the judging committee 
were ecstatic about the design, united 
in their belief that it would make 
a statement comparable to other 
important campus designs such as the 
Jefferson quadrangle at the University 
of Virginia or the Harvard Yard.
Unfortunately, the North Woods design 
The North Campus “diag”
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Artist’s conceptions of the North Woods plan
A schematic of the North Woods master plan
A schematic of the north-south axis of the North Woods plan
was completed during the last year of 
my presidency. Although we were able 
to launch some aspects of the design 
(such as purchasing a large tree farm to 
provide new trees, and beginning some 
of the circular plantings and entrances), 
the effort was rapidly brought to a 
halt by my successor, Lee Bollinger, 
who had become infatuated with the 
architecture of Robert Venturi (noted 
for post-modernist design in the Las 
Vegas style). Bollinger replaced the 
University’s longtime master planner 
with Venturi, who promptly stopped 
everything else going on campus, 
including the North Woods project. The 
deans who had strongly supported the 
project were either removed or retired, 
and Bollinger’s new administration 
attempted to bury the concept (and the 
North Campus).
 We were fortunate, however, in the 
fact that the new president’s lack of 
interest in the North Campus meant 
that Venturi’s attention was focused 
elsewhere. Hence, although the North 
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The Venturi-Bollinger “Halo” on Michigan Stadium
The expansion of the Pfizer R&D laboratories on 
the North Campus
Woods project was suspended, at least 
we did not suffer from the Venturi 
architectural touch that humiliated 
other parts of the campus.
 But, as the College has learned 
throughout its history, if an idea is 
good, it will eventually return. And the 
compelling nature of the North Woods 
plan suggests that in the wake of the 
unusually brief tenure of the Bollinger 
administration (the shortest for a 
president in the University’s history), 
there may be an opportunity to resume 
the project. Let us all hope!
 However, the Bollinger 
administration was to leave one final 
legacy for the North Campus. Even as 
the president was negotiating his next 
position at Columbia University, he 
persuaded the Regents to sell 55 acres 
of the University’s North Campus 
property to the Pfizer Corporation 
for further expansion of their already 
massive R&D laboratories, land that 
had been reserved in the master plan 
for academic programs. Although 
this sale brought the administration 
some $25 million of badly needed 
cash to dump into the “cat hole” of 
the Life Sciences Institute, it did so 
at the expense of land critical to the 
University’s future expansion. It is 
interesting to compare this short-term 
opportunism (by a president walking 
out the door) with the vision of the 
Regents some 50 years earlier when 




Lessons for the Future
As this book is written, Anne and I are 
completing our 33rd year in Ann Arbor 
and at the University of Michigan. 
This is not only an unusually long 
period, as faculty careers go, of serving 
a single institution, but it also spans 
most of the half-century period in the 
history of the College of Engineering. 
During this period we have had the 
opportunity—indeed, the privilege—to 
serve the University and the College 
in many roles: as a faculty member, 
teaching and conducting research; as 
a leader of groups such as the Faculty 
Women’s Club that knit together the 
campus community; as dean and 
“deanette”, provost and “provostess”, 
and president and first lady, leading 
the College and the University; and 
as emeriti, returning to teaching 
and participating in the University 
community, almost as ghosts from the 
past, serving in whatever way we can 
(and are allowed).
 Yet, looking back over these many 
years of serving the University, the 
brief five-year period spent in the role 
of dean of engineering was in many 
ways the most exciting and rewarding. 
In part it had to do with the energy 
and excitement of youth, since we were 
both in our mid-30s when I was tapped 
by the University for this role. So, too, 
it arose from the wonderful experience 
of working with some remarkably 
talented and dedicated colleagues in 
the “calling” of rebuilding the College. 
And, of course, it was immensely 
satisfying to play some role in the 
resurgence of the College, rising like a 
phoenix bird from the ashes of malaise 
and neglect of the 1960s and 1970s to 
a position of national leadership in 
engineering education once again.
 Of course, the sharp acceleration 
of the College and its rapid rise to 
prominence had as much to do with 
how far it had declined in earlier 
decades as it did with our success in 
rebuilding an adequate measure of 
University support and restoring the 
quality of its faculty and its programs. 
Peaks always look far higher when 
viewed from a deep valley.
 In this final chapter, it seems 
appropriate to offer a somewhat 
broader view of the history of the 
College and the ebb and flow of its 
fortunes and fate, dependent mostly 
upon people, but also upon events. But 
perhaps more significant is an attempt 
to draw out some lessons to be learned 
from the experience of rebuilding an 
academic unit, both as a dean and then 
as a university leader. I have also taken 
the liberty of speculating a bit about 
the future of engineering education. 
Hopefully these observations can 
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provide not only some measure of 
what it takes to achieve excellence 
in academic programs, but they can 
also provide guidance for those who 
will be responsible for sustaining 
the momentum of the University of 
Michigan’s College of Engineering in 
the years ahead, enabling it to continue 
to serve the University, the state, the 
nation, and the world.
Five Years Before the Mast
As the earlier narrative in this 
book makes apparent, the list of 
accomplishments during that brief 
period in the early 1980s is both 
significant and lengthy. But, now from 
the perspective of hindsight, I would 
suggest that the most important of 
these achievements were the following: 
At the top of the list would be restoring 
the College of Engineering as a top 
priority of both the University and 
the State of Michigan, as evidenced by 
the remarkably strong support of both 
the College’s needs for strong funding 
(e.g., doubling General Fund support 
and passing legislation establishing the 
Research Excellence Fund) and quality 
facilities (e.g., the North Campus move, 
Engineering Building I, and the ITIC 
complex).
 Second on the list would be 
transforming the culture of the College, 
reestablishing both the commitment 
to excellence and the confidence that 
it could be achieved. This required not 
only the presence of strong rewards 
and expectation for excellence, but 
also creating a “go for it” spirit of risk-
taking and entrepreneurism through 
the faculty, students, and staff of the 
College.
 A third area of effort was rebuilding 
the quality of the faculty in the face 
of the low morale and apathy that 
had come to characterize much of the 
College during the preceding decade. 
We were able to arrest the departure 
of our strongest junior faculty while 
recruiting new faculty members at 
all levels. In fact, during the five-
year period, almost 120 new faculty 
members were hired, corresponding to 
roughly 40% of the faculty cadre. 
 Of course, key in our efforts was the 
ability to restore adequate support for 
the College. As we have described in 
earlier chapters, we were able to triple 
the University’s base support of the 
College, increasing its General Fund 
budget from $13.2 million per year in 
1980 to $36 million in 1986. This was 
augmented by similarly large increases 
in sponsored research support and 
private giving.
 History will probably record the 
successful move of the College to 
the North Campus as a major event 
of the period, since this had been 
a goal for over three decades. But 
beyond the success in putting together 
and executing a plan to accomplish 
the move in slightly less than four 
years, we were also able to provide 
a number of new facilities that 
gave the College one of the nation’s 
leading environments for engineering 
education and research (e.g., EECS, 
Dow, FXB, SPRL, IST, Lurie, and the 
Media Union). We were also able to 
build a state-of-the-art computing 
environment, CAEN that became the 
envy of the nation.
 There were also several subtle but 
nevertheless important changes. We 
believed it important to restore the 
focus of the College on graduate 
education and research, since these 
areas provide the measures that 
would most determine our reputation, 
national rankings, and ability to attract 
students and faculty. Investments were 
made to build world-class programs 
in hot areas such as manufacturing 
engineering, microelectronics and 
advanced optics, computer science and 
engineering, and bioengineering.
 By the mid-1980s, the quantitative 
measures of College momentum 
began to surge and continued to do 
so throughout the 1990s. The volume 
of sponsored research grants and 
contracts attracted by our faculty 
doubled, then doubled again, and has 
continued to rise. Ph.D. production 
also has increased by a factor of four 
since it hit a low point in 1980. In fact, 
today the College of Engineering has 
the largest population of graduate 
students of any school or college in 
the University. The College has been 
both a national and University leader 
in its efforts to diversify its student 
body and faculty with respect to 
race and socioeconomic background. 
Members of the faculty now routinely 
are recognized with major awards such 
as election to the National Academy of 
Engineering. And the reputation of the 
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College has climbed to new heights, 
with both the College and most of its 
departments now ranked among the 
top five in the nation (alongside MIT, 
Stanford, UC-Berkeley, and Illinois). 
More information on these quantitative 
measures is provided in an appendix.
 Hence, by any measure, the College 
of Engineering has come a long ways 
since the doldrums of the 1970s. Today 
it is clearly recognized as both one of 
the strongest academic programs in the 
University and a leader in engineering 
education across the nation and 
throughout the world.
A Broader Historical 
Context
As we have observed in earlier 
chapters, the fortunes of the College 
have waxed and waned over the 
century and a half of its existence. To a 
very considerable degree, the strength 
of the College has depended upon 
people, both academic leaders such 
as deans and university presidents, as 
well as events at the University, state, 
and national level. To illustrate this, I 
have attempted to develop a symbolic 
chart suggesting the correlation 
between the reputation or strength of 
the College and its priority within the 
University for various periods in its 
history. 
 Although there may be some risk in 
doing so, I also feel obliged to relate 
these trends both to leadership of the 
College and to historical events of the 
period. There seems little doubt that 
the College of Engineering made the 
most progress during three periods 
of deans: Mortimer Cooley, G. G. 
Brown, and finally the team that led 
the College during the 1980s. In part 
this had to do with the events of the 
times. Cooley led the College during 
the industrialization of America, with 
great demands for technology and 
engineering. G. G. Brown benefited 
from a period of exceptional growth in 
higher education, with the G.I. Bill and 
returning veterans from WWII, as well 
as the developing research partnership 
between the federal government and 
the nation’s research universities, 
stimulating massive investments in 
campus-based research and graduate 
education as a key factor in achieving 
national security during the Cold War. 
During the 1980s we benefited very 
significantly from the new emphasis 
on diversifying the state’s economy 
and restoring the competitiveness of 
Michigan industry.
 In contrast, other deans of the 
College of Engineering have not been 
so fortunate. Sadler was at the helm 
during the Great Depression, while 
Crawford led during WWII, times that 
made progress very difficult. Attwood, 
Van Wylen, and Ragone faced shifting 
University priorities, driven by the 
Great Society themes, the protest 
movement, and the recessions of the 
1970s. These broader themes explain 
to some extent the directions in which 
they attempted to lead the College. For 
example, Van Wylen responded to the 
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enrollment growth associated with the 
post-WWII baby boom by focusing the 
College on undergraduate education. 
Faced with declining University 
support, Ragone focused his efforts on 
private fund-raising. 
 So too, there are likely correlations 
as well with University leadership. For 
example, Cooley had the support of 
Angell and Burton; Brown benefited 
from the arrival of Harlan Hatcher; and 
I had the exceptionally strong support 
of both Harold Shapiro and Bill Frye. 
In contrast, both Sadler and Crawford 
served under Alexander Ruthven, then 
in declining health. Van Wylen and 
Ragone served during the Fleming 
years, at a time when the priorities 
were coping with campus unrest, and 
had to contend with Allen Smith as 
provost, who had little enthusiasm for 
supporting engineering. Fortunately, 
my successors (Vest, Banks, Knoll) 
could depend upon my strong 
support as both provost and president. 
During his early years as dean, Steve 
Director had to contend with a largely 
disinterested if not occasionally hostile 
administration led by Lee Bollinger. 
Fortunately, the sky appears to be 
brightening with the arrival of a new 
president, Mary Sue Coleman.
 But although events of the times 
and University leadership are key 
in determining the fortunes of the 
College, we should not underestimate 
the important role of the dean in 
exploiting or surmounting these 
factors. Both Mortimer Cooley and 
G. G. Brown were not only energetic, 
forceful, and persuasive, but they 
also devoted considerable time to 
making the case for the College to the 
University and the state. They were 
active both on the campus and beyond, 
becoming frequent visitors to the State 
Legislature and the United States 
Congress. These two leaders provided 
excellent role models for our efforts to 
rebuild the College during the 1980s.
Some Lessons Learned—
Revisited
Although we briefly discussed some 
of the lessons learned during the 
early stages of our efforts to rebuild 
the momentum of the College, it is of 
interest to reconsider this topic from 
the broader perspective provided by 
two decades of subsequent reflection. 
Since I believe these to be key elements 
of successful academic leadership, it 
is also appropriate to stress them once 
again here.
Establishing the Priority of the 
College within the University
Both the history of the College 
of Engineering and my own 
experience suggest that the first 
and most important objective must 
be establishing the priority given 
an academic unit by the central 
administration. When the visibility of 
the College of Engineering on State 
Street has been high, the College has 
thrived. When the University has 
neglected–or even, at times, acted 
against–the College, it declines very 
rapidly, as it did during the 1960s 
and 1970s. When our team came into 
the dean’s office in 1981, we realized 
immediately that until we had re-
established the priority of the College 
with the central administration, the 
rest of our agenda would simply not be 
possible. Key in this effort was making 
the case for the College directly to the 
top leadership of the University, to 
the president (Harold Shapiro) and 
the provost (Bill Frye). Once we had 
earned their respect, commitment, and 
support, the other components of our 
plan began to fall rapidly into place.
 This task is clearly the primary 
responsibility of the dean. There really 
is nobody else, among the faculty, 
alumni, or patrons of a college, who 
can effectively make this case and 
earn the confidence and support of 
the university leadership. History has 
shown time and time again that when 
the dean is incapable of or ineffective 
in making the case and establishing 
a college’s priority, it simply cannot 
prosper.
Consistency and Persistence
Although it can sometimes seem like 
beating your head against a brick 
wall, consistency and persistence are 
everything. Staying on message both 
to internal constituencies such as the 
faculty and external patrons such as the 
central administration, industry, and 
alumni is essential. Any uncertainty 
or wavering will rapidly erode the 
effort to build support. And besides, 
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sometimes a window of opportunity 
opens in what appears to be an 
immovable brick wall.
Speed and Timing Are Everything
Today it is sometimes difficult to 
understand just how rapidly we 
pushed ahead our blitzkrieg to rebuild 
the College. But it is also my belief 
that this was, in part, the key to our 
success. We were able to accelerate, 
building momentum along a number of 
fronts. Success in one area propagated 
to others, almost like a chain reaction. 
Restructuring the salary program to 
reward achievement drove faculty 
effort and morale, which in turn 
established a credible case for greater 
University support. The completion 
of the North Campus move was 
key in recruiting strong faculty who 
rapidly established the College as a 
major player in key national research 
initiatives.
 Our experience clearly indicates that 
to take advantage of the opportunities, 
one needs to have the capacity to move 
very rapidly. Timing is everything. 
Windows of opportunity open and 
close very rapidly, whether in the 
University, Lansing, or Washington.
The Importance of Having a Clear 
Strategy
Too often academic leaders tend 
to react to–or even resist–external 
pressures and opportunities rather 
than taking strong, decisive actions to 
determine and pursue their own goals. 
They frequently become preoccupied 
with process rather than objectives, 
with “how” rather than “what.” We 
believed it important to develop a 
planning process that was not only 
capable of adapting to changing 
conditions, but to some degree capable 
of actually modifying the environment 
in which the university would find 
itself in the decades ahead. We sought 
a progressive, flexible, and adaptive 
process, capable of responding to 
a dynamic environment and an 
uncertain—indeed, unknowable—
future.
 To this end, we adopted an 
opportunistic planning approach. The 
idea was to develop flexible strategies 
that took advantage of windows of 
opportunity, which avoided confining 
the College to rigid paths, deep ruts. 
In a sense, this corresponded to an 
informed dead-reckoning approach, 
in which one selected strategic 
objectives—where we wanted to 
go—and then followed whatever 
course seemed appropriate at the time, 
possibly shifting paths as opportunities 
arose and updating strategic plans 
with new information and experience, 
always with the ultimate goal in mind. 
In such opportunistic planning, we 
assumed that the planning framework 
was never rigid. What first appeared 
to be constraints might, in fact, be 
transformed into opportunities. 
 Since I am a scientist-engineer, 
it is not surprising that as a leader 
I tended to be comfortable with 
strategic thinking. Yet it should also 
be acknowledged that my particular 
style of planning and decision making 
was rather unorthodox, sometimes 
baffling both our university planning 
staff and my colleagues alike. Once 
I overheard a colleague describe my 
style as “fire, ready, aim,” as I would 
launch yet another salvo of agendas 
and initiatives.
 This was not a consequence of 
impatience or lack of discipline. Rather 
it grew from my increasing sense that 
traditional planning approaches were 
simply ineffective during periods of 
great change. Far too many leaders, 
when confronted with uncertainty, tend 
to fall into a “ready, aim . . . ready, aim 
. . . ready, aim . . . “ mode and never 
make a decision. By the time they are 
finally forced to pull the trigger, the 
target has moved out of their sights. 
Hence, there was indeed logic to my 
“anticipatory, scattershot” approach to 
planning and decision making.1  
    I believed that incremental change 
based on traditional, well-understood 
paradigms might be the most 
dangerous course of all, because those 
paradigms may simply not be adequate 
to adapt to a time of very rapid 
change. If the status quo is no longer 
an option, if the existing paradigms 
are no longer valid, then more radical 
transformation becomes the wisest 
course.2 Furthermore, during times of 
very rapid change and uncertainty, it 
is sometimes necessary to launch the 
actions associated with a preliminary 
strategy long before it is carefully 
thought through and completely 
developed.
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Always Bet on Your Best People and 
Strongest Programs
Clearly, academic institutions and 
programs are intensely people-
dependent enterprises. The secret to 
success is simple: attract the very best 
people; provide them with the support, 
encouragement, and opportunity to 
push to the limits of their talents and 
dreams; and then get out of their way! 
Academic leaders should post on their 
desktops a sign stating: “IT’S THE 
PEOPLE, STUPID!”
 There is a corollary here. If you are 
going to place a big bet on the future, 
make certain that you place it on your 
best people and your best programs. 
Always invest in areas of strength, 
and from them, create the momentum 
to build new areas. It was for this 
reason that we placed our largest bets 
(and they were very large, indeed, 
amounting to many millions of dollars) 
on programs such as the Center for 
Integrated Manufacturing, the Solid 
State Electronics Laboratory, the Center 
for Ultrafast Optics, and the Computer 
Aided Engineering Network.
 The converse is also true. It is very 
dangerous to make major investments 
in areas of weakness in an effort to 
build new areas of excellence. This 
almost never succeeds.3
Thinking Outside the Box
As we have noted, simply damning 
the torpedoes and pushing full speed 
ahead does not always lead to success. 
The decision process in a university can 
become overloaded and driven into a 
state of paralysis. Sometimes it takes a 
more creative approach.
 Our deans’ team was particularly 
fortunate in tapping the creative talent 
of some truly extraordinary people 
who have gone on to demonstrate this 
rare human attribute elsewhere. Chuck 
Vest’s skill in managing the successful 
North Campus move has been echoed 
time and time again in his leadership 
at MIT. Dan Atkins’ efforts in building 
the Computer Aided Engineering 
Network and stimulating a broad array 
of leading research initiatives were 
precursors of the role he would play as 
the founding dean of our new School of 
Information. Lynn Conway’s creative 
talents have been demonstrated time 
and time again through initiatives such 
as the Center for Machine Intelligence, 
the UMTV broadband network, and her 
many efforts in engineering design. We 
were fortunate in our ability to tap the 
creative talents of many others among 
the department chairs, the College 
Executive Committee, the faculty, and 
our students.
The Importance of Teamwork
The importance of teamwork runs 
throughout this period in the College’s 
history. Indeed, the sense of teamwork 
among our deans’ team, department 
chairs, Executive Committee, and 
faculty was truly extraordinary. It 
clearly dominated the usual hierarchy 
of authority that characterizes 
administrative organizations. 
 Not to say that we avoided 
responsibility. Sooner or later someone 
had to lead the troops into battle, and 
suffer the consequences if the battlefield 
strategy was a failure. I have long 
become convinced that academic leader-
ship is never effective from far behind 
the front lines. Truly effective academic 
leadership occurs on the front lines.
The Future of Engineering 
Education
All of these lessons are likely to 
prove valuable in the years ahead as 
engineering education faces a period of 
extraordinary change, perhaps too long 
delayed and today desperately needed. 
Let me explain.
 In rummaging through the historical 
collections of the University during the 
research for this book, I was surprised 
to find how similar the engineering 
curriculum of a century ago was to 
today’s programs.  In 1900 we required 
students to take 130 credit hours of 
courses in mathematics, physics, 
and chemistry with a concentration 
in applied courses in areas such 
as mechanical, civil, and chemical 
engineering, just as we do today.  
In fact, if one swaps yesterday’s 
requirement for surveying and 
mechanical drawing for today’s courses 
on computers, the two curricula are 
almost identical.  Of course, the actual 
content of these courses has changed 
considerably—or so one would hope.
 With one major exception, the actual 
structure of the engineering curriculum 
has remained roughly the same over 
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the past century.  That exception 
is an important one.  The 1900 
curriculum placed far more stress on 
the importance of a liberal education, 
with more courses in humanities, arts, 
and social sciences.  In fact, one might 
even suggest that we have regressed 
over the past century, overloading our 
current curriculum with highly specific 
technical courses at the expense of 
broader educational opportunities for 
our students.
 Of course, engineering practice 
today is dramatically different than it 
was a century ago.  Indeed, it is quite 
different from that of two decades 
ago, when most of our current faculty 
members were educated. This raises an 
important question:  Is the education 
we provide today for technical 
professions such as engineering 
adequately preparing our students for 
a world of practice and citizenship that 
is quite different from the one that we 
have known? 
 Study after study has suggested 
that dramatic change is necessary 
in engineering education.  From 
the National Academies to federal 
agencies such as the National Science 
Foundation to industrial groups 
to accreditation agencies there is a 
growing consensus that engineering 
education today remains trapped 
in a mid-20th Century paradigm4 
(or perhaps even a late 19th Century 
paradigm, if my archeological 
discoveries about similarity between 
early engineering curricula and today’s 
offerings are correct).  We continue 
to provide a form of engineering 
education, which, while familiar from 
our own educational experiences, is 
increasingly irrelevant to the changing 
needs of a profession—not to mention a 
society—that is already far beyond our 
universities.  
 The context for considering the 
nature of undergraduate education in 
general and engineering education in 
particular is provided by the broader 
challenges of change characterizing 
our world and impacting higher 
education. Engineering education will 
not be exempt from these changes, but 
may be swept along at the crest of the 
wave of university change. There is 
little likelihood that the engineering 
curriculum will continue to preserve its 
century-old structure in the century—
indeed, in the decade—ahead.
The Challenges
Today, engineering practice is evolving 
rapidly in response to a rapidly 
changing world.  The shifting nature 
of national priorities from defense 
to economic competitiveness, the 
impact of rapidly evolving information 
technology, the use of new materials 
and biological processes—all have 
had deep impact on engineering 
practice.  The shift of our society from 
guns to butter, from transportation 
to communication, from atoms to 
bits, means that today’s engineering 
students will spend most of their 
careers coping with challenges and 
opportunities vastly different from 
those most currently practicing 
engineers—or currently teaching 
faculty—have experienced. While 
engineers are expected to be well 
grounded in the fundamentals of 
science and mathematics, they are 
increasingly expected to acquire 
skills in communication, teamwork, 
adaptation to change, and social and 
environmental consciousness.  
 It is also clear from this perspective 
that engineering education simply 
has not kept pace with this changing 
environment.  It is only a slight 
exaggeration to say that our students 
are currently being prepared to practice 
engineering in a world that existed 
when we, as their faculty, were trained 
a generation or two ago.  They are not 
being prepared for the 21st Century.
No doubt that part of this challenge is 
due to the intellectual organization of 
the contemporary university in which 
academic programs are partitioned 
into increasingly specialized and 
fragmented disciplines.  Perhaps 
reflecting the startling success of 
science in the 20th Century, most 
disciplines are reductionist in nature, 
focusing teaching and scholarship on 
increasingly narrow and specialized 
topics.  While this produces graduates 
of great technical depth, it is at a certain 
sacrifice of a broader, more integrated 
education.  This is particularly true 
in science-based disciplines such 
as engineering.  The old saying is 
not far off the mark, “A Harvard 
graduate knows absolutely nothing 
about absolutely everything.  An MIT 
graduate knows absolutely everything 
about absolutely nothing!”
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 We must question the value of 
narrow specialization at a time when 
engineering practice and engineering 
systems are becoming large, more 
complex, and involving components 
and processes from widely dispersed 
fields.  Many believe that the most 
important intellectual problems 
of our time will not be addressed 
through disciplinary specialization but 
rather through approaches capable 
of integrating many different areas 
of knowledge—through “big think” 
rather than “small think”.
 Ironically enough, the essence of 
engineering practice is the process 
of integrating knowledge to some 
purpose.  Unlike the specialized 
analysis characterizing scientific 
inquiry, engineers are expected to be 
society’s master integrators, working 
across many different disciplines and 
fields, making the connections that 
will lead to deeper insights and more 
creative solutions, and getting things 
done.  Thus, engineering education 
is under increasing pressure to shift 
away from specialization to a more 
comprehensive curriculum and broader 
educational experience in which topics 
are better connected and integrated. 
 As the knowledge base in most 
engineering fields continues to 
increase at an ever more rapid rate, the 
engineering curriculum has become 
bloated with technical material, 
much of it already obsolete.  Most 
undergraduate engineering programs 
have already become almost five years 
in length for most students.  Even with 
this increasing technical content, most 
engineers will spend many months 
if not years in further workplace 
training before they are ready for 
practice.  Furthermore, the effort to 
include the new technical knowledge 
in many fields, while retaining as well 
much of the old, has squeezed out 
other important curriculum content in 
areas.  For example, at the University 
of Michigan, the humanities and 
social sciences component of the 
undergraduate engineering curriculum 
has dropped to less than twenty credit 
hours, with as low as two credit hours 
of free electives in some engineering 
majors. 
 We simply have to accept the fact 
that it is no longer possible (if it ever 
was) for an engineering student to 
learn all they need to know during 
their undergraduate studies.  Acquiring 
the array of technical knowledge 
and experience is a lifetime goal and 
requires a personal commitment to 
continual learning.  An undergraduate 
engineering education should be 
viewed as only the initial launch for a 
career, designed to place the student in 
a lifetime orbit of learning.
 As the growth of technical 
knowledge accelerates and the 
undergraduate engineering curriculum 
becomes more bloated and strained 
with new technical content, it 
becomes ever more apparent that 
it is simply no longer possible to 
regard the baccalaureate degree as 
sufficient for professional practice.  
Today, engineering is one of the 
very few professions that require 
only an undergraduate degree for 
professional status.  Most other 
knowledge-intensive professions such 
as law, medicine, and even business, 
utilize graduate programs built 
upon a diversity of undergraduate 
majors.  Little wonder that the status 
of engineers lag somewhat behind 
those of other professionals with more 
advanced education.
 The inadequacy of the baccalaureate 
degree for professional practice is 
becoming apparent to employers as 
well.  There is an increasing trend to 
hire graduates at the masters or even 
Ph.D. level for technical work, while 
relying upon baccalaureate engineering 
graduates for supporting services 
such as sales and technical support.  
Although study after study has 
recommended that the masters degree 
become the accepted route into the 
engineering practice, this continues to 
be resisted both by the profession and 
the academy.
 There is little doubt that the current 
sequential approach to engineering 
education, in which the early years are 
dominated by science and mathematics 
courses with engineering content 
deferred to the upper-class years, 
discourages many capable students.  
Students have little opportunity to find 
out what engineering is all about until 
late in their undergraduate studies.  
It is not unusual to find students 
wandering into our counseling and 
placement offices in their senior year, 
still trying to find out what they are 
majoring in and what they can do with 
an engineering degree.  Compounding 
this is the fragmentation of the current 
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curriculum, consisting of highly 
specialized and generally unconnected 
and uncoordinated courses, whose 
relationship to one another and 
to engineering education is rarely 
explained.  Although everyone agrees 
that the undergraduate curriculum 
should focus on the fundamentals, few 
can agree on just what content is truly 
fundamental.  
 While the rigor of the scientific 
and mathematics foundation of 
modern engineering is important, it 
must be augmented by the broader 
contextual and integrative approach 
characterizing engineering practice.  
Students must gain experience not 
only in solitary analysis but also in 
group work and hands-on “design-
build-operate” projects.  We must strive 
to integrate real design and process 
understanding into the educational 
system.  Above all, we must challenge 
our students to think, to create, and to 
understand excellence.
 In today’s world of change, most 
graduates will find themselves 
frequently changing not only jobs, but 
entire careers.  We already find that 
only about fifty percent of engineering 
graduates will enter technical careers, 
and after five years, about half of 
these will have moved into other areas 
such as management or sales.  Most 
engineering graduates of today will 
find themselves in engineering practice 
for only a relatively short period, if at 
all.
 Yet the increasing importance of 
technology to our world has made 
an engineering degree an excellent 
preparation for many other careers and 
professions:  business, law, medicine, 
consulting, and government service, 
to name only a few.  This poses a 
particular challenge to engineering 
educators, since they still focus 
primarily on educating students for the 
engineering profession.  
 Instead, as Roland Schmitt, former 
chair of the National Science Board 
and president of RPI has noted, we 
must enlarge the very concept of the 
engineer to cover a wider range of 
human activities than every before.  
Engineering educators must begin by 
realizing that it is their duty to educate 
the leaders of our society as well as 
to educate the professional engineer.  
We should develop and promote a 
new kind of engineering education 
as a form of “liberal education” for 
the 21st Century.  This will require 
new objectives and new curricula, 
some radically different that those of 
today because of a radically different 
objective:  educating not simply 
professional engineers but a new breed 
of graduates with an engineering-
based, liberal education.
 Engineering faculties are almost 
unique among those of professional 
schools since they generally have little 
experience or activity in professional 
practice.  The strong research focus of 
most engineering schools has led to a 
cadre of strong engineering scientists, 
able at generating new knowledge but 
relatively inexperienced in professional 
practice.  Furthermore, engineering 
faculty are judged and rewarded by 
criteria appropriate to science faculty.  
Indeed, professional practice is not 
only absent in promotion and reward 
criteria, but frequently discouraged.   
 The faculty reward system recognizes 
teaching, research, and service to the 
profession, but it gives little recognition 
for developing a marketable product or 
process or designing an enduring piece 
of the nation’s infrastructure. It would 
be hard to imagine a medical school 
faculty comprised only of biological 
scientists rather than practicing 
physicians or music school faculty 
comprised only of musicologists 
rather than performing artists.  Yet 
such detachment from professional 
practice and experience is the norm in 
engineering education. 
It Is Time to Stop Talking and 
Take Action
Engineering educators, professional 
societies, and federal funding 
agencies such as the National Science 
Foundation have not been insensitive 
to these concerns.  All agree that a 
sea change in engineering education 
would require a concurrent change 
from the predominant engineering 
school academic culture based on 
compartmentalization of knowledge, 
individual specialization, and a 
research-based reward structure to 
one that values integration as well 
as specialization, teamwork as well 
as individual achievement, and 
educational research and innovation 
as well as research in the engineering 
sciences. These studies suggested 
a new set of goals for engineering 
education:
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1. To offer a broad liberal education that 
provides the diversity and breadth 
needed for engineering practice.
2. To prepare graduates for entry into 
careers and further study in both 
the engineering and nonengineering 
marketplace.
3. To develop the motivation, capability, 
and knowledge base for lifelong 
learning.
 This will require a very major change 
in the engineering curriculum.  To some 
degree, it will require modernizing the 
science and mathematics instruction, 
e.g., recognizing that discrete rather 
than continuous mathematics is the 
foundation of the digital age, that 
biology and chemistry are rapidly 
becoming more important than physics, 
that new materials and processes have 
made obsolete much of the traditional 
curriculum.  Beyond these technical 
changes, the NSF studies recognized 
that the new engineering curriculum 
must reflect a broad range of concerns, 
including environmental, political, 
social, international, and legal and 
ethical ramifications of decisions.  
Although the technical component 
would continue to be the core of an 
engineering education, the economic, 
political, social, and environmental 
context of engineering practice needs to 
be explicitly addressed.  
 Beyond that, engineering education 
should move away from the current 
dominance of classroom-based 
pedagogy to more active learning 
approaches that engage problem-
solving skills and team building.  
Joseph Bordogna, Deputy Director of 
the National Science Foundation and a 
former engineering dean recalls the old 
Chinese proverb:
I hear and I forget.
I see and I remember.
I do and I understand. 5
 This is apt indeed for engineering 
education.  As a recent NSF workshop 
put it, the ubiquitous lecture is the 
bane of true learning, especially in 
observation-based, hands-on fields 
such as engineering.  The lecture-
dominated system encourages a 
passive learning environment, a 
highly compartmentalized (lecture-
sized) curriculum, and worst of all, 
instills neither the motivation nor 
the skills for life-long learning.  The 
dependence on the standard lecture 
must be diminished with emphasis 
given instead to discovery-oriented 
learning.  We must create discovery-
oriented learning environments that 
capitalize on the full power of new 
communication, information, and 
visualization technologies.
 Undergraduate engineering 
programs can no longer ignore the fact 
that they simply cannot provide all the 
necessary knowledge for graduates to 
remain competitive throughout their 
careers.  Content-based learning alone 
must not drive engineering education.  
The primary aim should be instead to 
instill a strong knowledge of how to 
learn, while still producing competent 
engineers who are well grounded in 
engineering science and mathematics 
and have an understanding of design 
in the social context.  Engineering 
schools must educate the student 
for a lifetime of learning rather than 
just for their initial job.  Students 
must learn how to learn, and they 
must be able to assess their skills and 
educational needs throughout their 
many careers.  As Peter Drucker puts 
it, “We are redefining what it means 
to be an educated person.   
Traditionally an educated person was 
someone who had a prescribed stock 
of formal knowledge.  Increasingly 
an educated person will be someone 
who has learned how to learn and who 
continues to learn throughout his or 
her lifetime.”
 Despite this broad effort, change 
in engineering education has been 
modest, as reflected in the tone of 
frustration in the recent remarks of 
Bill Wulf, President of the National 
Academy of Engineering:  “We have 
studied engineering reform to death.  
While there are differences among the 
reports, the differences are not great.  
Let’s get on with it!  It is urgent that we 
do!”
 Who is holding back change?  
Professional societies and accreditation 
agencies such as ABET?  No, we have 
seen that they have become important 
forces of change.
 What about industry?  To be sure 
there is still a good deal of myopia 
among the recruiters that visit 
our placement office, all too often 
reinforcing very narrow definitions 
of student majors and abilities.  Yet 
at high levels of management, there 
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is strong awareness of the need for a 
broader form of engineering education.  
In a recent survey of CEOs conducted 
by the Business Higher Education 
Forum, it was found that the qualities 
valued most highly in graduates were 
not specific technical knowledge 
or skills but rather the ability to 
communicate clearly, a commitment to 
lifelong learning, the ability to adapt 
to an increasingly diverse world, and 
finally the willingness not only to adapt 
to change but to actually drive it.
 What about the faculty itself?  To 
be sure, change is sometimes a four-
letter word on university campuses.  
It is sometimes said that universities 
change one grave at a time.  Judging 
from my comparison of the engineering 
curriculum of a century ago, even this 
may be too optimistic for engineering 
education.  In fact, engineering 
educators do tend to be very 
conservative with regard to pedagogy, 
curriculum, and institutional attitudes.  
This conservatism produces a degree of 
stability (perhaps inflexibility is a more 
apt term) that results in a relatively 
slow response to external pressures.  
 For the past several decades, the 
emphasis of engineering education 
has been focused on the scientific 
foundation of engineering knowledge.  
In part this had to do with the impact 
of modern science on technology.  
But it was also due to the culture 
of the research university, in which 
engineering faculty were evaluated 
based on their performance in 
fundamental research rather than 
engineering practice.  Many believe this 
emphasis on research has also eroded 
the quality of teaching in engineering 
schools.  In fact, a recent conference 
of young faculty suggested that most 
engineering schools not only fail to 
support adequately but also outright 
discourage faculty achievements in 
teaching, instructional scholarship, and 
public service.  Tenure and promotion 
criteria do not encourage faculty to 
aspire to broad scholarly achievements, 
especially innovation, nor to 
contributions to public understanding.
Some Ideas for Accelerating Change
In the spirit of stimulating debate and 
thought, let me suggest a few more 
Draconian actions designed both to 
shake up and transform engineering 
education. First, it may be time to 
start with a clean slate by eliminating 
all specialized engineering majors, 
particularly at the undergraduate level. 
The ever more narrow specialization 
among engineering majors is driven 
largely by the reductionist approach 
of scientific analysis rather than 
the highly integrative character of 
engineering synthesis.  It may be 
appropriate for basic research, but 
it is certainly not conducive to the 
education of contemporary engineers 
nor to engineering practice.  Although 
students may be stereotyped by faculty 
and academic programs—and perhaps 
even campus recruiters—as electrical 
engineers, aerospace engineers, etc., 
they rapidly lose this distinction 
in engineering practice.  Today’s 
contemporary engineer must span 
an array of fields, such as modern 
technology, systems, and processes.
 Perhaps it is time to go even further 
and simply abandon the concept of an 
undergraduate engineering major and 
instead provide a general engineering 
curriculum, much as in other 
professions such as medicine, law, and 
business.  Like these professions, one 
could leave specialization until later, 
provided either through graduate 
study or on-the-job training.  
 In fact, one might conjecture that 
in a future characterized by lifelong 
learning, perhaps engineering 
will rapidly evolve along the lines 
of other learned professions and 
shift professional education and 
training entirely to the graduate 
level, eliminating the undergraduate 
engineering degree altogether.  There 
are strong reasons to suspect that 
a broad, liberal education is just as 
important for engineering practice 
as it is for other professions such as 
medicine and law.  (Here one could also 
make the case for significantly greater 
technical and scientific content in the 
contemporary liberal arts curriculum.)
 Although science and engineering 
are heavily based on laboratory 
methods, in fact they are usually 
taught through classroom lectures 
coupled with problem-solving 
exercises.  Contemporary engineering 
education stresses the analytic 
approach to solving well-defined 
problems so familiar from science and 
mathematics—not surprising, since so 
many engineering faculty members 
received their basic training in science 
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rather than engineering. To be sure, 
design projects required for accreditation 
of engineering degree programs are 
introduced into advanced courses at 
the upper-class level.  Yet design and 
synthesis are quite small components in 
most engineering programs.
 Clearly those intellectual activities 
associated with engineering design—
problem formulation, creativity, 
innovation—should be introduced 
throughout the curriculum.  This 
will require a sharp departure from 
classroom pedagogy and solitary 
learning methods.  Beyond team design 
projects, engineering educators might 
consider adopting the case method 
approaches characterizing business 
and law education.  More use might be 
made of internships as a formal part of 
the engineering curriculum, whether in 
industry or perhaps even in the research 
laboratories of engineering faculty 
where engineering design is a common 
task.
 It is absolutely essential to broaden 
the engineering faculty to include 
practitioners.  One approach would be 
to work with industry to persuade and 
allow senior engineering staff to accept 
faculty appointments.  In fact, many 
retired engineers would make ideal 
faculty members, bringing their wealth 
of experience in engineering practice not 
only to the students but to the reshaping 
of the current science-driven culture 
of engineering schools.  Of course, 
this would require a very significant 
restructuring of the faculty promotion 
and reward systems.  It might even lead 
to the elimination of tenure, at least 
in some components of engineering 
education.  But the mix of practitioners 
and scholars has been both accepted 
and constructive in most other 
professional schools—medicine, law, 
business, architecture, and the fine arts.  
It seems high time to bring engineering 
education into line.
 As we noted earlier, engineering 
educators should be challenged to 
devise an engineering-based “liberal 
education” for students of the 21st 
Century.  Engineering principles 
and modes of thought should be 
the centerpiece of what the liberally 
educated person should know in the 
age of knowledge that is our future.  
We should produce graduates for 
all careers—from industry to law 
to government—with an education 
attuned to the issues and challenges of 
a knowledge-driven society, many of 
which have dominant technical themes. 
The old saying that the purpose of a 
college education is not to prepare a 
student for their first job but rather 
their last job still has a ring of truth.
The Future of the 
University of Michigan’s 
College of Engineering
Today the College of Engineering 
enjoys not only a reputation among 
the top engineering programs in the 
nation, but it is probably the strongest 
academic unit in the University of 
Michigan. This success is due to the 
efforts of many, many people–faculty 
and staff, alumni and patrons, and 
academic leaders at both the College 
and University level. Beyond skillful 
leadership and vision, commitment 
and loyalty to the College and the 
University were essential.
 But it is also due, I believe, to a 
concerted effort by the College to 
weave itself into the mainstream of the 
University. We worked hard during 
the 1980s not only to build strong 
relationships with the leadership 
of the University, but to position 
the College as an active participant 
in University-wide priorities (e.g., 
working with LS&A to strengthen the 
sciences, building interdisciplinary 
programs with numerous schools and 
colleges, pulling back from efforts to 
duplicate instruction in areas such as 
mathematics and the humanities). In 
the process, the College of Engineering 
was able to build a political base of 
support across the University that 
enabled the strong support provided 
by the central administration and the 
State of Michigan.
 The lesson of history seems clear. The 
College of Engineering tends to thrive 
when it is at the center of University 
activities. It invariably suffers when 
it attempts to go it alone, to follow 
its own agenda, to decouple from the 
University leadership. One must never 
forget that the College of Engineering 
draws its strength and its reputation 
from the University of Michigan. It is 
a great engineering school because it is 
an integral part of a great university!
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Appendices
Appendix A
List of the College of Engineering 
Buildings
1854: South College
1881: Scientific Blacksmith Shop
1882: Carpenter’s Shop
1885: Brick Engineering Shop
1891: Old Dental School 
1904: West Engineering
1908: Old Hospital structure for 
surveying added on one end
1916: Old Power Plant
1922: East Hall (Old Tappan   
Elementary School) 
1923: East Engineering
1947: East Engineering Addition
1950: Cooley Laboratory, Phoenix  
Laboratory (North Campus)
1952: Fluids Laboratory (now 
 G. G. Brown Laboratory) (North 
Campus)
1954: Automotive Laboratory (North  
Campus)
1964: Institute of Science and 
Technology (North Campus 
– UM)
 North Campus Commons (North 
Campus – UM)
 Chrysler Center for Continuing 
Engineering Education (NC)
1968: Space Physics Research      
Laboratory (North Campus)
1970: Building 1-A (addition to GGBL  
for water resources)
1970: Aerospace Engineering Building  
1981:  Dow Building (North 
Campus)
1981: Accelerator Laboratory (Naval  
Architecture)
1983: DRDA (Industrial Engineering),
     Cooley Laboratory (Nuclear     
Engineering)
     GGBL High Bay Area (Civil      
Engineering)
     GGBL and Auto Lab renovated 
 for  Mechanical Engineering
     Stearns Building (Engineering      
Placement)
1985: Electrical Engineering and    
Computer Science Building
1985: Addition doubling (then tripling)    
Space Physics Research Building
1985: Connector between Dow and  
GGBL
1986: Addition to North Campus       
Commons (Chuck’s Bar & Grill)
1986: IST reassigned to Engineering
1990: FXB Building for Aerospace  
Engineering
1996: Media Union
1996: Lurie Administration Building  
and Lurie Tower
2002: Addition to IST
2003: Carl Gerstacker Laboratory
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Introductory Address to the Faculty, 
March 17, 1981
 Thank you, Dr. Frye. It is certainly a 
privilege—and certainly also, I might add, a 
challenge—to be offered the opportunity to 
serve as dean of the College of Engineering. 
The College has a distinguished history, 
ranking among the leading engineering 
programs in the United States for many 
years. It has played an essential, indeed, a 
vital, role within the University, the state, 
and the nation. And I believe the College 
will play an even more important role 
during the next decade, as the state and 
the nation become ever more dependent on 
engineering to revitalize industry and the 
economy.
 To be sure, the College faces serious 
challenges at the present moment, 
including inadequate funding, decaying 
physical facilities, obsolete equipment, and 
an overloaded faculty. But it also faces a 
time of great opportunity. Never before 
has the demand for engineers, and the 
demand on the part of students to become 
engineers, been more intense. Furthermore, 
I believe that the central administration, 
President Shapiro and Vice-President Frye, 
understand well the present difficulties 
faced by the College and are seriously 
committed to working with us to overcome 
these difficulties. But we must go beyond 
that, to develop our own goals for the long 
term—to determine where we are today, 
where we want to be in five or ten years, 
and what we need to do to get there—and 
the faculty must play an essential role in 
this activity.
 I would suggest that the most important 
of our goals for the long term should be 
a rededication, a commitment, to the 
achievement of excellence, in education, 
scholarship and research, and in the 
professional achievements of faculty and 
students. All too often we have been 
distracted by more immediate goals such 
as the North Campus move or improving 
instructional efficiency than focusing 
on the quality of the College’s research 
and instructional programs. The key to 
quality lies not with physical facilities nor 
clever administration—it is with people, 
their abilities, their attitudes, and their 
commitment.
 I would hope to work with you to 
establish an environment within the 
College that not only allows for excellence, 
creativity, and innovation, but actively 
stimulates and rewards—indeed, 
demands—such efforts. To do this will 
require your cooperation. It will also 
require resources, both from traditional 
sources such as University support, state 
funding, and federal research grants as well 
as new and innovative relationships with 
industry. But I am confident that with the 
proper incentives, such resources can be 
acquired.
 As a dean I will be dedicated and 
committed to the achievement of excellence. 
I would hope that I can exhibit the energy 
and enthusiasm to stimulate and achieve 
this. I assure you that I intend to be a 
full-time dean, receptive and responsive to 
student and faculty needs and concerns and 
totally dedicated to working with you to see 
that these needs are met. It is my intent to 
open up new lines of communication to the 
faculty, to reinvolve you in the governance 
of this College. To this end, I would hope 
to have the opportunity to meet with most 
of you, either as individuals or members 
of your department or research groups 
during the next month, to learn your needs 
and concerns and to seek your advice and 
suggestions. 
 In conclusion, I am very optimistic about 
the future of the College. I look forward 
to working closely with you to meet the 
challenges, the opportunities, and the 
responsibilities that face the College during 
the years ahead.
APPENDIX
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Appendix C
  
The “MIT of the Midwest” Plan (1985)
Stage I: The Restoration Phase
The College sought a base budget 
increase of $8.5 million to restore 
state support of the College to a level 
comparable to that presently received 
by other peer public engineering 
schools (Illinois, Purdue, Texas). 
Additional one-time support of $20 
million was sought to support major 
initiatives in the critical areas of 
complex manufacturing technology, 
advanced electronics and optical 
devices, and advanced materials.
Stage II: The Leadership Phase
A sequence of additional state 
investments were sought to bring 
the support of UM Engineering 
to a level comparable to that of 
leading engineering schools (e.g., 
UC- Berkeley, MIT, Stanford). This 
would require an additional increase 
in base appropriations of $9.5 million 
and one-time equipment support of 
an additional $20 million to restore 
the College’s laboratory equipment 
inventory to competitive levels. In 
addition, two new facilities were 
sought: a $20 million building to 
contain laboratories for rapidly 
changing areas of technology, and 
a $20 million facility to serve as an 
incubation center for bring together 
startup company and satellite corporate 
R&D laboratories with College faculty, 
students, and staff.
Policy Matters
• College control over all contract 
research funding (both direct 
and indirect cost recovery via an 
Engineering Research Institute model).
• Some degree of control over other 
College-generated resources and 
expenditures (e.g., tuition revenue and 
patent and royalty income).
• Modification of University conflict-
of-interest and patent policies.
Other Sources of Support
 The College would use the additional 
state funding to generate an additional 
$70 million per year in revenues from:
• $30 million per year of federal and 
industrial research contracts
• $25 million per year of tuition and 
fee income
• $15 million per year of private gifts
(It should be noted that over the next 
decade, the College achieved most of 
these goals. Phase I was, of course, 
the Research Excellence Fund. The 
policy changes, including control of 
all revenues was achieved through the 
Responsibility Center Management 
program implemented during my 
presidency. Although we did not 
achieve the additional state support in 
Phase II, we did achieve $70 million 
of additional state capital outlay 
for the Media Union and the Lurie 
Engineering Center. Finally, the goals of 
sponsored research volume, tuition and 
fee income, and private support were 
all achieved within a few years.)
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    Finally, as the Regents approached the 
end of their tenure, they quietly moved 
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Chapter 2
1Here I might note my own connection to 
Saarinen’s architecture. When I arrived at 
Yale in 1960, the university had just finished 
construction of two of Saarinen’s boldest 
designs, Stiles and Morse College. These 
massive stone structures, more reminiscent 
of the Neolithic stone monuments scattered 
about England than Yale’s traditional gothic 
architecture, were infamous because they 
avoided 90-degree corners in any of its 
rooms. Later, during a summer job in 1963 
with an architect-engineering firm, I was to 
work on another Saarinen design, Dulles 
International Airport in Washington, yet 
another project somewhat ahead of its time 
with its soaring architecture and mobile 
airport lounges.
2 The Michigan Alumnus, October, 1949, p.93
3 The Michigan Alumnus, December, 1950, 
p.15
Chapter 3
1 In an interview with the Michigan Technic, 
Ragone observed, “The decision to move 
the College was made before I arrived on 
campus in 1953. The decision was already 
made before then, when we built the 
Mortimer Cooley building out there in 
1953-54. We were committed right then. 
The Mechanical Engineering Department 
is split. We’ve now half out there and half 
in here. I think that’s more serious than 
worrying whether you’re going to talk to the 
philosophers. But, having the Mechanical 
Engineering Department split in two, and 
the Civil Engineering Department split, and 
the Water Resources Department split—I 
think that’s more serious intellectually than 
worry about whether you’re going to talk to 
the rest of the campus.” 
Chapter 4
1 The Academic Affairs Advisory Committee 
of the Senate Assembly was sometimes 
known as the “little aaac” to distinguish it 
from the Academic Affairs Advisory Council 
(the big “AAAC”) comprised of the deans. 
Much later this confusion was rectified by 
renaming the AAAC the Provost’s Advisory 
Group or PAG. However to keep things 
simple, I will use AAAC instead of aaac in 
this book.
2 My paths would cross frequently in later 
years with those of Frank Rhodes, with 
whom I worked closely on an array of 
higher education issues as a university 
president and then who succeeded me in 
1994 as chairman of the National Science 
Board.
3 Actually, since the West Engineering 
Building had originally been constructed in 
1904, I suppose it would be more correct to 
classify it as Edwardian in era. Whatever. It 
was still almost a century out of date with 
contemporary engineering needs.
Chapter 5
1 There is an interesting sidebar here: 
Since engineers think quantitatively, we 
developed a rather complex formula to 
allocate budget resources according to 
several key performance indicators such 
as instructional load, Ph.D. enrollments, 
sponsored research activity, and so on. 
We distributed this formula to all of the 
department chairs, along with tables 
showing the allocation to each department, 
in an effort both to stress openness and 
clearly indicate the priorities we used for 
resource allocation. After a couple of years 
of using this formula, one of our department 
chairs, Steve Pollock, cornered me one day 
and said, “Say, do you guys know that if 
you simplify the algebra in the formula, 
all of the terms cancel out?!” Actually, we 
had realized that early on, but since no one 
questioned the algorithm and it seemed 
to be doing the job in sending out the 
right message concerning priorities and 
incentives, we decided to leave it alone.
2 Our development people were horrified 
that I might make GM mad.
Chapter 7
1 There are many stories about our use of the 
Apple Lisa to launch CAEN. We negotiated 
a very special arrangement with Apple, 
with deep discounts and special hardware 
and software support. Several large trucks 
arrived from California two weeks before 
the fall term started with the first delivery, 
and with great effort, we managed to get 
all of the computers operating before the 
students arrived. Although the Apple Lisa 
was never a major commercial success, for 
many years it remained the state-of-the-art. 
Even when it became obsolete it had a use. 
The College presented Chuck Vest with an 
Apple Lisa converted into a planter when he 
left to become president at MIT!
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Chapter 8
1 Interestingly enough, a similar situation 
arose in the late 1960s when two law faculty 
members, Robben Fleming and Allen 
Smith, were president and provost. Fleming 
always delights in telling the story of being 
introduced by the dean to the LS&A faculty, 
who told them not to worry, since although 
Fleming was also a lawyer, like Smith, he 
wasn’t a very good lawyer.
2 At the time, not only was Glenn Knoll 
Interim Dean, but Bill Martin, another 
faculty member from nuclear engineering, 
was associate dean. When rumors about the 
possibility of my returning to the role began 
to circulate, the running joke was “Question: 
How many nuclear engineers does it take to 
Chapter 9
1 Larry Downs and Chunka Mui, Killer App 
(Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 
1998).
2 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Nature of Scientific 
Revolution (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1962)
3 An unfortunate example of the latter 
approach is the massive investment the 
University made in recent years to build 
a new Life Sciences Institute. Although 
this is an important area, and although 
the University investment has been 
massive (largely depleting the reserves 
of the University Hospital), this is not an 
investment in strength. In fact, many other 
institutions with clear advantages (including 
Nobel Prize winning faculty) are investing 
far greater sums, making it highly unlikely 
that the effort will succeed. The University 
would have been far wiser to invest in areas 
of existing strength such as the clinical 
sciences, and then to evolve from these into 
broader areas of the life sciences.
4 Morgan, Robert P., Proctor P. Reid, 
Wm. A. Wulf, “The Changing Nature of 
Engineering”, ASEE Prism, May-June, 1998, 
pp. 13-17.
5 Bordogna, Joseph, Eli Fromm, Edward W. 
Ernst, “Engineering Education:  Innovation 
Through Integration”, Journal of Engineering 
Education, January, 1993, pp. 38.
2 One piece of evidence of just how 
receptive the students were to this plan 
was an editorial in the Michigan Daily that 
concluded: “The University’s engineering 
school has tried something different. It is 
purchasing a new, sophisticated computer 
network, and giving engineering students 
unlimited access to it. The system has its 
price-an extra $100 per term-but it is worth 
it. The school could have forced all students 
to buy their own computers. But this will 
provide a far more sophisticated system. 
And financial aid can cover the tuition hike 
in some cases.”
3 Ironically, the completion of the EECS 
Building and its dedication in September of 
1986, which marked the official completion 
of the North Campus move, occurred just 
after I had moved over to the provost’s 
office on State Street. Chuck Vest was 
the new dean, and he had the honor of 
presiding at the EECS dedication and 
hosting the celebration of the completion 
of the move. Anne and I stood in the 
back of the audience at the dedication (an 
experience that would become even more 
common when we stepped out of the 
presidency ten years later 
lead the College? Answer: Three ...and still 
counting!”
3 Charles Moore was not only the most 
distinguished graduate of the University’s 
School of Architecture, but was important 
to the University in other ways as well. 
When we awarded him an honorary degree 
in 1994, he noted that his great-great 
grandfather had been the Regent of the 





Anderson, Henry 8, 13





Atkins, Daniel 58, 96, 117
Atomic Energy Commission  1
Attwood, Stephen 14, 19
Automobile industry 78
Automotive Laboratory 24
Banks, Peter 16, 118




Brown, George Granger vii, 14, 19
Budget cuts 87
Budget Priorities Committee 46
Buildings of College 143
CAEN (Computer Aided
 Engineering Network) 96






Chairman’s Advisory Committee 57
Chaos  101
College Executive Committee 52
Commencement 105
Commitment from top 80
Computer Kickoff Sale 98
Computer tools 82
Consistency and persistence 80
Conway, Lynn  58, 95, 100, 104
Cooley Laboratory 25
Cooley Memorial Hall 17
Cooley, Mortimer 5, 7, 13
Cosovich, Jon 63
Crawford, Ivan  8, 14
Cultural change 105
Curriculum Committee 43




Dean’s Office (new) 70
Dean’s Office (old) 50
Deaning ix
Deans of UM Engineering 12, 131
Deans Team 57
Decline and fall of College  36
Dennison, Charles 4
Development 77
Director, Stephen 16, 77, 118
Dow Building 68
Dow-GGBL Connector 98
Duderstadt, Anne viii, 33, 111, 115
Early years of College 3
East Engineering 7
East Hall 6




Engineering Building I 88, 99
Engineering departments 8
Engineering education 134
Engineering farewell picnic 111




External Review Committee 59





First century of College 1
First lady 115
Fogler, Scott 58
Forces of darkness 108
Ford Nuclear Reactor 22
Frieze, Henry 17
Frye, Billy 39, 43, 47
Fund-raising 77
Future of UM Engineering 140
FXB Building  99, 119
G. G. Brown Laboratory 26
General Motors Institute 75
GI Bill  20
Good, gray Michigan 1
Greene, Charles 4, 6, 12
Haddad, George 86
Halo (on Michigan Stadium)  128
Hancock, Walton 58
Harden, Elaine 51
Harger, Harold 39, 51
Haven, Erastus 3
High Tech Task Force 73
Higher Education Act 20
Highway Safety Research
 Institute 26
History of College 1





 Institute 73, 121




152 A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE UM COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING
Invisible hand 113
Joint Capital Outlay Committee 89
Kennedy, Richard 63
Knoll, Glenn 44, 118
Kuhn, Thomas 102
Lansing politics 88
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 35
Lessons for the future 129
Lessons learned 80, 132
Lin, Maya 120
Lisa computers 82, 97
Los Alamos 31
LS&A bonds 106
Lurie Bell Tower 120
Lurie Engineering Center 120
Lurie, Robert and Ann 120
Making the case 62
Media Union 122-125
Michigan Research Corporation 105
Michigan Terminal System 96
MIT of Midwest Plan 146
MIT president 118
Molin, Keith 88
Moore, A. D. 10
Moore, Charles,  120
Morrill Act of 1863 6
National Medal of Technology  36
National Science Board  95
NERVA rocket engine 32
Nichols, Ralph 88




 Move 38, 68
North Woods Project 126
Notebooks, Duderstadt viii





Phoenix Laboratory  22
Phoenix Project  21
Pierpont Commons 119
Plan (Strategic Plan) 59
Planning documents 80
Post-War Decades 19






Public higher education  viii
Rackham Executive Board 46
Rackham Graduate School 45
Ragone, David  15, 38
Replacement Hospital Project 27
Research centers 104
Research environment 71
Research Excellence Fund 90
Research incentives 46
Revolution 40
Robotics Institute (see ITI) 73
Rover Program 31
Saarinen, Eero 25
Sadler, Charles 8, 13
Salary programs 64, 67, 86
Scientific blacksmith shop 5
Senate Assembly 47
Shapiro, Harold 47, 62
Significance of College
 To Engineering Education 9
 To Nation 11




Space Physics Research Institute 122
Speed and timing 80
Spivey, Allen 63





Student computer fee 97
Tappan, Henry Philip 3
Teamwork 81
Technology transfer 104
To Do Lists 95
Van Wylen, Gordon 15, 19
Venturi, Robert 128
Vest, Charles 16, 57, 88, 117
VisiCalc 82
West Engineering  7
White, Albert E. 9






Plan (Strategic Plan) 59
Planning documents 80
Post-War Decades 19






Public higher education  viii
Rackham Executive Board 46
Rackham Graduate School 45
Ragone, David  15, 38
Replacement Hospital Project 27
Research centers 104
Research environment 71
Research Excellence Fund 90
Research incentives 46
Revolution 40
Robotics Institute (see ITI) 73
Rover Program 31
Saarinen, Eero 25
Sadler, Charles 8, 13
Salary programs 64, 67, 86
Scientific blacksmith shop 5
Senate Assembly 47
Shapiro, Harold 47, 62
Significance of College
 To Engineering Education 9
 To Nation 11




Space Physics Research Institute 122
Speed and timing 80
Spivey, Allen 63





Student computer fee 97
Tappan, Henry Philip 3
Teamwork 81
Technology transfer 104
To Do Lists 95
Van Wylen, Gordon 15, 19
Venturi, Robert 128
Vest, Charles 16, 57, 88, 117
VisiCalc 82
West Engineering  7
White, Albert E. 9





154 A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE UM COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING
The images that illustrate this story are from :
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Bentley Historical Collections and
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